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LBY~~tE=====--=-=--' Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF/THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS/THIRD-
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
REPLYTOPLAINTIFF/THIRD-PARTYDEFENDANT'SMEMORANDUMINOPPOSITIONTODEFENDANTSI 
THIRD-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1 
AOO ';-
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit requiring Defendants to defend against claims for $220,000 in 
damages, as well as interest and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 as a commercial 
transaction. Now, in opposing an award of costs and fees, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not 
the prevailing party. Additionally, Plaintiff avers that Defendants' costs and attorneys fees are not 
reasonable. This Reply will show, however, that: (1) Defendants are the prevailing party based upon 
the final result of the action; (2) Defendants are entitled to reasonable costs; (3) the accounting of 
the attorneys fees are reasonable and necessary; (4) Plaintiff s pre-trial briefing was appropriate; and 
(5) Plaintiff has presented no admissible evidence, and only argument, in response to the affidavit 
presented to the Court. That is, no affidavit has been filed by an attorney competent to testify that 
the costs and attorney fees presented to the Court are not reasonable. As such, the only admissible 
evidence regarding reasonable costs and fees are contained in the Affidavits of Mr. Wetherell and 
Mr. Pica. 
As the Court is aware, the law firm ofBrassey, Wetherell & Crawford appeared in this matter 
only a few days before trial. The firm's services were needed to take the lead in trial and to provide 
necessary trial support. Mr. Pica is a sole practitioner who handled all of the pre-trial litigation by 
himself. This fact is significant in assessing attorneys fees, given that Plaintiff often had more than 
one attorney attending hearings and in providing pre-trial support. In addition, Plaintiff had a lead 
attorney, an associate attorney, and a paralegal attending the trial proceedings. Thus, this alone shows 
the reasonableness of Defendants' fees in this matter. 
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Under these circumstances, Defendants were able to obtain a complete defense verdict, in 
that Plaintiff did not recover any of the $220,000 sought in its Complaint. Further, Defendants 
prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, in which they asked the jury for 
an award of nominal damages. As a result, Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter. 
Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attomeys Fees. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants are the Prevailing Party in this Matter and Therefore are Entitled 
to Attorneys Fees. 
Plaintiff argues Defendants are not the prevailing party in this matter. Instead, Plaintiff 
contends that the Court should consider the separate claims and weigh attomeys fees accordingly. 
See p.7 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. In doing so, Plaintiff avers that the Court should distinguish 
between Defendants' claims against Knipe Land Company and John Knipe. See p.8 of Plaintiffs 
Memorandum. In connection with these arguments Plaintiff cites the case of Ngyuen v. Bui, 146 
Idaho 87,191 P.3d 1107 (Ct. App. 2008) and Ram co v. H-KContractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,794 
P.2d 1386 (1990). These arguments, however, are without merit as the Court is to consider the final 
result ofthe action in determining attomeys fees. 
Rule 54 provides in significant part: 
Rule 54( d) (1 ). Costs - Items allowed. 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
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prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B)(emphasis added). 
As such, the prevailing party question is examined from an "overall view," not a claim-by-
claim analysis. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009) (citing 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLCv. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 130, 
133 (2005)). 
The case of Nguyen as relied on by Plaintiff supports this proposition.! In that case, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals recognized: 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are 
claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court 
determines who prevailed "in the action." That is, the prevailing 
party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not 
a claim-by-claim analysis. 
See Nguyen, 146 Idaho at 194, 191 P.3d at 1114 (quoting Eighteen M.ile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho 
at 719, 117 P.3d at 133). 
Similarly, in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
Where, as here, there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the 
mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single 
claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on the 
claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates an award of fees 
only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action." 
See Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. 
! Moreover, Plaintiffs reliance on the case of Ramco is misplaced, as the referenced portions deals 
solely with a determination of costs, and not attorneys' fees. SeeRamco, 118 Idaho at 113, 794 P.2d at 1386 
(stating the "claims should be severed and costs analyzed separately for each," but also holding that the 
district court improperly denied attorneys' fees under a separate analysis). 
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As such, the question becomes a determination of which party prevailed in this "action." See 
id. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffbrought this lawsuit seeking $220,000, plus interest, costs and 
fees, and was awarded nothing by the jury. As the Court is aware, Plaintiff s claims and Defendants's 
defenses thereto consti tuted the vast maj ority of this action. Therefore, Defendants are the prevailing 
party. 
Plaintiff s arguments are analogous to the district court's decision in Eighteen Mile, in which 
it focused too much attention on the sued parties less than tremendous success on its counterclaim, 
and seemingly ignored the fact that the party avoided all liability as a defendant. See Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that 
"logic suggests that a verdict in Nord Excavating'S favor and a victory on its counterclaim (albeit 
a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing party." See id. Such is the case in this 
matter, as Defendants obtained a complete defense verdict on Plaintiffs claims, and obtained a 
favorable verdict on its counterclaim. Thus, Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter. 
Further, Plaintiffs proposition to segment and separate Knipe Land Corporation and John 
Knipe is unsupported by the cases provided by Plaintiff. Notably, none of the cases cited by Plaintiff 
involve a situation where the corporation and its owner both were named as parties and were 
significantly involved in the lawsuit. As a result, the Court should follow the well established rule 
and examine the prevailing party question as to attorneys' fees under an overall view, and not a 
claim-by-claim analysis. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125. 
Plaintiff also contends that the claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act should be 
separated from the other claims for purposes of awarding attorneys fees. See p.15-16 of Plaintiff s 
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Memorandum. Nevertheless, based upon the foregoing case authorities, this matter must be 
considered as a whole, and a determination must be made as to "this action." Therefore, Defendants 
prevailed in this matter when considering the claims in their entirety. 
As the Court is well aware, the vast majority of all briefing, discovery, and trial proceedings 
relating to the employment contracts and Plaintiffs claim thereto. As such, the fact that Defendants 
successfully defended against these claims, and Plaintiff received nothing, shows Defendants are the 
prevailing party. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 914,204 P.3d at 1125. Moreover, Defendants prevailed 
on their own claim for nominal damages under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, 
Defendants are the prevailing parties, even if they did not recover fully on their Third-Party 
Complaint. See id. 
Plaintiffs final argument is that settlement offers cannot be considered in deciding whether 
a party prevailed in the matter. See p.16-17 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. In making this argument, 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish between settlement demands and the relief initially sought by the 
parties. This distinction, however, makes little difference in this case as Plaintiff sought $220,000 
in its original Complaint and recovered nothing in this matter. Moreover, the express wording of the 
rule states that the Court shall "consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties." See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
Furthermore, the Court in Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000), recognized 
that "the parties' offers of settlement should have been a factor in determining which party 
prevailed." [d. at 3l3, 17 P.3d at 257. This holding was reaffirmed in the recent case of Zenner v. 
Holcomb, 210 P.3d 552,557 (2009) (citing Polk)("This Court has held that offers of settlement, 
including offers of judgment, should be considered in detenniningthe final judgment or result ofthe 
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action in relation to the relief sought."). Thus, settlement offers are a factor to be considered by the 
Court. See id. 
In this case Defendants offered Plaintiff $92,500 to settle the matter months before trial. 
Defendants did so to avoid the stress of a trial on the 72-year old retired Defendants who faced a 
claim against them for $220,000 plus costs, Plaintiff's attorney fees estimated at $150,000, and 
defense costs and attorney fees estimated at $125,000. Plaintiff would take nothing less than 
$200,000 to settle and therefore forced the case to trial. Literally, these retired Defendants faced a 
potential liability of $500,000. In looking at the prevailing party issue and the punitive damage 
issue, the Court should consider this conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiffs sought far more in this matter than Defendants, and recovered nothing. As a result, 
Defendants are the prevailing party. 
B. Defendants are Entitled to Costs. 
Plaintiff next argues that Defendants have overstated their costs. Specifically, Plaintiff 
argues that Defendants are only entitled to costs in the preparation of exhibits that are admitted in 
evidence at trial. See p.9 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. Plaintiff's argument, however, fails to 
recognize that twelve sets of many of these exhibits were presented and published to the jury. 
Additionally, Defendants utilized many ofthe exhibits proffered by Plaintiff in an effort to improve 
efficiency, and to reduce confusion and multiplication of documents for the jury. Therefore, 
Defendants should not be penalized for seeking to increase efficiency by sharing exhibits at trial. 
Thus, Defendants are entitled to these costs as a matter of right. 
Discretionary costs also should be granted as this matter involved unique issues of first 
impression in Idaho, and will protect consumers from future deceptive practices. Further, Defendants 
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were required to defend this action despite the fact that it never should have been brought in the first 
place. Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' costs. 
C. Defendants' Attorneys Fees are Reasonable and Necessary, and Should be 
Awarded by the Court. 
Plaintiff contends the attorneys fees should be reduced based upon the billing entries, and 
their alleged duplication in this matter. As set forth below, however, the billing entries are sufficient 
and reasonable. 
In assessing attorneys fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set forth in 
Rule 54( e )(3) and may consider any other factor it deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 
Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3d 258,261-62 (2008). The bottom line for an award of attorneys fees is 
reasonableness. Id. at 750, 185 P.3d at 262 (citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas 
Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475 (2004)). Moreover, the number of attorneys necessary 
to handle a case depends upon whether the trial court concludes that the attorneys were reasonably 
required. Id. at 751, 185 P.3d at 264. 
Plaintiff first argues that the summary of fees and costs provided by Defendants contained 
several block-build entries. Further, Plaintiff quibbles over two entries. Nevertheless, a review of 
the professional services provided as well as the Affidavits of Counsel show that the time entries 
adequately set forth the person performing the services, the date the service was rendered, an 
adequate description of the services rendered, and an itemization of amount of time needed to 
provide that service. No affidavit is presented to contest the verified evidence presented to the 
Court. 
Plaintiff complains that Mr. Richardson spent only 1.8 hours oflegal services at trial and two 
hours oftravel time on June 24,2009, with respect to his entry of3.8 hours. Notably, this entry was 
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done based upon Defendants' sensitivity and keen awareness of fees in this matter. As a result, it 
was a tactical decision to allow Mr. Richardson to attend only parts of trial in this matter. This is 
significant given the fact that Plaintiff had a lead attorney, an associate attorney, and a paralegal 
attending trial throughout the entire proceedings. Therefore, any complaint that Mr. Richardson spent 
approximately only 1.8 hours at a particular day of trial lacks merit. 
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Wetherell billed for additional time in comparison 
to the time ofMr. Derek Pica for the last day oftrial on June 25,2009. Nevertheless, this argument 
fails to take into consideration the amount of preparation before and at trial on that day by Mr. 
Wetherell as the lead attorney in this matter. As a result, this entry is appropriate. As the Court is 
well aware, Mr. Wetherell and Mr. Richardson came into this case with little time before trial in 
order to prepare. Reviewing the entries as a whole shows that their law firm was efficient and 
knowledgeable in preparing and obtaining a favorable jury verdict in this matter. 
Plaintiffs also argues that Mr. Richardson billed for the third day of trial on this matter. 
Nevertheless, as the Court may be aware, although Mr. Richardson attended much of the trial on 
June 25,2009, the firm made the decision not to bill for his travel time or trial attendance, despite 
the fact that he continued to provide services during that time. Thus, there should be no complaint 
that Defendants chose to be sensitive to their time expenditures and billings. 
Plaintiff also contends that the hourly rates for Defendants' paralegal in this matter is 
excessive. In making this argument, however, Plaintiff fails to recognize that hourly rates typically 
are increased for trial preparation and trial attendance. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
recognized a district court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in the Boise area for 
attorneys ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00. See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 777,203 
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P.3d 702, 707 (2009). Thus, the fact that the paralegal's rate was only somewhat less than the rate 
charged by Mr. Pica does not fairly take into account the fact that Mr. Pica's rates increased for his 
trial preparation and trial work. Therefore, the rates of Defendants' paralegal are reasonable. 
As a result, a consideration of the individual entries and the outcome obtained in this matter 
shows that the billing summaries for Defendants are entirely appropriate in this matter and should 
not be reduced. 
D. The Pre-Trial Motions and Activities Show that the Attorneys Fees Are 
Reasonable. 
Plaintiff's final argument is that Defendants should not have filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment or a Motion to Reconsider and/or a Motion for Clarification. Plaintiff also 
contends that this briefing did not contain any new law or evidence, and therefore was unnecessary. 
A review of that briefing, however, shows that these arguments were not only made in good faith, 
but presented issues with a significant chance for prevailing. 
Moreover, there is no requirement that a party must submit new evidence in order to raise 
a motion for reconsideration or clarification. See Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P .3d 
100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that although Rule I1(a) permits a party to present new 
evidence, it does not require new evidence). 
Thus, the time expenditures for the pre-trial motions are reasonable in this matter and notably 
only contain the work of a single attorney, in comparison to two attorneys which regularly attended 
hearings for Plaintiffs during the pre-trial phase in tllls matter. Moreover, the Court will note that 
Plaintiff did not prevail on its own motion to amend the complaint to add punitive damages, or on 
its motion in limine. Accordingly, the pretrial motions were reasonable and do not change the fact 
that Defendants prevailed in this matter. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF/THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTSI 
THIRD-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 10 
JtJl{ 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant to Defendants the requested attomeys fees 
and costs in this matter. 
DATED this $ay of August, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL 
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Page 562 
these are IDJI instructions that gives us the 
platform to move forward. 
THE COURT: Mr. Geston, we will make your 
proposed 13, just by serendipity we will make that 
13-A in our packet given to the jury. 
MR. GESTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't you make 
yourselves comfortable. I don't know where those 
folks are, and let me make sure they're ready to join 
us. 
MR. GESTON: Your Honor-
MR. WETHERELL: Can I -
MR. GESTON: - could we move for a directed 
verdict? 
THE COURT: Oh, you wanted to amend your 
pleadings too? 
MR. WETHERELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
MR. WETHERELL: Yes, Your Honor, I forgot, we 
would move the court now to amend the pleadings to 
conform with the proof, on behalf of my client. 
MR. GESTON: In what particular? 
MR. WETHERELL: Well, I - actually, I mean,.1 
think that there is - I think you could allege a 
fraud in this case, quite frankly. I think that a 
Page 563 
fraud case has been tried. 
MR. GESTON: In that case I object. 
MR. WETHERELL: Just for the record, I think a 
fraud case has been tried. 
I believe that when they asked my client 
to sign the February 20 extension of the employment 
contract and at the same time withholding the 
information what they planned - how they planned to 
interpret that contract against him, I think they 
fraudulently induced him into signing that 
agreement. And I think that the facts are clear that 
that is what they - exactly what they did in this 
case was conceal a material fact from my client to 
induce him to sign that contract. And I think they 
did this throughout there dealings with him as a 
course of fraudulent indUcement, because of the way 
they were holding in their pocket what they planned 
to do with these contracts. 
THE COURT: All right, sir. 
Mr. Geston. 
MR. GESTON: I object, Your Honor. I mean, 
this is the first inkling we ever heard of such a 
thing, and it counsel's justification for trying to 
make it part of the pleadings is for actions that 
have nothing to do with the rights of the parties as 
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they were originated and then finally set. 
THE COURT: Right. I think I'll sustain the 
objection. Case has been tried within the framework 
of the pleadings and I don't think we should open 
additional avenues at this juncture, so 1'/1 sustain 
it. 
And now, Mr. Geston, did you have 
something else you want to take up? 
MR. GESTON: Yes, sir. The plaintiff would 
move under Rule 50 for directed verdict. Your Honor, 
we covered a lot of what I was going to say in our 
observations on the contracts, but just to impose on 
the court's patience and counsel's, to recap where we 
are after hearing what turned out to be actually a 
pretty straight-forward trial and a limited number of 
facts, which are all largely in agreement. What 
we're starting out with is what the court determined 
months ago. There are two valid and legally 
sufficient contracts. All right. So all the talk 
about what's in the them under the license law and 
all that, which the court on the second visit to that 
issue found don't apply. So that's fine. We're 
starting out with two contracts and we've got some 
very simple language in them. 
Now, I know the court's going to give the 
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jury instructions on looking for ambiguities and what 
to do with them if they find them, but I don't think 
that's the jury's job. We're kind of straddling the 
fence here by saying if it's clear then you apply it, 
but if there is ambiguities, well, then you sort 
things out. But the court, I don't think should be 
saying, "if" to the jury. The court ought to say 
it's either ambiguous or it's not, and I don't see 
how, when we were talking about the dictionaries, 
"forfeit" has common meaning. The court said so 
itself. There is nothing unusual, there is nothing 
deep or difficult about monies paid on deposit, which 
Mr. Robertson agreed with me, and forfeiture, and he 
agreed with me there too. So beyond that, what do we 
have? 
All right. We have monies that were for 
paid on account and that were forfeited. What is the 
defense to that? Waiver. 
And I went over that with the comments on 
the instructions. Waiver requires evidence of 
reasonable reliance on a clear act that works to the 
detriment of the person trying to assert. 
If the payment of bills with money I took 
that I don't deserve is a detriment, how can it be a 
detriment when I am relieved of a debt by doing 
Page 562 to Page 565 
,---_ ... -------
1 
2 
3 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
ss. 
4 I, DENECE GRAHAM, certified Shorthand Reporter 
5 and Notary Public duly qualified in and for the State 
6 of Idaho do hereby certify: 
7 That said hearing was taken down by me in 
8 shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
9 thereafter reduced to computer type, and that the 
10 foregoing transcript contains a true and correct 
11 record of the said hearing, all done to the best of 
12 my ability. 
13 I further certify that I have no interest in 
14 the event of this action. 
15 WITNESS my hand this 24th day of July, 2009. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
#324 
651 
EXHIBITB 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF AND THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTSITHIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Idaho Corporation, 
an ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RECEIVED 
JUL Z 72009 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, 
et al" 
Defendants. 
==~===-~-=========-----) RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, ) 
et al., ) 
) 
Third-party Plaintiffs,) 
JOHN KNIPE, 
individual, 
vs. 
an 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Third-party Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2008-682 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL 
(EXPEDITED) 
PRESIDING JUDGE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
DATE PAGE 
JUNE 23, 2009 6 
JUNE 24, 2009 141 
JUNE 25, 2009 413 
1 
BSA KNIPE v RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, CV-2008-682 XMAX(74/40) 
Page 298 Page 300 
(1) right about this time, wasn't there, and that is your (1) A. I have. 
(2) listing agreement was up, wasn't it? Your contract (2) Q. Okay. Could you tell the jury what that 
(3) with my client was up; right? (3) is. 
(4) A. It would have been up I think the 28th of (4) A. This is addressed to Richard and Johnnie 
(5) February. (5) just saying that they haven't produced, and anyway, 
(6) Q. When was it? (6) it would be asking for half of the money -
(7) A. Would have been the 28th of February, I (7) Q. Okay. 
(8) believe. (8) A. - the forfeited money. 
(9) Q. And you wanted Richard to sign a new (9) Q. Okay. So from September '05 to Richard's 
(10) listing agreement with you, didn't you? (10) email of - everybody has it but me - what's the 
(11) A. Richard wanted me to continue to market. (11) date on Richard's email to you? 
(12) He said he had a French company coming in and he (12) A. This is the 20th of -
(13) asked me to go ahead and we would relist. (13) Q. January? 
(14) Q. All right. So now that let's just make (14) A. Oh, no. This is February 11. 
(15) sure we,have this set up. (15) Q. February 11. This whole time Richard is 
(16) The course of dealing over all this time (16) retaining - Richard retains all nonrefundable 
(17) is that Richard keeps the nonrefundable earnest (17) earnest money; right? 
(18) money, the check goes directly to him, correct, from (18) A. He retained all of the nonrefundable 
(19) September of '05 through February 28 of '08; right? (19) earnest money. 
(20) A. I think- (20) Q. And he tells you how happy he is that he 
(21) Q. Is that correct? (21) is able to payoff all these debts. I mean, one of 
(22) A. I think so. (22) the - it was debt; right? 
(23) Q. All right. And then the transaction (23) A. He had a - I don't know if he was in 
(24) doesn't close, so Richard for the - this is the (24) debt. He just said he had paid the debt on the farm 
(25) first time this ever comes up - Richard sends you an (25) and bought new pickups and new R.V.'s. 
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(1) email and says, I would like that 22-5 back because (1)Q. Okay. Now, okay, but-
(2) the deal didn't close, it's your commission; right? (2) A. - four-wheelers. 
(3) A. He sent an email saying, I thought since (3) Q. - he did tell you how happy he was to 
(4) I didn't sell it, it would come back to us. He did (4) spend - that he got that money? 
(5) not say, I want it back. He did not make a demand (5) A. He said it was pretty nice. He didn't 
(6) letter. It was a question. (6) have tosell-
(7) Q. Says whatever says. You got that (7) Q. Okay. 
(8) email- (8) A. - the property and he had money. 
(9) A. Yes. (9) Q. So the first thing that happens is he 
(10) Q. - though; right? (10) sends that email on February 11. Now, what is 
(11) And then you testified under oath that (11) happening right at this time? The listing agreement 
(12) all did you was hand that over to Mr. Knipe; correct? (12) is it up on February 28; right? 
(13) A. I gave it to Mr. Knipe, yes. (13) No listing agreement; correct? 
(14) Q. Okay. And you had no other involvement (14) A. On the 28th it would have expired, yes. 
(15) with that; correct? (15) Q. Okay. And so you want a new listing 
(16) A. Other than - other than telling him what (16) agreement with Richard. 
(17) it was that day that I was doing. (17) A. Richard wants me to continue to market 
(18) Q. Okay. Right at this time you're listing (18) his property. 
(19) agreement is over with; correct? (19) Q. You and Richard want to enter into a new 
(20) A. The date on this is February 11. The (20) contract; right? 
(21) listing was not over with till I believe the 28th. (21) A. Richard has asked me, said he had some 
(22) Q. Okay. So in any event, Mr. Knipe (22) properties coming. We offered to extend and continue 
(23) responds to Richard and Johnnie, and I'm going to (23) to market the property. Listings are expensive to 
(24) hand you what's been marked as Exhibit RR. (24) have. 
(25) Have you seen that document before? (25) Q. Mr. Knipe responded to Richard's request 
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(1) for the 22-5 by letter that you have in front of you; (1) letter of Mr. Knipe's response to that? I didn't? 
(2) correct? (2) RR, would you look at RR, please. And 
(3) A. Yes. (3) that's been admitted. 
(4) Q. What is that exhibit number? (4) A. Yes. 
(5) A. It says RR. (5) Q. And so you look at QO. You have that? 
(6) Q. Thars not a number, is it? (6) A. Yes. 
(7) MR. WETHERELL: I'd ask for admission of RR, (7) Q. Now, 00 is referring to RR, isn't it? 
(8) judge, if it hasn't already been. (8) A. Yes. 
(9) (Defendants' Exhibit RR moved for (9) Q. And what does RR say? RR is saying, we 
(10) admission.) (10) want half the earnest money - we want half of all of 
(11) MR. GESTON: No objection. (11) this money; right? 
(12) THE COURT: RR will be admitted. (12) A. RR? 
(13) (Exhibit RR admitted into evidence.) (13) Q. Yes. 
(14) BY MR. WETHERELL: (14) A. Yes. 
(15) Q. Do you 'really recall going to Richard's (15) Q. Okay. 
(16) home to'get him to sign a new service contract with (16) A. That is-
(17) you? (17) MR. WETHERELL: I'd ask for - this is your 
(18) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I'll object to this (18) email. 
(19) line of questioning. /t's irrelevant to the (19) I'd ask for admission of OQ, judge. 
(20) controversy. The rights of the parties have already (20) (Defendants' Exhibit 00 moved for 
(21) been set by this time. (21) admission.) 
(22) THE COURT: It is outside. Is there some (22) MR. GESTON: Renew the objection, Your Honor. 
(23) relevance to it? (23) We're gOing forward here far beyond the controversy 
(24) MR. WETHERELL: Oh, it - it's - yes, Your (24) of between the parties (indecipherable.) 
(25) Honor. I just - these are my last questions. I (25) THE COURT: Let me see 00. 
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(1) just want to know what happened - (1) MR. WETHERELL: Do you have that before you? 
(2) THE COURT: All right. (2) Oh. 
(3) MR. WETHERELL: - on a certain day. (3) THE COURT: I'll permit it. 00 will be 
(4) THE COURT: Overruled. (4) admitted. 
(5) MR. WETHERELL: Okay? (5) (Exhibit 00 admitted into evidence.) 
(6) THE COURT: Sure. Overruled. (6) MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury, 
(7) Go ahead. (7) Your Honor? 
(8) BY MR. WETHERELl: (8) THE COURT: You may. 
(9) Q. You have the request from Richard for the (9) MR. WETHERELL: Did I publish RR, the Knipe 
(10) 22-5, you handed it over to the broker and you said (10) letter, to the jury? 
(11) you had no other dealings with it, the listing (11) THE COURT: No. 
(12) agreement is up, and then you send this email. (12) MR. WETHERELL: Can I publish RR to the jury, 
(13) Do you see that? What exhibit number is (13) Your Honor? 
(14) that? (14) THE COURT: You may. 
(15) A. It's 00. (15) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(16) Q. Okay. And is this an email from you to (16) Q. All right. let's get this set up. 
(17) John Knipe? (17) You need to get a new listing agreement 
(18) A. Yes. This is after the termination of (18) signed by Richard; correct? 
(19) the - of American. (19) A. He wanted me to sign a new one, yes. 
(20) Q. And you have Mr. Knipe's letter? (20) Q. Okay. And you said you had nothing to do 
(21) A. Yes, I do. (21) with that Knipe letter other than you sent him the 
(22) Q. What exhibit was that? (22) $22,000 request; right? 
(23) A. His email is PP, and that's the 22,000 (23) A. Yes, that's what I said at the time. 
(24) and wanting me to market for the French company. (24) Q. Okay. So you're on your way to get a new 
(25) Q. Okay. But didn't I just ask give you a (25) listing agreement, and you send an email to John in 
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(1) he did back out of it? (1) Q. And what is that? 
(2) A. I heard Rowena say that, yes. (2) A. It looks like a note I wrote to Richard 
(3) Q. Do you recall her saying that? (3) and Johnnie telling them that First American says 
(4) MR. GESTON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. (4) they have the earnest money, they're going to prepare 
(5) Back out of what deal, counsel? (5) a document for everyone to sign confirming it's okay 
(6) BY MR. WETHERELL: (6) to release the money, it's nonrefundable money. 
(7) Q. Backed out of this listing of February (7) "Will fax or email to you their document upon 
(8) 20, 'OB, that he could back out at any time and he (8) receipt. Thank you, John." 
(9) did. Do you remember her telling the jury that? (9) Q. So now this is an email that you sent to 
(10) A. I remember her telling us that, yes. (10) Richard. Was this on the very first $150,000 that 
(11) Q. Okay. (11) was released from the MidAmerican deal? 
(12) A. I'm not saying that I agree with it, (12) A. I don't see that it says, but I assume it 
(13) but- (13) is. 
(14) Q. Well; you don't agree with it because (14) MR. WETHERELL: Okay. I'd ask for the 
(lS) you're sUing him for it? (lS) admission of Exhibit KK. 
(16) A. I'm not saying I agree with it or I don't (16) (Defendant's Exhibit KK moved for 
(17) agree with it. (17) admission.) 
(18) Q. Okay. (18) MR. GESTON: No objection. 
(19) A. I'm just saying, yes, I heard her say (19) THE COURT: KK will be admitted. 
(20) that. (20) (Exhibit KK admitted into evidence.) 
(21) Q. But the next day after he signed the (21) MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury, 
(22) contract he actually got a copy of your letter; (22) Your Honor? 
(23) correct? (23) THE COURT: You may. 
(24) A. In the U.S. mail? (24) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(2S) Q. Yes? (2S) Q. All right. This is the very first 
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(1) A. Okay. (1) $150,000, and you are telling Richard what's going to 
(2) Q. Okay? Rowena said he could get out of (2) happen to this money, it's hard to read, but number 
(3) this contract, but you're suing him because he didn't (3) one - correct me if I'm wrong - one, you say 
(4) go through with that last listing, aren't you? (4) following up on our conversation a few minutes ago, 
(5) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, excuse me again. If (S) you say, one, have call in to title company to 
(6) we're referring to by this contract to this (6) confirm they have received money into escrow. 
(7) relisting, that's not part of our controversy. (7) Waiting for them to confirm. They were all in some 
(a) That's not what we're talking about. (8) company meeting and expect a call back in few 
(9) THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained. (9) minutes. Two, wilt instruct the company - the title 
(10) BY MR. WETHERELL: (10) company to cut you a check as follOWS: A, half to 
(11) Q. I don't know if - I mean, we have a (11) Robertson Kennel, Inc.; B. half to Richard and 
(12) Consumer Protection Act claim, so do I - would the (12) Johnnie Robertson personal property; C, will ask them 
(13) court like me to wait to put on that evidence or - (13) to deduct 5 percent commission on money depOSited. 
(14) THE COURT: I would. (14) Our listing says we are to be paid 5 percent on any 
(15) MR. WETHERELL: Okay. (lS) noriforfeited nonrefundable money you receive at the 
(16) BY MR. WETHERELL: (16) time that it is paid to you. That money is to be 
(17) Q. Mr. Knipe, I'm handing you what's been (17) credited back at clOSing. 
(18) marked as Exhibit KK. DO you see that? (18) Do you see that? 
(19) A. Could you repeat the question? (19) A. Yes. 
(20) Q. Do you recognize Exhibit KK? (20) Q. Okay. So this was - what did you 
(21) A. Can I have a second to read through it? (21) consider to be - you're saying that this is 
(22) It's hard to read. (22) nonrefundable earnest money and they get 95 percent 
(23) Q. Please go ahead. It is very hard to (23) of it; right? 
(24) read. (24) A. Well, I - I think at the very beginning 
(25) A. Yes,l do. (25) I'm saying that the title company is preparing escrow 
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Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson, 
husband and wife; and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an Idaho Corporation and Answers 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please state the name, address, and telephone 
number of each and every person known to you or your attorneys who has any 
knowledge of, or who purports to have any knowledge of any of the facts of this case, 
and please further describe in as much factual detail as you are able the evidence or 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Page 1 
infonnation which each such person or party is believed by you to possess. By this 
Interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks names, addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals 
who have knowledge or who purport to have knowledge of the facts of this case which 
pertain to issues of damages as well as liability as well as the substance of such 
knowledge as each of them may possess insofar as you are aware. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1: 
Richard A. Robertson 
Johnnie L. Robertson 
Richie Robertson 
John Knipe 
Rowena Strain 
Robert Hannon 
Sheila Hannon 
Mark Norem 
Cindy Crane - Pacific Corp. 
Bill Fehnnans - President, Mid-American 
Employees of First American Title Company of Idaho, 7311 Potomac Drive, 
Boise, Idaho 83704; (208) 375-0700 
Plaintiff is fully aware of the address and telephone numbers of the above 
persons. Plaintiff is also fully aware of the knowledge each person has with regard to this 
litigation. 
Defendant's response to this Interrogatory will be supplemented as additional 
witnesses are identified. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify each and every person you expect 
to call as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, and for each person state: 
(a) . The qualifications upon which you intend to rely to establish the person as 
an expert witness; 
(b) A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, and the basis and 
reasons therefore; 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Page 2 
(c) Each and every fact, document, date, or other infonnation relied upon or 
provided to each expert witness in fonning and rendering his or her 
opinions or inferences, in accordance with Idaho Rule of Evidence 705 
, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26; 
(d) Any exhibits or documents to be used as a summary of or support for such 
opinions; and 
(e) A listing of all other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at 
trial or in deposition in the last five years, including the case caption, 
number, venue, and attorneys of record, as well as a general description of 
the subject of each lawsuit. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.2: No experts have been identified. 
This response will be supplemented if an expert is retained. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please separately identify and describe all real 
property owned by you and each of you in Payette County and/or Washington County, 
Idaho, at any time after January 1, 2005, which real property was the subject of either the 
2005 Employment Contract or the 2007 Employment Contract, and all real property 
owned by you or each of you in Payette County and/or Washington County that was not 
subject to either such Employment Contract. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.3: Defendants cannot answer this 
Interrogatory as to the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract as 
they failed to contain a legal description that was agreed upon by Plaintiff and 
Defendants. The real property owned by Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
1. Robertson in Payette County is legally described in the two (2) Agreements to Sell and 
Purchase they entered into with Mid-American dated October 21, 2007 which Plaintiff 
has in its files', The real property owned by Defendant, Robertson Kennels, Inc. in the 
counties of Payette and Washington is legally described in the Agreement to Sell and 
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Purchase that Robertson Kennels, Inc. entered into with Mid-American dated October 21, 
2007 which Plaintiff has in its files. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify the amount and time of deposit or 
payment of all monies received by you from potential purchasers named Harmon, or all 
or a portion of the real property owned by you in Payette County and/or Washington 
County, Idaho. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.4: Defendants are unsure of the total 
amount of money deposited by Harmons in a realtor's trust account in regard to their 
potential purchase of real property owned by Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson. Defendants are also unsure of the date the funds were deposited as 
they were also deposited in a realtor's trust account. Defendants, Richard A. Robertson 
and Johnnie L. Robertson did receive $35,000.00 from a realtor's trust account relating to 
the Harmons .. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please describe in as much factual detail as you 
are able, each and every act, statement, communication, or other circumstance which you 
contend indicted or otherwise lead you to believe that Plaintiff had no interest in or claim 
to any of the monies deposited or paid by Harmon and described by you in your response 
to the preceding Interrogatory under the terms of the 2005 Employment Contract, or that 
Plaintiff had renounced, released, or otherwise waived any such right or claim as it may 
have had thereto. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.5: OBJECT as this Interrogatory is 
overbroad and vague as to the information it is seeking. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Page 4 
~oa3 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please state whether you contend that the terms of 
the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, 
had not been extended until at least February 28, 2008. If you contend that the term of 
either of such Employment contract had not been extended from the date of their 
respective executions until February 28, 2008, it is requested that you describe all 
contractual provisions, agreements, notices oftermination, statements, documents, or 
other circumstances of any sort which, to the extent, embody, refer to, or reflect the 
expiration or termination of the term of either or both such Employment Contracts prior 
to February 28,2008. If your response hereto is that the effective terms of either or both 
of the Employment Contracts had not been extended to at least February 28, 2008, it is 
further requested that you further state the date or dates upon which you contend each 
such Employment Contracts was terminated or expired and that you fully set forth the 
factual and legal bases for such contention. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.6: The 2005 Employment Contract 
attached as EXhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Complaint expired by its terms on September 1, 
2006. Further, the 2005 Employment Contract is very specific that the renewal clause on 
the 2005 Employment contract must be signed for it to be extended. Neither party signed 
the renewal clause. 
The 2007 Employment Contract attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs Complaint 
expired by its terms on June 1,2007. Further, the 2007 Employment Contract is very 
specific that the renewal clause on the 2007 contract must be signed for it to be extended. 
Neither party signed the renewal clause. 
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In reality, neither contract ever became effective as they were not complete as 
required by Idaho Code § 54-2050. 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please disclose the amount(s) and time(s) any 
potential purchaser ofreal property owned by Defendants, or any of them, in Payette 
County and/or Washington County, Idaho paid or deposited any money with respect to 
such intended purchase. Your response hereto need only disclose all such payments 
deposited or made on or after January 1,2007. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.7: Knipe Land Company has these 
records in their possession as to the amounts and times of any deposits made by any 
potential third party purchaser as is required by Idaho Code § 54-2045. Any such deposit 
would have been made into a trust account controlled by Plaintiff and its broker, John 
Knipe. Defendants have never directly received any deposits by a potential third party 
purchaser. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please state whether any of the payments 
described by you in your response to the preceding Interrogatory were paid or deposited 
by potential purchasers of real property owned by you in Payette County and/or 
Washington County that was not the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 
2007 Employment Contract. If your response hereto is in the affirmative, please further 
describe such real property as was owned by you but which was not subject to the said 
Employment Contracts. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: There was no agreement as to 
what real property was the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract attached to 
Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit "A" or the 2007 Employment Contract attached as 
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Exhibit "B" as neither contract contained a legal description of any real property that was 
to be the subject of the respective contracts. Since no legal descriptions were contained 
in the respective Employment Contracts, all real property owned by each respective 
Defendant in the counties of Payette and Washington was not the subject of the 
Employment Contracts. The legal descriptions for all real property owned by each 
Defendant in the counties of Payette and Washington are contained in the respective valid 
Sale and Purchase Agreements entered into with Mid-America, which Plaintiff has 
personal records of and is acutely aware. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please describe in as much factual detail as you 
are able, each and every act, statement, communication, or other circumstance which you 
contend indicted or otherwise lead you to believe that Plaintiff had no interest in or claim 
to any of the monies deposited or paid at any time after January 1,2007, by potential 
purchasers of real property owned by Defendants in Payette County, and/or Washington 
County, Idaho or that Plaintiffhad renounced, released, or otherwise waived any such 
right or claim as it may have had thereto. Your response to this Interrogatory should 
further describe any documents which embody, refer to, or reflect such admission or 
waiver. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. 
INTERROGATORY NO. to: Please describe all circumstances, acts or 
omissions of Plaintiff which you contend prevent or deprive Plaintiff of any interest in or 
right to recover monies paid by Potential purchasers of the real property that is the 
subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either 
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of them, or which otherwise reduces or diminishes Plaintiff's entitlement thereto, 
including without limitation, any acts or omissions which you contend constituted a 
breach by Plaintiff ofthe 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment 
Contract, or either of them. Your response hereto should include but should not be 
limited to the identification of every statutory, regulatory, or factual defect or 
insufficiency in the form, content, execution or performance of the 2005 Employment 
Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, that would prevent or 
restrict the enforcement of either such contract in a court oflaw. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Defendants further object as the 
Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants , attorney. Without waiving this 
objection, see Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Claim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: To the extent you have not already done so, 
please identifY and describe with particularity each and every factual, statutory or 
regulatory insufficiency in the form, content, execution or performance of the 2005 
Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, which 
would prevent or to any extent restrict enforcement in a court oflaw of that provision in 
each Employment Contract that if a deposit or amount paid by a prospective purchaser on 
account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by Plaintiff as the 
"Broker" in each Employment Contract. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Defendants further object as the 
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Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants' attorney. Without waiving this 
objection, see Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Claim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: To the extent you have not already done so, 
please describe each and every contract, understanding, or other circumstance under 
which monies actually deposited or paid after January 1,2007, by any potential purchaser 
of all or any of the real property that is the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and 
2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, should not be considered as forfeited as a 
result of such potential purchaser's not consummating the purchase of such real property. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: OBJECT as this Interrogatory 
continues to assume there was real property that was the subject of the 2005 and 2007 
"Employment Contracts" that are attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibits "A" and 
"B" respectively. Those Employment contracts do not comply with Idaho Code § 9-503 
(Idaho's Statute of Frauds) and Idaho Code § 54-2050. Further, the monies in question 
were not forfeited pursuant to the specific terms of the respective Real Estate Purchase 
and Sale Agreements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify and describe all listing 
agreements or other contracts you have entered into with licensed real estate brokers or 
agents since January 28,2008 to market or sell any real property owned by Defendants in 
Payette County, and/or \Vashington County, Idaho. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please describe in as much factual detail as you 
are able, all statements, communications, or other actions taken by you to terminate, 
revoke, rescind, or renounce any agreement by you to extend the term ofthe 2005 
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Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract until September 1, 2008. To 
the extent your response hereto is embodied in, referred to or reflected by any letter, 
email, or other document, please fully describe each such document. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: See previous Interrogatory 
responses. Further, on February 20, 2008, Defendants, after receiving a letter from 
Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, demanding one-half of the earnest monies paid by Mid-
America, Defendant, Richard A. Robertson contacted Rowena Strain and advised her that 
he was not going to continue to list the property with Knipe Land Company and Rowena 
advised him she would not turn in the "Renewal Agreement" and would send Defendant, 
Richard A. Robertson, a termination form. No termination form was ever sent. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: In previous correspondence, you have denied that 
Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of deposits or amounts paid on account of the intended 
purchase of real property that is the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 
2007 Employment Contract by potential purchasers named Harmon and, after January 1, 
2007~ by other potential purchasers of real property owned by Defendants in Payette 
County, and/or Washington County, Idaho. To the extent that you have not already done 
so, please set forth the factual and legal bases of your denials and identify all witnesses 
and tangible items of evidence which you contend support such denial. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Without waiving the objection, John 
Knipe, on behalf of Knipe Land Company, Inc., personally signed "Instruction to 
Escrow" to First American Title Company ofldaho on September 26,2007; October 23, 
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2007; and December 18, 2007 specifically instructing earnest monies to be released to the 
respective Defendants based upon the terms of the Employment contracts. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please describe with specificity any interest that 
Derek Pica has or had in any real property owned by you in Payette County and/or 
Washington County, Idaho at any time on or after September 1, 2005. Your response 
hereto should include, but should not be limited to, any options to purchase or otherwise 
acquire any such real property or any interest therein or to otherwise participate in the 
sale or offering for sale of any such real property. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Derek Pica has no interest in any 
real property located in the counties of Payette or Washington, state of Idaho, including 
any real property owned by either Defendant. Further, Mr. Pica never entered into an 
agreement of any kind to purchase, lease or otherwise obtain an interest in any real 
property in either the county of Payette or the county of Washington, state ofIdaho, 
including any property owned by Defendants. Mr. Pica's dogs have from time to time 
attempted to claim a territorial interest in Defendants' real property by marking certain 
trees, shrubs, rocks, fence posts, vehicle tires, etc. when hunting on the property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: If you deny any of the Requests for Admission 
propounded in Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission, or if your response to any 
of said requests is anything but an unqualified admission, for each denial and/or partial 
denial, set forth in full and complete detail the factual basis for each such denial and/or 
partial denial and, identify each and every witness and/or document which you contend 
supports each denial and/or partial denial. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: See Responses to Requests for 
Admissions. 
ff "J"'\Ia....j DATEDthism:-daYOf.lwe,200S"D.11? 
Derek A. Pica 
Attorney for Defendants 
~\\\\\\\\ IIl1l1/fIIlllI, vF;.1fj.iifi~'% ~ ..... «'A'\~. 
~o, .. ·· ··.:.r ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) ~ ( NOTARY \ ~ 
) ss. ~ \ _0- j ~ 
County of Ada ) % \. PUB' lC / ~ ~ ~ ~, ~ ~, <5'......... ..,.,.~ ... o ~ 
.r,. /'...., .... " ......... ("\~. ~ 
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RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, being firsffdtily sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is one of the Defendants in this action, has read the above Defendant's 
Answers to Plaintiff's First Set ofInterrogatories to Defendants, knows the contents 
thereof and believes the same to be true and correct and in accordance with his desire. 
DATED this Jc;J day of~...e 
-- (/ ,2008. 
'ifd~ 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON 
Defendant 
0. ,-\h ~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisJ.J __ day of" '"" !') (.. , 2008. 
CJL i=L 
NOTARY Pl1!3LIC I;"OR IDAHO 
Residing at: ..: . \ &. ~ L 0 
My Commission Expires: ~ \ :3::;; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
n-J 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the...L£ day of July, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATqRIES TO DEFENDANTS to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by 
the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the 
following person(s) 
Hand Deliver 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
/ 
Derek A. Pica 
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(1) PROCEEDING (1) error, et cetera. And that's what I would use, 
(2) (2) judge. 
(3) OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: (3) And I don't want to do it with Mr. Knipe 
(4) THE COURT: Please be seated. (4) if the court's going to stay with its ruling, so I 
(5) We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel (5) wanted to make that offer of proof at this time. 
(6) and parties are present. (6) THE COURT: Mr. Geston. 
(7) Counsel? (7) MR. GESTON: Well, Your Honor, I think the 
(8) MR. WETHERELL: Excuse me, Your Honor? (8) court's decision is correct. I mean, the very 
(9) THE COURT: Somebody want to take something (9) argument itself shows that we don't need a 
(10) up? (10) dictionary. Counsel says let's refer to a treatise 
(11) MR. WETHERELL: Oh, yes, Your Honor, I had an (11) for a plainly and ordinary meaning of a word. Well, 
(12) offer of proof on using the dictionary, because this (12) if the jury can't - doesn't know the plain and 
(13) is the last witness of the plaintiff's case in chief, (13) ordinary meaning of a particular word, it's not a 
(14) and I just wanted to say that both Rowena testified (14) plain and ordinary word. So that's the jury's 
(15) that YOI,fuse. the plain and ordinary meaning of the (15) business and I think they can perfectly well figure 
(16) term. It's' my understanding - well, the law is if (16) out what the word "forfeiture" means in this 
(17) it has a set legal meaning you're supposed to go with (17) contract. 
(18) the set legal meaning. (18) THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
(19) Well, I can't find Idaho case that has a (19) objection. I think forfeiture is - the 
(20) set legal meaning for forfeiture. The closest one I (20) understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this 
(21) could find was that opinion of Judge Mitchell where (21) context is just an unequivocal surrender of any claim 
(22) Judge Mitchell had this very contract in front of him (22) or interest in controverted sum. So I think they 
(23) and the defense argued that - the defense argued (23) understand that. 
(24) that it wasn't enforceable and what Judge Mitchell (24) MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge. 
(25) ruled was that as matter of law that since there was (25) THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
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(1) no breach of contract there couldn't be a forfeiture, (1) objection. I think it would be time-wasting, I think 
(2) and therefore this provision that we're talking about (2) it would be a diversion of our juror and factfinder 
(3) here didn't apply. That's the closest thing I find (3) for something that's easily comprehended by them. 
(4) that's a set legal meaning. (4) I'm going to sustain it. 
(5) And then it's my understanding under the (5) MR. WETHERELL: And then, judge, with that 
(6) law that if it isn't defined in the contract, there (6) ruling then I will not use this - I won't use this 
(7) is not a set legal meaning, you would go to plain and (7) at all. 
(8) ordinary meaning. And, of course, it's our position (8) THE COURT: Just have him tell us what he 
(9) the plain and ordinary meaning would come right out (9) thinks it means, and then have your client tell us 
(10) of the dictionary, so I have the American Heritage (10) ; what he thinks it means, because that's why we're 
(11 ) Dictionary where it would define forfeiture- (11) here. 
(12) Judge, I ended up in the emergency room (12) MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge. 
(13) last night because of this eye and I'm having a hard (13) THE COURT: All right. Thanks. 
(14) time reading today. I kind of look like Popeye. (14) IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: 
(15) THE COURT: Yeah. (15) THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. 
(16) MR. WETHERELL: Okay. (16) We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel 
(17) The American Heritage, if I was allowed (17) and parties are present, jurors are present. 
(18) to I would have the witnesses testify the very first (18) We're continUing with the 
(19) definition is, quote, "something surrendered as (19) cross-examination of Mr. Knipe. 
(20) punishment for an offense or breach of contract." (20) Sir, you will recall you have been sworn 
(21) And then Webster's plain and ordinary (21) and are under oath. 
(22) meaning of the term is the very first one, (22) Go ahead, sir. 
(23) forfeiture, from Webster's Handy Collegiate (23) MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(24) Dictionary. is a deposit - a posit hostage or agreed (24) 
(25) penalty surrendered through neglect default, a crime, (25) 
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the court's rulings. (1) 
MR. WETHERELL: And then the one - well, and (2) 
then I don't need to tell you why I agree with the (3) 
court's instructions do I? I mean, I think the (4) 
record is clear. (5) 
THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you go ahead and (6) 
tell us. We might as well make a record. (7) 
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. Let's do make a (8) 
record. (9) 
Your Honor, first of all, as to waiver (10) 
we're going to argue three things. First of all, (11) 
when the funds were released, there was a known right (12) 
or a known contingency in those funds and it was (13) 
waived. My client specifically told the plaintiffs (14) 
how, you know, that it was nice to have this money, (15) 
he was able to payoff his farm, the money was spent, (16) 
basically. And there were many opportunities for the (17) 
plaintiffs to tell my client over almost a two - (18) 
well, more than a two-year period that he needed to (19) 
hang on to that money and not spend it basically to (20) 
his detriment, and their silence and their release of (21) 
those funds. (22) 
The next one is when they waited, when (23) 
the Harmon money was released and then wait two and a (24) 
half years later to ask for it back, that delay is a (25) 
waiver. (1) 
And then the last one that I'm - that I (2) 
want to make sure the court knows I'm going to argue (3) 
is that by - under the Idaho Code, by failing to put (4) 
in this real estate contract how forfeited earnest (5) 
money should be divided, that acted as waiver also. (6) 
Because it is an affirmative duty on the part of the (7) 
broker to put in the purchase and sale agreement how (8) 
forfeited earnest money is going to be divided (9) 
between the broker and the client, and that wasn't in (10) 
there. '(11) 
So those are my three waiver arguments. (12) 
On conversion, I think that the testimony (13) 
is very clear that the plaintiffs took that money in (14) 
anticipation of a clOSing, that when the closing (15) 
didn't happen it should have been returned, my client (16) 
started this fire by simply writing a letter asking (17) 
for the money that had been taken out of the deposit (18) 
to be returned to him because there wasn't a (19) 
closing. So they have converted it and they've kept (20) 
it since we asked for it. We're the first ones that (21) 
asked for that money back, so we of course never (22) 
waived our right to that money, and, in fact, we're (23) 
the ones that asked for it back. I (24) 
So now with that said, judge, I would ask I (25) 
I 
-----. ----------- _. __ ...... . 
XMAX(139/37) 
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for punitive damage instruction, and just for this 
very one fact. I realize that it would only be an 
advisory verdict to the court, but I think that it 
would be proper to instruct the jury on, is this 
conduct outrageous, you know, the standard punitive 
damage instruction that we have submitted, and then, 
you know, you, you wouldn't have a damage figure for 
it, but it would be in the special verdict form, was 
the plaintiff's conduct outrageous, et cetera, 
et cetera, like you would in a punitive damages. 
I think understand that Consumer 
Protection Act of course you have to decide if there 
are any money to be given for punitive damages, but I 
think that has an advisory verdict it would be proper 
for the jury to be instructed on that and let them 
have a chance to deliberate and provide the court 
with their opinion as to whether or not the conduct 
is outrageous. 
THE COURT: I'm going to decline your 
invitation to instruct the jury on the issue of 
punitive damages. Thank you, though. 
MR. WETHERELL: And I wanted to make sure I 
addressed -
Oh I was - judge, I believe that it's 
proper because all contracts have the covenant of 
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good faith and fail dealing. I'd just ask for the 
IDJI on that every contract contains a duty of 
reasonable performance. The covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing requires the - I would say the 
parties to perform in good faith the obligations 
contained in the parties' agreements. And I think 
just a simple -
THE COURT: I think in view of your client's 
testimony that he was highly satisfied with the 
activities and endeavors and efforts of Knipe that 
it's really obviated and would make surplusage only 
and lends itself to confusion for me to give the good 
faith and fair dealing instruction. 
MR. WETHERELL: And obviously my client was 
happy until he got sued. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WETHERELL: And the good faith goes to -
THE COURT: We will. 
MR. WETHERELL: - not telling my client the 
whole time that they were going to do this. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. WETHERELL: And I believe that's it, Your 
Honor, unless -
THE COURT: I appreciate-
MR. WETHERELL: .- outside of that I agree 
, J 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The jury's June 25, 2009 verdict denied Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") any 
relief because it found that Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie 
L. Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "the Robertsons") had not breached the 
two contracts they entered into with Plaintiff to list their land for sale (the "Employment 
Contracts"). The jury awarded the Robertsons a judgment of $1,000 on their Third Party 
Complaint against Third-Party Defendant John Knipe for violating the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (Idaho Code §§ 48-603, 48-608) (the "ICPA"), but it also determined that John 
Knipe had not tortiously converted $22,500 paid to KLC out of earnest money paid by a 
prospective purchaser ofthe Robertsons' land, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy LLC 
("MidAmerican"). The jury was not asked, nor did the verdict form proposed by the Robertsons 
and given to the jury by the Court provide the jury an opportunity to identify just what John 
Knipe did to offend the ICPA. Finally, the jury did not find that KLC had violated the ICP A. 
That verdict notwithstanding, the Robertsons now try to exploit the ICP A to demand still more 
relief from the Court itself for causes of action that they had every opportunity to plead and seek 
relief for at trial but which the jury did not allow them. 
In opposing the Robertsons' Motion for additional relief, KLC and John Knipe 
incorporate their prior Motion for a New Trial, or, In the Alternative, For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV Motion") and a supporting Memorandum. 1 They also 
I KLC and John Knipe will therefore not repeat their arguments asking that the Judgment 
entered be amended to delete reference to the Court retaining jurisdiction of this case to entertain 
claims for additional relief by the Robertsons and that Judgment not being "final" for that 
purpose. 
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submit, herewith, the Affidavit of Mark S. Geston ("Geston Aff."), attaching portions of the 
transcript of the June 23-25 trial and the Robertsons' Answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 14. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Jury Has Fully Resolved the Controversy and There Is No Opportunity for 
Further Relief, Equitable or Otherwise. 
The claims and causes of action under the ICP A the Robertsons chose to litigate were set 
forth in Count One of their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint which they served on July 
15,2008. When the Court granted KLC leave to file its First Amended Complaint on June 10, 
2009, the Robertsons declined to take advantage of that opportunity to amend their own 
responsive pleading. Importantly, when they moved to amend their pleadings to conform to the 
evidence after both parties had rested at trial, the only thing they could think to propose was an 
additional claim for "fraud" concerning conduct that occurred on February 20,2008, long after 
the parties' contracts had been signed, performed, and their respective rights to the monies 
actually in controversy determined. The Court denied the Robertsons' motion to amend, finding 
that the "[c]ase has been tried within the framework of the pleadings and I don't think we should 
open additional avenues at this juncture, so I'll sustain," the objection to the proposed 
amendment. (Trial Tr. 563 :25-564:4; see Geston Aff. Ex. A, Trial Tr. 562: 15-564:04.) 
The Court's denial of the Robertsons' Rule 15(b) motion to amend their pleadings to 
conform to the evidence is consistent with Idaho law holding that matters not framed by the 
pleadings may nevertheless be allowed by post-trial amendment only if such amendments deal 
with issues that were actually tried with either the express or implicit agreement of both parties. 
As has already been discussed in Plaintiffs JNOV Motion: 
I.R.C.P. 54(c) states that "every final jUdgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." If 
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the trial court grants relief not specifically plead[ ed] by the parties, 
then the issue must be tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties. An issue must be tried by express or implied consent in 
order to give the parties notice and the opportunity to present 
evidence. 
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008) (citations 
omitted); see also MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 
(1980). The Robertsons' ICP A claims were fully framed by their pleadings and resolved by the 
jury.2 The mere fact that testimony was introduced at trial about the February 2008 agreement to 
extend the effect terms of the Employment Contracts and KLC's decision not to demand the 
monies already due it by virtue of MidAmerican' s prior termination of its land purchase contract 
and consequent forfeiture of the earnest money it had paid, does not mean that the parties 
consented to try the propriety of those events as a new cause of action. "'Implied consent to the 
. trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was 
introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to 
be aimed at the unpleaded issue.''' Hughes v. Fisher, LLC, 142 Idaho 474, 483, 129 P.3d 1223, 
1232 (2006) (citation omitted). There was no agreement by KLC and John Knipe to these events 
being the subject of a new cause of action by the Robertsons. To the contrary, express objection 
was made by KLC to such testimony at triaL (See Geston Aft. Ex B ,Trial Tr. 302: 14-23, and 
Geston Aft. Ex C, Trial Tr. 407:5-9.) 
Of course, a major problem that confronts any discussion of how the ICPA figured into 
this case is that neither the evidence presented nor the jury's verdict provides any clear insight 
2 In so arguing, KLC does not concede that John Knipe personally violated the ICPA, that 
his conduct in February 2008 was properly before the jury, or that its determination that he did 
something to violate that statute can stand against KLC's alternative motions for a new trial or 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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into exactly what John Knipe did to violate the terms of that statute-and in this respect, it bears 
repeating that KLC was not found to have violated any provision of the ICP A, something that the 
Robertsons' Motion deliberately tries to ignore. As discussed in the JNOV Motion, the only 
logical guess that can be made based on the evidence presented at trial and the verdict that 
emerged from it (and, given the record, it can be nothing more than that, a guess) is that it was 
related to John Knipe's February 19,2008 email exchanges with KLC's agent, Rowena Strain. 
As noted above, that concerned KLC negotiating an agreement with the Robertsons to renew the 
effect of terms of the two Employment Contracts before it demanded one-half of the earnest 
monies the second purchaser of the Robertsons' land, MidAmerican, forfeited on January 25, 
2008, when it terminated its land purchase contract. Lacking any better factual defenses, and any 
legal defenses at all, the Robertsons highlighted the events to portray John Knipe and Rowena 
Strain as unscrupulous people. One is at a loss to imagine what other actions John Knipe 
undertook that the jury could have decided violated the ICP A, particularly in light of the jury's 
determination that John Knipe did not tortiously convert the $22,500 KLC received from 
MidAmerican's earnest monies, its award of only the statutory minimum of damages allowed by 
Idaho Code § 48-608(1), and its failure to find any statutory fault with KLC's conduct. 3 But if 
the events concerning the signing of the renewal agreements in February 2008 are, in fact, what 
3 The only events that the Robertsons' own Memorandum describe as justification for the 
additional relief they now demand are, first, the February 2008 events, even though they were 
irrelevant to the matters actually in controversy. The second thing they propose is the idea that 
KLC somehow made more money when MidAmerican terminated its land purchase contract than 
it would have if that contract had been consummated and the Robertsons' land actually 
purchased -an argument that they know has no relevance to the ICPA or anything else 
connected with this controversy, and which was, in any event, explicitly refuted by the 
documentary evidence. 
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the jury had in mind, the Court must confront the fact that those events had nothing to do with 
the competing claims that were actually tried. 
The parties' agreement to renew the two Employment Contracts in February 2008 had 
been part of the litigation as it was originally framed by Plaintiffs Complaint, because the 
Employment Contracts provided that Plaintiff would remain entitled to receive a commission for 
180 days after they were terminated if the Robertsons sold their land to a party which KLC had 
introduced them to. This was potentially a significant issue since the lawsuit was filed at a time 
when that termination period still had time to run. However, time passed as this action wended 
its way toward trial, and the 180-day time period unquestionably expired before the time the trial 
was scheduled to begin. KLC therefore asked the Court for leave to amend its Complaint to add 
punitive damages and to eliminate the issue of the renewal of the Employment Contracts from 
the controversy. The Court did not allow punitive damages but granted KLC leave to file an 
Amended Complaint that discarded any claim concerning the February 2008 renewal of the 
Employment Contracts, and that First Amended Complaint was filed on June 10,2009. The 
Robertsons never filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint, and that was how the 
pleadings were postured going into the trial. KLC therefore objected to Rowena Strain being 
cross examined at trial about the renewal of the Employment Contracts in 2008. (Trial Tr. 
302:14-23; see Geston Aff. Ex. B). Objection was also being made to John Knipe being 
similarly cross-examined, on the ground that it was "not part of our controversy. That's not what 
we're talking about," and the Court sustained the objection. (Trial Tr. 407:5-9; see Geston Aff. 
Ex. C.) Yet the Robertsons now try to capitalize on these events as, in practical or legal effect, a 
separate cause of action requiring additional relief that they either never asked for at trial or 
which is frankly contradictory to what is in the jury's verdict. 
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The Robertsons had every opportunity to seek all the relief they wanted from the jury 
under the ICP A. They obtained only minimal relief against John Knipe and none against KLC, 
but that is all they managed to persuade the jury they were entitled to. The scope of that relief 
should not now be unilaterally expanded by the Court. 
B. The Robertsons Can Have No Relief Under Idaho Code § 48-608 Because They 
Elected Their Remedies. 
As pointed out in Plaintiff and John Knipe's JNOV Motion, Idaho Code § 48-608(1) 
provides that a consumer who purchases services 
and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or 
property ... as a result of the use or employment by another 
person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in 
the alternative, may bring an action to recover actual damages or 
one thousand dollars ($1,000) .... 
(Emphasis added.) It was never disputed that the Robertsons terminated the Employment 
Contracts as soon as KLC demanded half of the forfeited MidAmerican earnest money, and that 
the parties had no further dealings after February 2008. Attached as Exhibit D to the Geston Aff. 
is the Robertsons' answer to KLC's Interrogatory No. 14, plainly stating that Defendant Richard 
Robertson terminated the Robertsons' agreements with KLC as soon as he received a demand for 
half of MidAmerican's forfeited earnest money. The evidence at trial can lead to no other 
conclusion but that the Robertsons "treat[ed] any agreement incident thereto [i.e., the agreement 
to renew the Employment Contracts, as well as the Employment Contracts themselves] as 
voidable," just as specified by Idaho Code §48-608(1). Under this Code section, which 
embodies the ICP A's private right of action, the Robertsons could either sue for monetary 
damages (including the statutory minimum of $1 ,000), "or, in the alternative" treat the 
agreements to extend effective terms of the Employment Contracts as "voidable," if those 
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agreements had been deceitfully induced by John Knipe. Having chosen the latter remedy, they 
cannot recover the former too. 
C. There Is No Evidence of Any Ascertainable Damages So There Can Be No Award of 
the Statutory Minimum Damages of $1,000. 
Idaho Code § 48-608( 1) allows a private right of action under the ICP A only to a 
consumer who "suffers any ascertainable loss of money." Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780, 
133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006), held that "[o]nce a violation of the ICPA is found, it is error to not 
award statutory damages." However, to be entitled to even this minimal relief, a consumer must 
still prove that he or she suffered 
some "ascertainable loss of money ... as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of a method, act or practice" ... 
prohibited by the act. Thereafter, a consumer is entitled to a 
statutory damage award of$500 [now $1,000] for his actual 
damages, whichever is greater. When a consumer merely pays an 
existing legal obligation, he does not suffer damages although 
there may be involved deceptive acts or practices. 
Yellowpine Water User's Ass 'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 351-52, 670 P.2d 54, 56-57 (1983) 
(citation omitted). 
The Robertsons failed to produce evidence of any "ascertainable loss" of money that 
could be remotely connected with the conduct of John Knipe. This assertion acknowledges the 
Robertsons' claim that they had been wrongfully deprived of the $22,500 KLC received from the 
earnest money MidAmerican paid before it terminated its purchase agreement. However, if the 
fact that the Robertsons did not get that sum had anything to do with the ICPA, the jury would 
have undoubtedly awarded that precise amount to them and not resorted to the statutory 
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minimum instead.4 That statutory minimum is to be used only where a loss has been shown, but 
it is either less than $1,000 or not subject to reasonable estimation. Yellowpine Water User's 
Ass'n allows no other interpretation of the damage provisions ofIdaho Code § 48-608(1). In the 
absence of any evidence of such a loss, even if it was less than $1,000 or could not have been 
reasonably quantified, the Robertsons were not entitled to even the minimal statutory damages in 
Idaho Code § 48-608(1). See also In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 856, 857 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2001). 
D. There Should Be No "Constructive Trust" for the $22,500 the Jury Determined the 
Robertsons Are Not Entitled To. 
Further exploiting the language ofIdaho Code § 48-608(1), allowing a consumer to "seek 
restitution," the Robertsons ask the Court to give them the $22,500 that the jury found they were 
not entitled to. The Robertsons maker demand under the guise of imposing a "constructive trust" 
on the money that "Plaintiff retained." (Robertsons' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Equitable Relief ("Robertsons' Memorandum") at 4.) In this, the Robertsons casually ignore the 
fact that the jury did not find that KLC did anything wrong under the ICPA. Second, they ignore 
the fact that the jury could have awarded the $22,500 as damages under the Iep A but it did not, 
and instead resorted to the $1,000 statutory minimum. Third, they ignore the fact that the 
$22,500 was paid to KLC, not to John Knipe, personally, and that there is therefore nothing in 
John Knipe's possession that any constructive trust may be imposed upon. Put another way, the 
Robertsons are trying to equitably grab money they were denied as damages. But a constructive 
trust is not meant to be "an all-purpose remedy which is available when all other remedies fail. 
4 The jury also found that John Knipe had not wrongfully converted the $22,500, and this 
is additionally incompatible with any argument that the Robertsons had suffered some 
"ascertainable loss." 
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS/ 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE 
IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 9 1'),... l:"~ 
Boise-222259.3 0010908- 00008 or Vv I 
A general claim for money damages will not give rise to a constructive trust." In re Allied 
General Agency, 229 B.R. 190, 196 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998). 
Fourth, and once again, the Robertsons ignore the fact that the jury found that the 
$22,500 had not been kept by John Knipe "without the right to do so," as it decided in 
connection with the Robertsons' conversion claim. (See Court's Instruction No. 18.) One is at a 
loss to see why equity, at this late stage of the game, demands the imposition of a "constructive 
trust" upon monies that the jury has already decided have not been wrongfully taken from the 
Robertsons. 5 
E. The Robertsons Should Be Denied Their Request for Injunctive Relief. 
The Robertsons have demanded that the Court enjoin KLC from "future use in business 
practices associated with Plaintiffs forfeiture provision as contained in its broker employment 
contract." (Robertsons' Memorandum at 6.) The origin of this claim is unknown, as is the 
evidence presented at trial that would justify it. The Robertsons asked for no such relief in their 
pleadings. To this writer's recollection, no mention of such a thing was made at trial, even 
during closing argument. 
To repeat, the jury did not find that KLC violated the ICP A in any respect, yet it is that 
entity's form contracts that the Robertsons now want to edit. The jury determined that John 
Knipe had violated the ICPA but, as discussed above, one can only guess at what conduct the 
5 The Robertsons' invocation of equity tempts them into repeating their argument that 
KLC made more money from a forfeiture of the MidAmerican earnest money than it would have 
if the Robertsons' property had been sold-an irrelevant claim they know is completely false. 
Although John Knipe so testified, it was by mistake, and that may be readily confirmed by 
reading the documents he was commenting on and doing a little arithmetic, both of which show 
that KLC would have earned much more money from a commission had MidAmerican closed its 
purchase agreement. 
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jury had in mind-and in that respect, the only thing that suggests itself is the events concerning 
the relisting agreement in February 2008, a matter that had no relevance to the matters actually in 
controversy and that was not shown to have caused Robertsons any ascertainable loss, however 
remotely. As the Court itself said with respect to argument over whether the Robertsons could 
cross-examine John Knipe with a dictionary to divine the true meaning of the word "forfeiture," 
"I think forfeiture is - the understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this context is just an 
unequivocal surrender of any claim or interest in controverted sum so I think they [the jury] 
understand that." (GestonAff. Ex. E, Trial Tr. 416:18-23.) 
There is no justification for this request. 
F. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Punitive Damages. 
The Robertsons finally ask for punitive damages. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) does allow 
such an award where there have been "repeated or flagrant" violations of the ICP A. However, 
the issue of punitive damages in general, and the determination of whether any conduct violating 
the ICPA was "repeated or flagrant," was never submitted to the jury. Idaho has not yet held that 
ajudge may, independently of what ajury decides, award such damages under Idaho Code 
§ 48-608(1). Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198, 879 P .2d 1126, 1131 (1994). In any 
event, the Court denied the Robertsons' belated request to inject punitive damages in to this 
controversy after the evidence that closed. (See Geston Aff. Ex. F, Trial Tr. 559:25-560:21.) 
Their Memorandum supporting the present Motion suggests nothing new to the Court to justify 
the renewal oftheir demand now. 
Secondly, the Robertsons never moved to amend their Third Party Complaint in the 
manner required by Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) to include a claim for punitive damages. Mac 
Tools, 126 Idaho at 196-98, 879 P.2d at 1129-31, held only that Idaho Code § 6-1604(1), 
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defining the standard of proof needed for a common law award of punitive damages (i.e., proof 
of "oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous conduct") did not displace the 
separate standard of proof for punitive damages provided by Idaho Code § 48-608(1) (i.e., proof 
of "repeated or flagrant" violations ofldaho Code § 48-603). Mac Tools said nothing about 
Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), which unqualifiedly requires that claims for punitive damages "in all 
civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted," first be added to the litigation by an 
appropriate amendment of the pleadings upon a showing, at a separate hearing, of evidence to 
allow the court to conclude that the moving party has established "a reasonable likelihood of 
proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." None of that was done 
by the Robertsons and they should not now be allowed to ignore Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) in 
order to ambush John Knipe with a claim that they had not given the slightest hint of pursuing 
until the close of evidence. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to find any evidence adduced at trial showing conduct by 
John Knipe that not only might have violated the ICPA but that could also be characterized as 
"repeated or flagrant." As noted above, what John Knipe might have done to violate the statute 
in any respect remains open to debate. The Robertsons' sole justification for demanding these 
damages is, once again, their fallacious argument about KLC earning more money on the 
termination of the MidAmerican purchase contract than from a commission earned at a closing, 
and their umbrage at John Knipe for not having demanded the money they owed it until after 
Richard Robertson renewed the Employment Contracts in February 2008-an agreement that he 
promptly repudiated with no further consequences to the Robertsons, and that was, in any event, 
irrelevant to the controversy actually tried. 
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G. There Is No Occasion for an Award of Prejudgment Interest. 
Persisting in their refusal to acknowledge absence of any verdict that KLC violated the 
ICPA, and, further, that whatever John Knipe did to violate the ICPA merited damages of only 
$1,000, the Robertsons now ask the Court for prejudgment interest on the $22,500 that the jury 
has decided they are not entitled to. The demand must be denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The provision in Idaho Code § 48-608(1) that the "court" award equitable relief is not an 
invitation to judges to ignore all the restraints of pretrial procedure and the decisions rendered by 
juries. The matters in controversy in this case were fully framed by the pleadings, tried to the 
jury, and resolved. It is unfortunate that the Robertsons subsequently concluded that they should 
have asked for more relief than they did and presented more issues to the jury than they chose to, 
but those were their decisions and the Court cannot unilaterally fix their oversights for them. 
The Robertsons had every opportunity to show the jury why they were entitled to gain the 
$22,500 they consented to be paid to KLC. They failed to do so, and, if nothing else, the fact 
that the jury awarded only $1,000 in damages against John Knipe conclusively demonstrated that 
they should have no further relief in that respect, especially under the guise of an equitable 
device such as a "constructive trust." 
The Robertsons' demand for an injunction, rewriting KLC's contracts, should be denied. 
Such a claim was never made and there was no evidence to justify it, and KLC never violated the 
Iep A in the first place. 
Finally, the Robertsons' sudden thirst for punitive damages cannot sidestep the 
procedural requirements ofIdaho Code § 6-1604 (2). That statute, by its plain language, applies 
to "all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted," and the present controversy is no 
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exception. The absence of any evidence showing any "repeated or flagrant" conduct by John 
Knipe that violated the ICPA is further ground to reject this demand. 
Finally, since there should be no further award of monetary damages to the Robertsons, 
there should be no consideration of any claim for "prejudgment interest." 
DATED: August~, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
After a three-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict denying Plaintiffs claims for $220,000. 
Plaintiff now seeks to take this matter away from the jury. In doing so, Plaintiff asks the Court to find 
that the term "forfeited" is plain in its meaning, and shows a breach of contract by Defendants. 
Plaintiff further asks the Court to prohibit Defendants from obtaining additional relief under the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and moves for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. The Court, however, should deny Plaintiffs motion and uphold the jury's verdict. 
This Memorandum will show that: (1) the judgment should be amended to allow Defendants 
additional remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (2) the jury verdict conforms with 
the clear weight ofthe evidence at trial; (3) Plaintiff presents no errors oflaw that justify a new trial; 
and (4) there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and therefore a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is not merited. 
According, the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion. 
II. 
PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
As the court is well aware, the relevant provision in the employment contract in dispute in 
this matter states: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall 
find a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price 
and terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby 
agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in 
amount to 5 percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof 
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may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance shall be paid to 
me. The Broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid on 
account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission. 
See Exhibits "A, 4 and 17" as admitted at trial (emphasis added). 
On February 12,2009, the Court ruled that the underlying employment contracts in 2005 and 
2007 were valid, but the terms and language of the contracts must be applied to the facts of this case. 
That is, the contractual meaning of the term "forfeited" could only be defined by the parties 
themselves and the actual way they employed the terms. Specifically, the Court's order states that 
"[t]he balance of the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to course of conduct, 
which are issues for the jury." See Court's Order on motions for summary judgment dated 
February 12, 2009 (emphasis added). 
Consistent with this ruling, the Court allowed both parties to present evidence at trial 
regarding the contractual terms employed by the parties and the meaning of the term "forfeited," 
which encompassed prior course of conduct. As such, Defendants introduced evidence they did not 
breach the employment contracts. A brief summary! of this evidence includes the fact that: 
Plaintiff's own representative, Ms. Swain, had previously considered the deposited 
monies as a commission, not forfeited money, which would require a closing on the 
transactions subsequent to Plaintiff receiving payment. 
Ms. Swain's testimony that the money paid in the Harmon transaction was paid as 
non-refundable monies to extend the closing date on the Harmon offer. 
I This sUlmnary is in no way exhaustive, and highlights only some of the evidence provided at trial. 
Specifically, dictionary definitions or plain and ordinary definitions from both Websters and New World 
Dictionary were not allowed into evidence as no foundation could be laid that these definitions were used 
or considered by the parties. 
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• Mr. Knipe's email dated September 26, 2007, admits that at the time Plaintiff 
distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies had not been 
forfeited. 
• Mr. Knipe's testimony that he considered the 5-percent deposit as an advance on his 
commission, not as forfeited money under the employment contract. 
• Mr. Knipe's testimony that he collected a 5-percent "commission" totaling $22,500. 
• Plaintiff disbursed all of the deposited monies to Defendants in the Harmon 
transaction, and did not characterize them as forfeited funds. 
Ms. Strain's testimony that she was aware that Defendants were spending the funds 
in both transactions without mention that Knipe alleged a claim on such funds. 
Mr. Robertson's testimony that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor 
in the MidAmerican transaction forfeited any money. 
Ms. Crane's testimony that the money paid by MidAmerican was paid to the 
Robertson's for access to the Robertson's property and was not earnest money that 
MidAmerican forfeited. 
• Ms. Crane's testimony that MidAmerican had not breached the land purchase 
agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited the money it 
paid under the terms of the contracts. 
• That under Plaintiff s theory, Plaintiff would make more money by keeping deposited 
earnest monies under the contract, than by closing on a transaction. 
On June 25, 2009, the jury rendered its verdict, finding that Defendants did not breach their 
employment contracts. Thus, the jury found that Plaintiff was not entitled to any of the $220,000 it 
was seeking. See Ans. To Questions I and 3 of Verdict. Additionally, the jury found that Plaintiff 
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violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and awarded Defendants $1,000.00 in nominal damages 
as was requested and was the most the jury could award under the Act. See Ans. To Questions 6 and 
& of Verdict. 
On July 7,2009, the Court entered Judgment recognizing the jury's verdict, and reserved its 
right to grant Defendants equitable remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants 
subsequently moved for costs and attorneys fees, and for its equitable remedies under the Act. On 
July 20,2009, Plaintiff moved the Court to am,end the judgment, for a new trial, or in the alternative, 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendants now provide their response. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Judgment Should Be Amended to Include Additional Remedies Under 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Plaintiff's first argument is that the Court should amend the judgment to eliminate references 
to any pleadings, and to make the judgment final. See p.8-9 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the jury's verdict prohibits the Court from rendering additional 
remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See p.9-l4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not grant punitive damages to Defendants. See p.13 of 
Plaintiff's Memorandum.2 The Court, however, should exercise its statutory authority under the Act 
and grant Defendants additional damages. 
As an initial matter, Defendants agree that the final judgment rendered in this matter should 
not include any reference to pleadings. That being said, the judgment should be amended to include 
equitable remedies for Defendants under the Act, as well as an award of attorneys fees and costs. 
2 Plaintiff makes these arguments in response to Defendants' prior Motion for Equitable Relief, as 
previously filed with the Court. 
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Under the Act, a party may seek equitable relief from the Court in addition to any actual or 
nominal damages. The Act states as to this issue: 
§ 48-608. Loss from purchase or lease - - Actual and punitive damages. 
(1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby 
suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, 
as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, 
act or practice declared unlawful by this chapter, may treat any 
agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, may 
bring an action to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars 
($1,000), whichever is greater .... Any such person or class may 
also seek restitution, an order enjoining the use or employment of 
methods, acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and 
any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may 
deem just and necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award 
punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems 
necessary or proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations. 
See LC. § 48-608 (emphasis added). 
Thus, under the express wording of the statute, the Court may grant restitution, an order 
enjoining violative practices, punitive damages, and any other appropriate relief, all in addition to 
Defendant's recovery of actual or nominal damages. See id. 
The Court acted properly in this case by allowing the jury to consider the issue of nominal 
damages, while retaining its own right to grant addition remedies. Therefore, the judgment 
previously entered acknowledges this fact. 3 
3 It should be noted that Plaintiff also argues that Defendants made an election of remedies in treating 
the employment contracts as voidable, and therefore should not be entitled to monetary damages. See p.12 
of Plaintiff s Memorandum. This argument, however, fails as Defendants pled to make the contracts 
voidable, or in the alternative, to obtain damages. Despite the year-old pleadings, the actual trial proceeded 
under the theory that there was a valid and enforceable employment contract and that the Robertson's 
intended to live up to the tenns of the contract and fulfil their obligations under the contract. The case was 
tried under a theory that no breach had occurred. For the Plaintiff to specifically ask Defendant to stand 
before the jury and stipulate that a valid and enforceable contract existed between the parties (which was 
done) and then argue to this Court that an election to have the contract declared void makes one wonder if 
the Court itself has a consumer claim for deceptive practices. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 6 
~O""" 
Plaintiff also claims that evidence regarding the 2007 extension agreements does not fall 
within the Defendants' claim under the Act. Significantly, the Act encompasses any misleading, 
deceptive or unconscionable acts. See I.e. § 48-603(17),(18). Thus, Plaintiff's conduct surrounding 
the 2007 employment agreements goes directly to the Defendants' claim under the Act. 
At trial, it was shown that Defendants were fraudulently induced to enter into an extension 
ofthe 2007 employment contracts by intentional non-disclosure of a demand letter drafted, but not 
presented, until two days after Defendants' signature was obtained. Plaintiffthen sued Defendants 
in this action after Defendants refused the extension that they were induced to enter into. These facts 
are highly relevant to claims of misleading, deceptive or unconscionable acts. See I.e. § 48-
603(17),(18). This specific act of concealment went hand in glove with the course of conduct of 
releasing funds and allowing the Robertson's to believe the funds belonged to them. This is 
especially telling when Plaintiff Knipe testified, under oath, that he "mentioned to the trust officer 
at the title company" that the title company "might want to mention to the Robertsons" that Knipe 
Land Company "may want the money back." No one could listen to such testimony and not 
understand the deception of the Plaintiff: He was Robertson's broker yet neither he or his licensed 
real estate agent ever mentioned that there would be a later "call" on the money. Also, under Idaho 
law if a title company trust officer knows of any actual or potential claims on trust funds, that title 
officer must inform all parties and hold the money in trust until the issue is resolved. Plaintiff Knipe 
has, with his testimony, implicated a title company trust officer in a conspiracy and a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Unless" of course, the jury believed the Knipe testimony was simply a new 
twist on an old deception. 
With respect to punitive damages, Plaintiff avers that such damages should not be granted 
based upon the requirements of I. C. § 6-1604. The essence of Plaintiff s argument is that Defendants 
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must first amend their pleading prior to receiving punitive damages. See p.l3 of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum. 
As set forth more fully in prior briefing, however, punitive damages under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act are unique. These damages are not an abrogation or codification of 
common law punitive damages, but rather present an entirely new remedy created by the legislature. 
See Mac Tools Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198,879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994). In fact, under the 
Act, punitive damages are only considered by the Court, and not by the jury. See I.e. § 48-608(1). 
Furthermore, it is well established in Idaho that where a theory of recovery is tried by the 
parties, the Court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended accordingly. 
SeeMikesellv. NewworldDevelopment, Corp., 122 Idaho 868,877,840 P.2d 1090,1099 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citing M.K. Transport v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192,1196 (1980)). As a 
result, a failure to amend pleadings to include issues tried by the parties does not affect the trial 
court's findings. See id. (citation omitted). This holds true for cases involving punitive damages. 
See id. at 878, 840 P.2d at 1100 ("Because the issue of punitive damages was fully tried by the 
parties, the district court should have treated the issue as if it had been properly pled."). 
Plaintiff was well aware in advance of trial as to the evidence used to support Defendants' 
claim for punitive damages. This is because the supporting evidence and testimony at trial came 
primarily from the deposition ofMr. Knipe. Further, Plaintiff itself filed its own motion for punitive 
damages prior to trial. 
As the Court is aware, after the closing of both parties' cases, the Court took up its potential 
jury instructions. At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on 
punitive damages, and that this decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its 
authority pursuant to the Act. The Court declined this invitation, and instead appropriately stated 
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it would consider such evidence at a later time. The Court's approach in this case is consistent with 
the new remedy as set forth in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which specifically allows the 
judge to grant punitive damages. See I.e. § 48-608(1). 
As a result, the Court should amend the judgment to reflect the additional amounts owed to 
Defendants under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, including punitive damages, and include an 
award for attomeys fees and costs. 
B. The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Motion for A New Trial as the Jury Verdict 
Conforms with the Weight of the Evidence. 
Plaintiff next argues that the plain meaning of the term "forfeited" or "forfeiture" shows that 
Defendants breached the employment contracts. See p.15-19 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. 
Essentially, Plaintiff attempts to remove this case from the jury. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that 
Defendants' witnesses lack credibility, and thus there is a lack of evidence to sustain the verdict. 
Nevertheless, the Court should deny Plaintiff s motion for a new trial under Rule 5 9( a)( 6), as the jury 
verdict conforms with the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial. This particularly is true 
where the Court considers the credibility of the evidence, and the context in which it was given. 
Rule 59 states in pertinent part regarding this issue: 
Rule 59(a). New trial- Amendment of judgment - Grounds 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part ofthe issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against the law. 
See I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). 
Under this Rule, the trial court must weigh the evidence presented at trial and grant the 
motion "only where the verdict is not in accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 9 
~07'f 
evidence." Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 647-48, 200 P.3d 1191, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 
2008)(citing Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 46, 58, 943 P.2d 912, 924 (1997) and 
Pocatello Auto Color v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 45, 96 P.2d 949,953 (1995)). 
The trial court has broad discretion in weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of 
witnesses, and in making independent findings offact. See Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 
749 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Ct. App. 1988)(citations omitted). Significantly, the Court must only grant 
the motion after considering whether a different result would follow upon retrial. Gillingham 
Construction, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d 946, 954 
(2005)( citation omitted). 
The mere fact that the evidence is in conflict is not enough to grant a new trial. Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 767, 727, P.2d 1187, 1195 (1986). Additionally, courts should be mindful 
to respect the findings and conclusions ofthe jury, and only grant a new trial where a mistake clearly 
is made. The Idaho Supreme Court explained in this regard: 
[R]espect for the collective wisdom of the jury and the function 
entrusted to it under our constitution suggest the trial judge should, 
in most cases, accept the jury's findings even though he may have 
doubts about some of their conclusions .... If having given full 
respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial. 
[d. at 768,727 P.2d at 1196 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
As the court is well aware, the relevant provision in the employment contract states: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall 
find a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price 
and terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby 
agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in 
amount to 5 percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof 
may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance shall be paid to 
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me. The Broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid on 
account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission. 
See Exhibits "A, 4 and 17" as admitted at trial (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff argues that the term forfeited is ordinary, not needing interpretation, and thus does 
not require further evidence. See p.16 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Nevertheless, Plaintiff objected 
to references to dictionary definitions of this term at trial, despite its alleged plain meaning. As 
previously briefed, the term forfeited or forfeiture requires a breach by the prospective buyer in order 
for it to become applicable. This very issue has been addressed by another Idaho district court. 
As explained in the Idaho district court case, Sauls v. Luchi, CV 2004-1616 (Dis. ct. First 
Judicial Dist, Idaho June 17,2005): 
The primary purposes of earnest money is to ensure that the seller 
will recover damages if the buyer defaults .... In the present case, the 
buyer did not breach the contract, so even if the forfeiture clause is 
valid regarding the earnest money deposit, it is not applicable. 
The Defendants attempted to obtain summary judgment arguing the same to this Court. 
Defendants then presented the facts to the jury which, as a matter of fact, detennined that with no 
breach of the contingent real estate contracts involved, the forfeiture clause does not apply. 
Notably, courts from other jurisdictions have defined "forfeiture" as requiring a breach of 
contract or neglect of duty. See People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Ill. 2005)( defining forfeiture 
as the loss of a privilege or property because of crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty); 
Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation v. GraysoTl, 746 So.2d 121, 123-24 (La. App. 3rd 
1999)( defining forfeiture as a surrender of something as a punishment for a crime, offense, error, or 
breach of contract); Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Ky. 1930)(stating that the word forfeit 
has a well-established meaning, which is "to divest or to suffer divestiture of property without 
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compensation in consequence of a default or offense"). Hence, a deposit or amount held in trust is 
only "forfeited" upon a breach by the potential buyer. 
In this matter, Plaintiff could not prove that the Harmons or MidAmerican committed a 
breach. Therefore, under its plain meaning, there was no forfeiture .entitling Plaintiff to its claim for 
the nonrefundable monies. 
The continual rehashing of this issue does not advance this case. The Court previously ruled 
that the interpretation of this term was for the jury to decide, based upon the conduct of the parties. 
More specifically, the Court held that the "balance of the issues and claims of both parties 
fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." See Court's Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment dated February 12, 2009 (emphasis added). As a result, all of 
Plaintiffs briefing regarding the plain meaning of the term forfeiture is irrelevant, as the Court 
determined that evidence was needed to resolve the factual issues presented and how those issues 
fit with the language used. 
All of that being said, the weight of the evidence at trial shows there was no breach by 
Defendants. Plaintiffs own representative had previously considered the deposited monies as a 
commission, or an advance on commission, requiring a closing on the transactions subsequent to 
receiving payment. Further, Mr. Knipe's own email dated September 26, 2007, to Defendants 
admits that at the time Plaintiff distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies 
had not been forfeited. See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Specifically, this email states that 
"our listing says we are to be paid 5% on any non-forfeited -non-refundable money you receive at the 
time it is paid to you." See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Plaintiff Knipe then had the title 
company deduct five percent of the MidAmerican deposit prior to dispersing funds to the 
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Robertsons. Further, the email itself characterizes the money to be paid to the two real estate 
companies on deposit as "commission." See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. 
Mr. Knipe also admitted at trial that he considered the 5-percent deposit as an advance on 
his commission, not as forfeited money under the employment contract. As such, Mr. Knipe 
instructed the escrow company to "deduct 5-percent commission on money deposited" when 
distributed, and that the "commission paid to the two real estate companies on deposits before 
closing will later be discounted from commission due at time this deal closes .... " See Exhibit 32 
of the deposition of John Knipe, as admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony as read 
to the jury confirms that he collected a 5-percent commission totaling $22,500. See p.l 04 of the 
deposition of John Knipe. Thus, the evidence from Plaintiff shows that it considered the deposited 
money as commission, not as forfeited monies and that he was only entitled to the $22,500 ifthe deal 
closed. More to the point is Plaintiff's prior course of conduct, in which it disbursed all of the 
deposited monies to Defendants in the Hannon transaction, and did not characterize them as forfeited 
funds at that time. Even Ms. Strain's testimony confirms that the money was not considered forfeited 
money but was paid on a non-refundable basis for extending the closing of the Harmon transaction. 
In fact, Defendants explained to her that they intended to spend the deposited monies, to which she 
did not object or instruct them otherwise. 
Significantly, the foregoing evidence all stems from Plaintiff's own witnesses and therefore 
carries much weight and credibility. The evidence from Defendants' witnesses further shows that 
no breach of the contractual terms. 
Mr. Robertson testified that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor in the 
MidAmerican transaction had forfeited any money. This was true because there was no breach or 
improper conduct on the part of the buyers. Likewise, Ms. Crane testified that MidAmerican had 
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not breached the land purchase agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited 
the money it paid under the terms ofthe contracts. Further, Ms. Crane testified that the money had 
been paid to Defendants solely to allow MidAmerican to enter the property and to use it. Thus, Ms. 
Crane's testimony highlighted the meaning of the term forfeiture, as applied to the property as a 
whole and the course of dealing in this matter. 
As a final note, the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion on the grounds that it failed to put 
forth any evidence, or even argue, that a new trial would bring about a different result. See 
Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628,632,769 P.2d 505,509 (1989). 
Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial, as the weight of the 
evidence clearly supports the jury's verdict. 
C. Plaintiff's Motion Presents No Errors of Law That Justify a New Trial. 
Plaintiff argues that several jury instructions and other events at trial constitute errors oflaw, 
justifying a new trial. The Court should deny this motion as Plaintiff has presented no errors oflaw 
that justify a new trial. 
Rule 59 states in pertinent part regarding new trials: 
Rule 59(a). New trial- Amendment of judgment - Grounds 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part ofthe issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. 
See LR.C.P. 59(a)(7). 
With respect to jury instructions, no new trial is needed where the instructions, as a whol~, 
fairly present the issues and the state of the law. Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby Wiggins 
Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 15,24,121 P.3d 946,955 (2005)(citingSilver Creek Computers,Inc. 
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v. Petra, Iltc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002) and Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho 
Equipment Company, Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 581, 51 P.3d 392, 395 (2002)). 
Thus, a court's review of jury instructions generally is limited to a consideration of them "as 
a whole and not individually." Highland v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 
(1999)(citing Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,256,805 P.2d 452,462 (1991)). 
Typically, only instructions that are pertinent to the pleadings and evidence should be given. 
Id. Nevertheless, the submission of an instruction not founded on an issue of the case does not 
require a new trial absent a showing of substantial injury from that instruction. Id. Additionally, 
the giving of an erroneous jury instruction does not justify a new trial unless the moving party can 
establish it was prejudiced thereby, and that the error affected the jury's conclusion. Id. 
As set forth below, the submitted jury instructions and rulings of law do not require a new 
trial. 
Instructions Nos. 11,12,13: Plaintiff contends the Court erred by failing to decide whether 
the employment contracts were ambiguous. See p.20 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. As a result, 
Plaintiff argues that Instructions Nos. 11-13 should not have been given. Nevertheless, a review of 
Idaho case authority shows no error. 
In Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794, P.2d 1381 (1990), the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized that a trial court implicitly rules that a document is ambiguous upon 
allowing the admission of parol evidence at trial. Id. at 111,794 P.2d at 1384. hlRamco, the trial 
court modified a standardized jury instruction, stating that the underlying agreement "could be" 
unclear. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that this instruction potentially gave 
the issue of ambiguity to the jury, which issue must be determined by the court. Id. Significantly, 
however, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "the trial court had already ruled on whether the 
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document was ambiguous when it determined to allow the admission of parol evidence at trial." [d. 
The Court further held that although the modified instruction suggested that the jury itself might 
determine the contract was ambiguous, it did not limit the jury's inquiry once that determination was 
made. [d. Instead, the jury was instructed that "[ t]he intent may also be gathered from any conduct 
or dealings ofthe contracting persons." [d. As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial. 
In this matter, the Court's conduct shows that the challenged instructions are appropriate. 
The Court's order dated February 12, 2009, found that the underlying employment contracts were 
valid, but implied that the contractual terms were ambiguous. The Court held that "[t]he balance of 
the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for 
the jury." See Court's Order on motions for summary judgment dated February 12, 2009 (emphasis 
added). Consistent with this holding, Instruction No. 11 (IDJI 6.08.1) allowed the jury to consider 
the contract as a whole to determine the intent of the parties, and contained the following 
standardized provision: 
Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting 
parties showing what they intended and how they construed the 
doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently 
with the remainder of the terms. 
See Instruction No. 11 (emphasis added). 
Additionally, Instruction No. 12 (IDJI 6.08.2) and Instruction No. 13 (IDJI 6.08.3) 
appropriately instructed the jury to consider the testimony of witnesses to clarify an ambiguity, and 
allowed for the construing oflanguage where the intent of the parties could not be ascertained. Thus, 
the Court properly instructed the jury to consider parol evidence consistent with its prior order dated 
February 12, 2009. Accordingly, the Court found an ambiguity in the contractual terms and properly 
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allowed the jury to consider additional evidence regarding this issue. In short, many contracts are 
110t ambiguous on their face. However, when the language is applied to a factual scenario, the way 
the parties behave toward one another gives meaning to the terms they employ. An "accident" is not 
an ambiguous term but punch the phrase into West Law and see how it has been used and interpreted 
by courts and juries under different factual scenarios. 
Instruction No.4: Plaintiff next argues that the Court improperly gave Instruction No.4 as 
an opening jury instruction. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that this instruction stated that Plaintiff 
received a "5% commission," when the parties had not agreed to this fact. See p.21-22 of Plaintiff s 
Memorandum. Plaintiff s Memorandum further notes that the Court determined to keep this 
instruction after hearing one of Plaintiffs own key witnesses, Ms. Strain, who testified consistent 
with what had been read to the jury in Instruction No.4. See id. According to Plaintiff, this is 
significant because the Defendants allegedly claimed that the "Ellsworth Dobbs Rule" prohibited 
Plaintiff from receiving anything under the employment contracts. See p.21 of Plaintiffs 
Memorandum. 
Plaintiff s arguments, however, are without merit as Defendants did not argue the Ellsworth 
Dobbs Rule to the jury, and thus there is no showing that the instruction affected the jury's 
conclusion. See Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 343, 986 P.2d at 1009. Further, the Court 
properly allowed the initial instruction to remain as subsequent evidence at trial supported that 
instruction. See id. ("Whether ajury instructi~n should or should not have been given depends on . 
whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."). 
In fact, not only was Ms. Strain's testimony supportive of this instruction, so was Mr. 
Knipe's own testimony. Mr. Knipe's testimony as read to the jury shows that he considered the 5-
percent deposit as an advance on his commission, not as forfeited money under the employment 
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contract. As such, Mr. Knipe instructed the escrow company to "deduct 5-percent commission on 
money deposited," and that the "commission paid to the two real estate companies on deposits before 
closing will later be discounted from commission due at time this deal closes .... " See Exhibit 32 
ofthe deposition of John Knipe, as admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony confirms 
that he collected a 5-percent commission totaling $22,500. See p.104 of the deposition of John 
.Knipe. Thus, the Court acted appropriately in maintaining the initial instruction.4 
Instruction No. 16: Plaintiff also argues that the Court improperly submitted Defendants' 
affirmative defense ofwaiver by estoppel to the jury. See p.22 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Notably, 
this was the only affirmative defense allowed by the Court. Plaintiff argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to submit this instruction to the jury, and that there was no detriment to 
Defendants. See p.22-23 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff s argument is moot and irrelevant, as the jury found no breach 
by Defendants. Thus, the jury never reached or considered Defendants' affirmative defense of 
waiver on the special verdict form. As such, there is no showing by Plaintiff that this instruction 
affected the jury's conclusion, and thus a new trial should not be granted. See Highland 
Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 343,986 P.2d at 1009. 
Additionally, the evidence at trial clearly showed that Defendants relied upon Plaintiff and 
its agent's conduct regarding the money given to Defendants. Specifically, testimony at trial showed 
that Defendants even told Ms. Strain that they intended to spend the money provided to them by 
Plaintiff. Neither Ms. Strain nor anyone else working for Plaintiff objected to Defendants' actions, 
4 It should be noted that if any party was prejudiced by Instruction No.4, it was Defendants. The 
instruction that a 5-percent conunission was paid prior to closing on the transaction magnifies Plaintiffs 
theory that it was entitled to an advance on commission before it closed on the transaction, which could be 
why the jury mistakenly did not return those funds to the Defendants. 
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or provided any indication or infonnation leading to a contrary conclusion. In fact, this was 
consistent with Plaintiffs prior conduct in which it had previously given Defendants the entire 
deposited monies from the Hannon transaction, and thus created a course of conduct that waived any 
contrary position. These actions constituted waiver and legal detriment. 
Testimony by Cindy Crane: Plaintiff next argues that the Court improperly allowed Cindy 
Crane to testify at trial. Plaintiff concedes that Defendants disclosed her name during pre-trial 
discovery, but argues that Defendants were required to disclose her knowledge and anticipated trial 
testimony. See p .24 of Plaintiff s Memorandum.5 Plaintiff argues that Rules 26( e)( 4) and Rule 33 
require disclosure of a third-party's testimony. 
A review of the corresponding rules and case law as to this issue show that the Court acted 
properly in allowing Cindy Crane to testify at trial. Significantly, Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent 
part that a party may discover the "identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable 
matter." See LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Further, Rule 26(e) states in part that a party is 
under a duty to seasonably supplement the "identity and location of persons having lmowledge of 
discoverable matters." See LR.C.P. 26(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Further, the fact that a party 
requests infonnation in the fonn of an interrogatory under Rule 33 does not change the parameters 
of discovery pursuant to Rule 26. See Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 310, 404 P.2d 589,593 
(1965)(Recognizing that the scope of examination under LR.C.P. 33 is the same as under LR.C.P. 
26(b)). 
As a result, Defendants' disclosure in this case that identified Ms. Crane's name and her 
employer was sufficient. Thus, the Court acted properly in allowing Ms. Crane to testify. 
5 Plaintiff previously filed a motion in limine regarding this same issue, which was denied by the 
Court. See p.23 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. 
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Furthennore, lay witnesses may be allowed to testify even where not properly identified. The 
interplay between the disclosure of the identity of a lay witness and a court's discretion to sanction 
under Rule 26(e)(4) was discussed in the case of Wiseman v. Schaeffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 
800 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In Wiseman, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the identity of each witness is 
discoverable. Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that a trial court's empowennent to exclude 
testimony under Rule 26(e)(4) rests in the "sound discretion of the trial court." [d. at 569, 768 P.2d 
at 802. The plaintiffs had challenged the admission oftestimony from two operators oflocal towing 
businesses, as they had not properly been identified. [d. The defendant called these witnesses to 
defend against a negligence claim. [d. The court allowed the witnesses to testify regarding the 
customs and standard practices in theindustry for tow truck operators. [d. In doing so, the trial cOUli 
correctly perceived the issue of whether to admit the testimony as one of discretion. Thus, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision. 
In the instant matter, the court acted properly in allowing Ms. Crane to testify at trial. 
Nowhere in the rules is a party required to disclose the substance of a third-party's knowledge or 
expected testimony. This particularly is true when such infonnation regarding the third-party is 
gathered through diligent efforts on the part of one party, and constitutes significant effort and 
attorney work-product. There is no showing why Plaintiff could not have subpoenaed Cindy Crane 
and taken her deposition in this matter. Additionally, Defendants indicated as early as July 15, 
2008, that Cindy Crane worked at Pacific Corp., and was a person who was believed to have 
knowledge regarding this case. Plaintiff was well aware ofthis fact and included Cindy Crane in its 
own discovery responses dated September 8, 2008. Interestingly, Plaintiff knew exactly who this 
witness was, where she was, and what her knowledge was. Defendant cannot be penalized for 
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Plaintiff s failure to talk to the person who negotiated directly with Plaintiff Knipe and signed the 
MidAmerican contract, a six million dollar contract from which Plaintiff Knipe hoped to collect 
several hundred thousand dollars. 
As a result, the Court acted well within its discretion in allowing Ms. Crane to testify, as 
Defendants properly identified her name and the company where she worked to Plaintiff. 
Use of Licensing Statutes: Plaintiff contends the use of any real estate licensing statutes was 
inappropriate. In support of its argument, Plaintiff avers that the case of Callis v. 0 'Neal, 2009 WL 
1929326 makes the Idaho real estate licensing statutes irrelevant to contract disputes. See p.25 of 
Plaintiff s Memorandum. 
Notably, the Court had ample Idaho appellate authority to allow cross-examination with 
standards from Idaho real estate statutes. In Johnson v. McPhee, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009), a 
real estate agent brought suit against a developer alleging breach of contract. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals allowed the use of the real estate licensing statutes to determine whether a real estate 
agreement was valid. See id. at 569. Significantly, Johnson did not involve a disciplinary matter 
before the Idaho Real Estate Commission, and thus shows the applicability of the licensing statutes 
to civil suits. See id. While not controlling as law in any particular case, a licensed real estate 
broker's knowledge of his legal responsibilities is always relevant. 
As the Court is well aware, licensing statutes are frequently used to prove civil cases in other 
contexts, such as bad faith insurance claims, bad faith adjusting claims, real estate claims, and legal, 
accounting and medical claims. As such, it was entirely appropriate for the Court to allow 
Defendants to question Plaintiff and its representatives as to their knowledge of laws and rules that 
govem their activities, particularly in connection with claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act. 
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Moroever, Plaintiff s reliance on Callis is unmerited. The opinion in Callis was not rendered 
at the time of trial and, at this point, has not been released for publication. Additionally, Callis is 
distinguishable from this case in that it involved the express issue of whether there was a repeal of 
statute by implication. See Callis, 2009 WL 1929326 at *5. In this case there is no such issues of 
conflicting statutes. Moreover, neither party in the Callis case cited or raised the appellate authori ty 
as contained in Johnson, as the issue was not squarely before the Court. 
More importantly, Plaintiff has failed to meet its requirement under the rules to show in 
particularity that it was prejudiced, and that the alleged error affected the jury's conclusion. It is hard 
to understand how asking Plaintiff what his professional obligations are and the knowledge he has 
ofthose obligations causes prejudice. Highland, 133 Idaho at 343,986 P.2d at 1009. Accordingly, 
the instruction was proper. 
Instruction No. 15: Plaintiff argues the Court erred by requiring Plaintiff to prove that a 
contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs own brief concedes that 
the jury "presumably found that there were contracts between the parties (otherwise they would not 
have found that the Robertsons did not breach them). See p.26 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. Thus, 
by Plaintiff s own admission this argument is unfounded. 
The Court also will note that counsel for Defendants stipulated to inform the jury in its 
closing statement that there was a valid enforceable contract between the parties. True to this 
stipulation, Defense counsel informed the jury of this fact both during Plaintiffs closing and as 
argued by Defendants. Additionally, the verdict itself specifically informed the jury that there was 
an agreement between the parties. The verdict inquires in relevant part: "Did the Defendants breach 
the employment contracts they entered into with Plaintiff?" See Question No. 1 of Verdict. As a 
result, there is no error. 
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Likewise, Plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 15 improperly instructed the jury that Plaintiff 
had the burden of proving the amount of damages. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the amount of 
damages should have been presumed. In making this argument, however, Plaintiff provides no legal 
authority and is required to carry its own burden of proof in bringing its case. 
Again, Plaintiff has failed to show the instruction affected the jury's conclusion. 
Accordingly, Instruction No. 15 provides no basis for a new trial. 
Instruction No. 20: Plaintiff contends Instruction No. 20 omitted an intent or knowledge 
component, which Plaintiff argues is required under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See p.26 
o fPlaintiff s Memorandum. Plaintiff further avers that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not 
apply to regulatory situations, and thus the Idaho real estate licensing statutes are ilTelevant. See 
p.26-27 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. Again, however, these arguments are unsupported. 
With respect to intent or knowledge, the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not require 
such a showing. Under Idaho law, proof of intent is not required, as only a tendency or capacity to 
mislead is needed. See State v. Master Distibutors, Inc., 110 Idaho 447, 453, 615 P.2d 116,122 
(1980). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that under the Act, "proof of intention to 
deceive is not required for finding that an act is unfair or deceptive." ld. at 453-54, 615 P.2d at 122-
23 (citing Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F .2d 669 (2d. Cir. 1963)). As a 
result, Instruction No. 20 was proper. 
Furthermore, the evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff waited to infonn Defendants about 
its intent to seek a return of the monies until after Defendants had reenlisted on the commission 
agreement. Such evidence is more than sufficient to show any elements of deceitful conduct. See 
Exhibit "KK," which is the email withholding demand until after the signature on the extension was 
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obtained. To top it off, Plaintiff sued for breach of the extension agreement Defendants were 
fraudulently induced to sign. See Third Claim for Relief of Plaintiff s original Complaint. 
With regard to the Idaho licensing statute, the Act simply states that its provisions Calmot be 
used in other regulatory proceedings, which clearly is not the case here. 
In conclusion, the Court used IDJI instructions which clearly and properly set forth the law. 
The instructions set forth a platform for the parties to argue their respective positions. There is no 
misstatement of law alleged and no allegation that Plaintiff was prevented in any way from 
presenting his arguments. Therefore, there are no legal issues that would require a new trial. 
D. The Court Should Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict. 
Plaintiff s final argument is that the Court should grant it a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. See p .28-31 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Plaintiff contends that the term "forfeiture" speaks 
plainly, and that parol is not needed. This argument appears to be a recitation of Plaintiffs prior 
arguments. See p.28-29 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. 
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the standard for granting a JNOV is "demanding." See p.28 of 
Plaintiff s Memorandum. Unlike a motion for a new trial, the trial court in considering a JNOV is 
not allowed to weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, nor make separate findings 
offact. Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986)(citingGmeinerv. Yacte, 
100 Idaho 1,4,592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979)). Rather, the moving party admits the proof of all adverse 
evidence and all inferences that can be drawn. Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 646,200 P.3d 
1191,1195 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The central issue is determining whether substalltial evidence supports the jury's verdict. 
HighlandEnterprises,/nc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 337, 986P.2d996, 1003 (1999). Nonetheless, 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNA TIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 24 
~Of" 
substantial evidence does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted. Id. The evidence need 
only be of a sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude the verdict 
of the jury was proper. Id. 
As such, the motion should be granted "only where there can be but one conclusion as to the 
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached and when that conclusion does not conform to the 
jury verdict." Carlsoll, 146 Idaho at 646, 200 P.3d at 1195. Thus, ajudgment notwithstanding the 
verdict gives a trial judge the last opportunity to order judgment that the law requires. See id. 
As set forth above, the Court previously ruled that the conduct of the parties should be 
considered in this case. This ruling was confirmed at trial upon the Court's allowing of parol 
evidence from both sides. As a result, Plaintiffs continued recitation of this argument is without 
merit and does not support a JNOV. 
Plaintiff also indicates that Defendants' affirmative defense ofwaiver by estoppel would not 
bar Plaintiffs recovery in this matter. Again, as set forth above, the jury did not reach the issue of 
Defendants' affirmative defense, as the jury found no breach ofthe employment contracts. Moreover, 
as set forth above, there is more than sufficient evidence to show waiver by estoppel in this case. 
Additionally, there is substantial evidence showing no breach by Defendants. This includes 
the fact that Plaintiffs own representative had previously considered the deposited monies as a 
commission requiring a closing on the transactions subsequent to receiving payment. Further, Mr. 
Knipe's own email dated September 26, 2007, to Defendants admits that at the time Plaintiff 
distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies had not been forfeited. See 
Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Mr. Knipe also admitted at trial that he considered the 5-percent 
deposit as an advance on his commission. See Exhibit 32 of the deposition of John Knipe, as 
admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony confirms that he collected a 5-percent 
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commission totaling $22,500. See p.l04 of the deposition of John Knipe. Thus, the evidence from 
Plaintiff shows that it considered the deposited money as commission, not as forfeited monies. 
Plaintiff's prior course of conduct also shows that it disbursed all of the deposited monies 
to Defendants in the Harmon transaction, and did not characterize them at that time as forfeited 
funds. In fact, Defendants explained to Ms. Strain that they intended to spend the deposited monies, 
to which she did not object or instruct them otherwise. 
Mr. Robertson further testified that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor in 
the MidAmerican transaction had forfeited any money. This was true because there was no breach 
or improper conduct on the part ofthe buyers. Likewise, Ms. Crane testified that MidArnerican had 
not breached the land purchase agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited 
the money it paid under the terms of the contracts as payments for access to the property. 
There is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, and therefore Plaintiff's motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. 
IV. 
CASE SUMMARY 
Plaintiff fundamentally misunderstood the issues and evidence presented at trial. Was the 
Harmon money paid as forfeited earnest money or was it paid to extend the closing date under the 
terms of the Harmon contract? Was the MidAmerican money paid as forfeited eamest money or was 
it paid to give MidArnerican access to the Robertson property? The evidence was overwhelmingly 
in Defendants' favor. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 26 
~()e;1 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should deny Plaintiff s Motion for aNew Trial and for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Additionally, the Court should amend the judgment to 
include additional remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. /« DATED thiS~ day of August, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
etherell, Of the Firm 
ttorneys for Defendants 
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Come now Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") and Third Party Defendant John 
Knipe, by and through their attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP, and submit this Reply in Support of Their 
Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs' (the "Robertsons") Response to Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict (the HRobertsons' Response") demonstrates that their jury verdict is principally 
suspended from a single slender thread. That is, that the word "forfeited," as identically used in 
the two real estate listing contracts KLC and the Robertsons entered into in 2005 and 2007 (the 
"Employment Contracts"), is ambiguous and thus requires explication by reference to extrinsic 
evidence. The only such extrinsic evidence introduced by the Robertsons at trial for this purpose 
was Richard Robertson's personal opinion of what "forfeited" me8.l1S and the testimony of 
another witness, Cindy Crane, but who airily explained the operation of other, separate contracts 
that she, and apparently the jury, thought illuminated the original intent of the Employment 
Contracts, even though she knew nothing whatsoever about the Employment Contracts 
themselves. 
In the Robertsons' view, money paid by a third party on account of that party's intended 
purchase of the Robertsons' land would not be "forfeited" within the terms of the Employment 
Contracts, even though that party had terminated its purchase contract and suffered the 
contractually specified consequence of losing all right to that money-unless the third party had 
also "breached" its separate land purchase contract with the Robertsons. (Trial Tr. 434: 1-25; see 
Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S. Geston in Support of Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's 
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Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial. or, in the Alternative, for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict C'Geston Supp. Afl.") Ex. A.) Since neither of the two prospective 
purchasers of the Robertsons' land "breached" their respective land purchase contracts, the 
earnest monies they paid to the Robertsons were never "forfeited." Therefore, the Robertsons 
did not "breach" the Employment Contracts which only required them to share "forfeited" 
earnest money with KLC. 1 The inconvenient fact that both of the prospective purchasers I the 
Harmons and MidAmerican Nuclear Energy LLC ("MidAmerican"). contractually lost all rights 
or benefit to the money they had paid on account of their intended purchase of the land when 
they decided to close was obviously of no significance to the jury. With all due respect to the 
jury, it is impossible to reconcile its verdict with the evidence. 
A. The Employment Contracts Are Unambiguous and There Is No Evidence to 
Support the Robertsons' Argument That Earnest Money Can Be "Forfeited" Only 
if Another, Independent Contract Has Been i'Brea~hed" 
The Robertsons' opposition to a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
depends on the existence of evidence that would have allowed the jury to reasonably find that the 
Robertsons had not breached the Employment Contracts. Such evidence does not exist. Wha.t 
was presented at trial were the Robertsons' admissions that (1) the Harmons and MidAmerican 
had paid the money in controversy "on account of [the] purchase" of the land; (2) each of those 
purchasers lost any right to that money, which would have been applied to the total purchase 
prices they had agreed to, when they decided not to purchase the land after all; and (3) the 
Robertsons kept almost all of the money, rather than sharing it equally with KLC. The only 
explanation for the jury's conclusion that the Employment Contracts had not been breached, and 
I It should be noted that, instead of just referring to "earnest moneYJ" the Employment 
Contracts broadly refer to IIdeposit[s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of land. 
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by a third-party purchaser cannot be forfeited unless there is also a showing that the purchaser 
"breached" an independent land purchase contract with the seller. The basis for this 
interpretation is Mr. Robertson's testimony that that was what he "felt" the word "forfeited" 
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meant; and the testimony of Cindy Crane, a MidAmerican employee who had nothing to do with 
the Employment Contractst who opined that MidAmerican had not "breached!! its purchase 
contract with Robertsons because it was entitled to back out any time before closing, at the cost 
of losing the benefit of all the money it had previously paid against the purchase price. 
Of course, Mr, Robertson's "feeling" that the earnest money was not forfeited here was 
not supported by any factual or documentary evidence. He admitted that he had not shared his 
belief with any of the other parties. Indeed, the Robertsons did not even make this argument in 
the litigation until a week before the trial began. They never claimed, in their three unsuccessful 
motions for summary judgment, or in any of their responses to pretrial discovery, that the 
Employment Contracts were ambiguous, alone and that the word "forfeited" should be 
interpreted and applied in such an unwieldy fashion. (Trial Tr. 454:1-455:1; 493:15-495:25; 
507:21-508:20; see Geston Supp. Aft. Exs. B, C, & D, respeotively.) 
Ms. Crane testified that MidAmerican had not "breached" its own contracts with the 
Robertsons because it had a "window" between the time it signed the contracts and the agreed on 
closing deadline, to tenninate the contract. Therefore) the MidAmerican contract was never 
"breached" because MidAmerican could walk away-although it would lose the $450,000 it had 
paid as part of its intended purchase of the land. On cross-examination, Ms. Crane agreed that 
nothing she had testified to about the MidAmerlcan land purchase contracts could be found in 
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the contracts themselves. (Trial Tr. 529: 14-530: 14; 531 :2~532: 1 0; 540:8~541 :24; see Geston 
Supp. Aft. Exs. E & P, respectively.) 
The detennination of whether language in a contract is ambiguous or not is the obligation 
of the court, not the jury. If the court finds the language is not ambiguous, it must instruct the 
jury that it can only apply that language as it is written and may not refer to extrinsic evidence to 
detennine its meaning. Indeed, it has been held that we where the contract is tmambiguous, the 
court must enforce it. Only if the court decides there is an ambiguity such that the wording may 
have two competing reasonable interpretations, may the jury be given the task ofUinterpreting" 
that language in light of extrinsic evidence. See Cannon Y. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 
393,396 (2007); Farnsworth v. Dairymen's CreameryAss'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 
152 (Ct. App. 1994); St. Clair v. Krueger j 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989); 
Bauchman .. Kingston P 'ship, LP v. Hafoldsen, No. 3455 I, 2008 WL 5133788. at *2 (Idaho Dec. 
8,2008); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 527, 181 P.3d 450, 453 (2008). 
Sustaining an objection to the Robertsons' cross-examination ofnC)s witness about the 
meaning of the word "forfeiture:' the Court observed that "[t]here is a plain and clear meaning of 
forfeiture, It and that there was therefore no need for such argumentative interrogation on that 
point. (Trial Tr. 240:3-4; see Geston SUpp. Aff. Ex. G.) Later in the trial, the Coun denied the 
Robertsons' offer of a dictionary into evidence, stating that "I think forfeiture is-the 
understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this context is just an Wlequivoca! surrender of any 
claim or interest in controverted sum." (Trial Tr. 416:18-417:4; see Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. H.) 
The Court therefore observed, in cormection with its denial of the Robertsons' motion to dismiss 
made after KLC rested, that, "in both these ... transactions the purchasers did forfeit the money, 
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that iSI they made a voluntary and unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in controverted 
sums. There was a literal forfeiture." (Trial Tr. 475:10-13; see Oeston Supp. Aff. Ex.!.) 
The Court therefore never ruled that "forfeited," as used in the Employment Contracts, 
was ambiguous, but instead found the term clear and unambiguous. The Robertsons nevertheless 
argue that "on February 12,2009. the Court ruled that the underlying employment contracts in 
2005 and 2007 were valid, but the tenns and language of the contracts must be applied to the 
facts of this case. That is, the contractual meaning of the term 'forfeited' could only be defined 
by the parties themselves and [by] the actual way they employ the terms." (Robertsons' 
Response at 3.) The Court found no such thing. It merely found that the Employment Contracts 
were "valid and suffer from no legal deficiency. The balance of the issues and claims of both 
parties fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." As the Court will 
recall, the focus of the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment it decided in the February 12, 2009 
Order was whether certain provisions of the Idaho Real Estate License Law, namely Idaho Code 
§§ 54-2050 and 2051, rendered the Employment Contracts void as a matter of law. The Court 
decided that this was not the case and that the Employment Contracts were valid, and the 
correctness of that decision has been confirmed by Callies v. 0 'Neal. No. 34968. 2009 WL 
1929326 (Idaho July 7, 2009).2 
2 The Court also anticipated the Callies decision in its June 9, 2009 Order on Motions, 
denying the Robertsons' Motions to Reconsider its decision on the first Summary Judgment, It 
also found the Employment Contracts could not be statutorily attacked on the basis of whatever 
was or wasn't in the provisions of the MidAmerican land purchase contract when it held that 
"[w]ith xoespect to the issue of the statute of frauds under Idaho Code § 54-2050 and § 2051, this 
Court does not believe that the statutes are applicable in the case at hand. Rather, the statutes 
appear to be applicable in the context of administrative hearing by the Commission against a 
broker." 
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Other matters were raised by KLC, John Knipe and the Robertsons on the first Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment (the meaning of the word "forfeited" notably not being among 
them), but the Court declined to make any aftinnative ruling with respect to them, least of all 
make the decision that the Robertsons claim it did on at page 3 of their Response. 
The Robertsons' argument therefore relies on what the Court's February 12, 2009 Order 
did not decide. They wish to treat its denial of summary judgment as an implicit ruling that the 
Employment Contracts were ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is needed to construe them. 
But the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing. "[AJ denial of summary 
judgment is not a decision on the merits; it simply is a decision that there is a material factual 
issue to be tried." 1 OA Charles Alan Wright. Arthur R Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2712 (2009). "[T]he denial of a motion for summary judgment on the 
ground of the existence of genuine issues of material facts does not conclusively and finally 
determine the claim of right involved. In fact, such a ruling leaves the issue yet to be decided. II 
Mueller v. Auker, No. 07-35554.2009 WL 2424803, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 10,2009); see ,,/so 
Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999); Hunter v. State, 138 
Idaho 44,47,57 P.3d 755,758 (2002); Moore's Federal Practice 3D § 56.41 [3][d] , 
The Robertsons claim that the Court's allowance of "parol evidence" (presumably Mr. 
Robertson telling the jury what he felt Hforfeited" meant and Ms. Crane telling the jury that, in 
her opinion, MidAmerlcan had not '·breached" its land purchase contracts) constituted an implicit 
ruling by it that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous. They cite Rameo v. H-K 
Contractors, Inc .• 118 Idaho 108, 794 P .2d 1381 (1990), but that authority contradicts rather than 
supports their argument. The controversy in Romco arose from the trial court's express l1nding 
at trial that the contract in question was ambiguous and its subsequent modification of a standard 
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jury instruction (it told the jury that the contract terms "could be" lUlclea:r, not that they "are" 
Wlclear). The Romeo court held that because the trial court had the obligation to decide whether 
a contract was either ambiguous Or unambiguous, giving an equivocal instruction to the jury was 
clear error. The Supreme Court, however, deemed the error hannless because the disputed 
instruction did not affirmatively prevent the jury from considering the parol evidence the court 
had allowed after ruUng that the contract was ambiguous. 118 Idaho at Ill, 794 P.2d at 1384. 
There was no such ruling at trial here. To the contrary, and as noted above, all of the statements 
from the Bench indicated that Hforfeited" was an ordinary word and did not need explication by 
dictionaries Or Hparol evidence. ,,3 
The Robertsons cite several cases that purportedly attach a specific legal meaning to the 
term "forfeited/' arguing that they show that that there can never be a forfeiture unless there has 
also been some "breach" or Hdefault" of an obligation. None of that authority is pertinent and 
none of it defines "forfeited" or "forfeiture" as such. Sauls v. Luchi, No. CV 2004 1616.2005 
WL 1663285 (Idaho June] 7,2005) dealt with a land purchase contract between a land owner 
and a prospective buyer.4 Although the court's opinion referred to a "forfeiture clause" in the 
subject oontfact, none of its terms were explained in any more detail. This Court therefore has 
no way of knowing what circumstances the parties in that case explicitly agreed to that might 
cause any "forfeiture" of earnest money. 
3 The Robertsons have never explained just what could constitute a "breach' I of their 
independent land purchase contracts. Do the Robertsons propose that they and Plaintiff agreed 
to have a nonsense term in the Employment.Contracts? Is there any logical way for the jury to 
have imagined why the Employment Contracts include a nonsense term or one whose 
effectiveness would depend on the operation of separate contracts that had not yet been written 
when the Employment Contfacts, themselves, were executed? 
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Of the three out-of .. state cases cited on pages 11 and 12 of the Robertsons' Response, one 
was a criminal matter concerning a murder, the second dealt with the "forfeiture" of statutory 
workers' compensation benefits, and the third concerned the statutory forfeiture of a devise 
under a will. None of these cases deal with situations having any relevance to the Employment 
Contracts between KLC and the Robertsons. None of these cases hold that any I'forfeiture" may 
not arise unless there has been a separate contractual wrong by a third party. To the contrary. 
these cases stand only for the proposition that property or money may be "forfeited" as a 
consequence of circumstances peculiar to each of those cases. 
The consequences giving rise to the Harmons and MidAmerican's forfeiture of their 
down payments on the Robertsons' land were, in each case, their failure to consummate the 
purchase they had contracted for. It should be of no significance that the Harmon and 
MidAmerican land purchase contracts anticipated such a default (a term used interchangeably 
with "breach" by the authority cited by the Robertsons) and specified the loss of benefit ()f 
monies previously paid by such purchasers as the consequence of their failure to close. The loss 
of their mone)' by the Harmons and MidAmerican was just as much a "forfeiture" wtder those 
terms as it would have been if there had been some other default or failure to deprive them of the 
benefit of their payments that could be labeled a "breach." 
The Robertsons buttress their argument that there was no "forfeiture" of the first 
purchaser's lost earnest money because both of KLC' s witnesses did not "consider" that the 
Harmons' money was forfeited when it was released to the Robertsons. Similarly, the 
Robertsons' Response asserts that KLC's agents did not "consider" the MidAmerican monies 
4 An unauthenticated and unsigned copy of that opinion was attached to the Robertsons' 
Trial Brief. 
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"forfeited" when it was released. But there was no dispute at trial that all the actual distributions 
of these monies occurred before the two purchasers announced that they would not consummate 
their purchases of the Robertsons' land. Since there could be no forfeiture until those purchasers 
announced they could not or would not close. there was no reason for anyone to consider the 
monies "forfeited" at the time they were distributed. 
Mr. Robertson admitted that the monies paid by the two prospective purchasers have 
been deposited were paid as part of their intended purchase of the Robertsons' land-precisely as 
the Employment Contracts specified. He also admitted that when he exercised his remedies 
under the MidAmerican land purchase contracts, be deemed those monies "forfeited." He 
admitted that the payments would 'be credited against the agreed-upon purchase price for the land 
had there been a closing. His federal income tax return reported the MidAmerican money he and 
his wife kept as "earnest money forfeited." (See Ex. 43.) Ms. Crane's conclusory statement that 
MidAmerican had not "breached" its separate contractual obligations under its land purchase 
contracts was, by her own admission, Wlsupported by anything actually in the contracts it entered 
into with the Robertsons, 
FinaJly, it is inherently illogical to re~y on the legal significance ofthe purchase contracts 
entered into between the Robertsons and the third-party purchasers of their land, to detennine 
how the Employment Contracts that the Robertsons and KLC entered into long before those 
contracts were even dreamed of let alone drafted and signed~ should be enforced. 
B. The Weight of the Evidence Requires a New Trial at a Millimum. 
To decide whether, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), there should be a new 
trial, "the trial judge must 'weigh the evidence and determine (1) whether the verdict is against 
his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would prclduce a 
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different result,m Harger v. Teton Springs Golf& Casting, LLC~ 145 Idaho 716, 719. 184 P.3d 
841 ~ 844 (2008) (citation omitted), A new trial should be ordered where "the trial judge ... has 
weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses ... 
[and] concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the 
evidence." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,766.727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). Importantly, the 
Court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Robertsons in such an 
analysis, and may grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's 
verdict. 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P,2d at 1195. 
Given that the monies paid by the Hannons and MidAmerican was lost to them when 
they refused to consununate their purchases, there can be no question but that the Robertsons 
breached the Employment Contracts and owe KLC half that money (minus the $22,500 
previously paid to KLC with the consent of all parties). The only ways around this factual 
evidence are to accept (1) Mr. Robertson's story that "forfeiture" does not mean what it says all 
by itself but is. instead, preconditioned on some kind of legal fault concerning the perfonnance 
of entirely separate contracts, and to accept (2) Ms. Crane's opinion that one of these separate 
contracts was not "breached" by her employer. How the jury found that there was no breach of 
the Employment Contracts in the face of such evidence is frankly a mystery. 
Beyond the undisputed evidence, the Court should also recall its Own estimation of Mr. 
Robertson, the individual who undertook all relevant actions and made all the decisions for the 
Defendants: " ... [t]here is no inequality of bargaining power here. I'm satisfied by the proofs 
that although Mr. Robertson did not even complete the tenth grade, he's obviously a man of vast 
intelligence. and better yet he's shrewd." (Trial Tr. 474:14-18; Oeston Supp. Aff. Ex. 1.) 
At the very least, a new trial must be granted. 
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C. The Court's Errors of Law Require a New Trial at a Minimum 
There were also significant errors of law at trial that require a new trial. As noted above, 
it was the duty of the Court to tell the jury what it had already told the attorneys during the trial, 
that the Employment Contracts were not ambiguous and that the tenn "forfeited" has a simpJe, 
easily comprehended meaning. Ramco, 118 Idaho at 111,794 P.2d at 1384. The Court 
nevertheless allowed Mr. Robertson and Ms. Crane to explain. over objection, what the word 
"forfeitedh in the Employment Contracts "really" meant and how it should operate. Their 
testimony did not concern anything actually written in the Employment Contracts, but instead 
consisted of Mr. Robertson's private belief about what the word "forfeited," considered ill 
isolation, meant and Ms. Crane's opinion about how the independent land purchase contract of 
her employer functioned. 
The Court again abdicated its duty to determine whether the Employment Contracts were 
ambiguous or not when it allowed the jury to decide that issue by submitting instructions on both 
points. This was unquestionably errOr and, given the absence of any ruling during the course of 
trial that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous, cannot be said to have been "harmless" as 
was the case in Ramco. [d. 
KLC and John Knipe's objection to the Court's opening Instruction No.4, dealing with 
whether the monies disbursed from the MidAmerican earnest money payments to KLC were 
agreed by the parties to be "commissions," although seemingly a minor point, was not hannless, 
particularly when considered with all the other instructions. First. the Instruction purported to 
tell the jury what the parties had agreed to, when, in fact, the parties had not agreed at all. The 
fact that the Court concluded, halfway through the first witness's testimony, that the Instruction 
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was factually correct, constituted additional error by preswning to make a finding of fact midway 
through a jury trial. 
Instruction No. 16 is cited by KLC and John Knipe as another ground for granting a new 
trial. The Robertsons argue that the significance of this Instruction is moot because the jury 
never decided that affirmative defense. That may be a fair pointJ but only if the Instruction is 
considered in isolation. Plaintiff's point is that it cannot be so regarded but must, instead, be 
viewed as an integral part of all the Instructions, which. as a groUPt invited the jury to render a 
verdict that was completely at odds with both the factual evidence and a plain reading of the 
Employment Contracts. This Instruction invited the jury to look beyond the wording of the 
Employment Contracts, just as the uncalled-for Instruction inviting the jury to look to extrinsic 
evidence to understand what KLC and the Robertsons intended by the language in the 
Employment Contracts did. 
The Court should not have allowed Ms. Crane to testify, first, because the substance of 
her knowledge of relevant events was not disclosed to KLC. even though KLC had explicitly 
asked the Robertsons for that information in an Interrogatory propounded long before trial, The 
Court dismissed KLC and Jo1m Knipe's concerns about such stonewalling tactics by simply 
saying that when "we"ve got experience[d] counsel like this and they see Ms. Crane knocking 
around the case, then they can take whatever action they want to take." (Trial Tr. 484:7-9; see 
Geston Supp. Af!. Ex, J.) The Robertsons have now built on this observation to hide behind the 
specification in Rule 26(e)(I) that there is only a duty to supplement prior discovery concerning 
"the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." According 
to the Robertsons, they had no duty to supplement their prior, incomplete answers and to provide 
any information about what they thOUght Ms. Crane knew that was relevant to the controversy. 
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However, that Rule applies only where a party "has responded to a request for discovery with a 
response that was complete when made . ... " Rule 26(e) (emphasis added). The Robertsons' 
original answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory was intentionally incomplete when it was made, and 
they revealed nothing more to KLC until shortly before trial, when Ms. Crane was named as a 
witness. KLC and John Knipe listed Ms. Crane as a person with knowledge because they knew 
she had represented MidAmerican in its efforts to buy the Robertsons' land, and would 
presumably have knowledge about MidAmerican's refusal to go through that purchase, but since 
that event was not in dispute and documented by MidAmerican's January 25, 2008 tenninadon 
letter to the Robertsons (Trial Ex. 38) and the consequent forfeiture its earnest money, KLC had 
no need to rely on her or reason of its own to depose her. 5 for its case. And even if her 
deposition had been taken, it would have been of little use, since the Robertsons' invention that 
could be no forfeiture of earnest money without a "breach" was first revealed in their trial brief, 
served a week before trial. 
The Court certainly has discretion to enforce the rules of discovery and ensure fairness. 
That discretion was exceeded, however, when the Robertsons were allowed to capitalize on their 
stonewalling of discovery and present Ms. Crane at trial. 
Secondly, Ms. Crane testified. again over objection, about how the MidAmerican 
contract operated, what it was intended to accomplish, and how it was not "breached." lhat 
testimony directly contravened the Court's prior ruling that although it would permit Ms. Crane 
to "testify on the course of negotiations with Mr. Robertson just to corroborate his testimony if 
that's what it's being put on for, but I'm not going to let her testify or give legal conclusions to 
the jury about the ultimate fact in question, which is, did MidAmerican forfeit money." (Trial 
S Ms. Crane is an Oregon resident and beyond this Court's subpoena power. 
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Tr. 484: 10-16; Geston Aff. Ex. J.) But that is exactly what Ms. Crane did: give legal 
conclusions about whether MidAmerican forfeited its earnest money. 
An additional error of law occurred when the Court allowed the Robertsons' attorney to 
cross-examine KLC~s witnesses about why KLC had not ensured that the MidAmerlcan land 
purchase contracts, which MidAmerican had drafted. included a specific provision to control the 
distribution of forfeited earnest monies, as required by Idaho Code § 54-2051. The obvious 
point of this interrogation was to demonstrate that (1) KLe's real estate agents paid no attention 
to the law, and (2) the absence of such a provision from the MidAmerican land purchase 
contracts meant there was no agreement to share forfeited earnest money after all. 
The Robertsons respond that such questioning was proper since "licensing statutes are 
frequently used to prove civil cases and other contacts, such as bad-faith insurance claims, bad-
faith adjusting claim, real estate claims, and legal, accounting and medical client." (Robertsons' 
Response at 21.) Of course, all of these "other contexts" involve torts-usually negligence 
claims, where the standard of reasonable care may be proven by reference to "licensing statutes." 
No such question was relevant to the instant case. 
The Robertsons rely on Johnson v. McPhee, _Idaho _) 210 P .3d 563 (Ct. App. 
2009).6 But McPhee was an appeal of a summary judgment concerned with whether a purported 
oral contract to sell real property for compensation has satisfied the statute of frauds. Instead of 
going directly to the statute of frauds addressing such agreements, Idaho Code § 9-508, the Court 
of Appeals inexplicably analyzed the Idaho Real Estate License Law and the Idaho Real Estate 
Brokerage Representation Act, and detennined that such a contract must be in writing (the one in 
6 It is by nO means certain that McPhee remains valid authority, given the subsequent 
Supreme Court decision in Callies. 
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that case was not, so summary judgment had been proper), McPhee detennined nothing more 
than that, and it provides no justification for the Robertsons' exploitation of a statute that has 
nothing to do with the controversy between them and KLC. That much is indisputable in light of 
Callies, which had been anticipated by this Court when it held in its February 12,2009 Order, 
finding that the Employment Contracts suffered from no legal deficiency, and, again, in its June 
9,2009 ruling that Idaho Code §§ 54-20S0 and 2051 were not "applicable in the case at hand. 
Rather, the statutes appear to be applicable in the context of an administrative hearing by the 
Commission against a broker." (See the Court's Order on Motions, June 9,2009, at 5.) 
Finally, the Court's Instruction No. 20 omitted any mention of the "knowledge" 
component that must be shown before any violation of the Idaho Consumer Protect Act 
C'ICPA") can be proved, State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447,615 
P .2d 116 (1980), held that the State need not prove an "intention to deceive" before successfully 
asserting a claim under the ICPA. However, Idaho Code § 48-603 expressly requires that any of 
the 19 prohibited business practices it enumerates must have been practiced by "a person [who] 
knows, or in the exercise of due care should know" that he was acting in such fashion before a 
violation of the statute can be found. This is the "knowledge element" that must be shown 
before a violation of Idaho Code § 48·603 can be found. Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780, 133 
P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006). The Instruction submitted by the Robertsons and gjven by the Court 
made no mention of such a thing. 
Considered as a whole, the Instructions were confusing at best and unfairly skewed 
against KLC' s interests at worst. In either event, a new trial is required. The admission of 
opinion evidence, the testimony by a witness whose knowledge had been concealed by the 
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Robertsons, and the exploitation of irrelevant statutes to undermine the integrity and 
professionalism ofKLC's real estate agents are all reasons for a new trial, too. 
D. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Should Be Entered 
All of the arguments set forth above concerning the evidence adduced at trial are equally 
applicable to KLC and John Knipe's demand for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), 
Questions of witness credibility aside, there is no reasonable way to reconcile the jury's finding 
that the Robertsons did not breach the Employment Contracts with the documentary and factual 
evidence, As the Court itself observed, "in both these ... transactions the purchasers did forfeit 
the money, that is, they made a voluntary and unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in 
the controverted songs. There was aUtera! forfeiture." (Trial Tr. 475:10-13; Geston Supp. Aff. 
Ex.1.) That evidence permits only one conclusion: the plain and simple requirement of the 
Employment Contracts that ·the Robertsons share earnest monies forfeited by a prospective 
purchaser with KLC. 
E. There Can Be No Further Relief Under the lePA 
The Robertsons' Response continues to ignore the fact that the jury did not find that KLC 
violated the ICP A. The Robertsons continually lump KLC together with John Knipe and argue 
as if the Court should now consider further relief against both litigants, This is incorrect. 
As far as Mr. Knipe is concerned, the only logical conclusion is that the jury did not 
approve of his recommendation that demand for the money the Robertsons already owed KLC 
not be made until after an agreement had been reached to extend the Employment Contracts' 
effective terms. But, as also noted, the entire issue of that February 2008 agreement to extend 
the tenns of the Employment Contracts was dropped from the controversy when KLC was 
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allowed to file its First Amended Complaint. 'The Robertsons did nothing to assert an 
independent cause of action founded on those circumstanoes.' 
The Robertsons nevertheless claim that these ICPA issues were tried with the implicit 
agreement of the parties. To the contrary, KLC and John Knipe continuously objected to 
testimony concerning whether KLC made the demand for monies that were already owed to it, 
either before or after the Employment Contracts were renewed in February 2009. 
The Robertsons claim Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Cotp., 122 Idaho 868, 878, 840 P.2d 
1090, 1100 (et. App. 1992). justifies the Court's post .. trial consideration of additional relief 
under the ICPA, and speCifically punitive damages. This argument is also intended to address 
Plaintiff's observation that the Robertsons cannot claim punitive damages under the ICPA 
JtI019/024 
because they never amended their pleadings to include such a claim, as required by Idaho Code 
§ 6-1604(2). The Robertsons argue that. in Mikesell, the mere fact that evidence supporting the 
punitive damages claim (even though such a claim was never mentioned until the close of 
evidence) had been present at the trial meant that the parties had implicitly agreed that a 
judgment could include such a claim. However, 
[i]n Mikesell, the complaint requested $10,000 in punitive 
damages, however, evidently neither party was aware that I.C. 
§ 6w 1604 prohibited such a request at the time of the trial and the 
issue was fully tried. After the trial, the district court refused to 
award punitive damages to the Mikesells because of the Mikesells' 
noncompliance with I.e. § 6·1604(2) and rule 9(g). The Court of 
Appeals determined that the district court erred in dismissing 1he 
punitive damages claim after it had been tried, holding that where 
an issue is improperly raised in the pleadings but tried by the 
parties without objection, it will be treated as having been properly 
raised. 
7 The Court sustained an objection to testimony concerning the February 2008 reUsting 
agreement, agreeing with the argument that "[t]his contract, this relisting, that's not part of our 
controversy. That's not what we're tallOng about." (Trial Tr. 407:5·9; Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. K) 
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Harwoodv. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 675-76, 39 P.3d 612,615-16 (2001). In this case, unlike 
Mikesell, there was no mention in any of the Robertsons' pleadings of any claim for punitive 
damages; that issue should not be injected into the controversy now. 
The Robertsons have also failed to point out any evidence that would show that the 
conduct of Mr. Knipe's that violated the ICPA-whatever it was-was "repeated or flagrant" as 
is required by Idaho Code § 48-608(1) before punitive damages may be awarded. No such 
award should be considered absent such evidence, 
Next, there was no showing that the Robertsons suffered any ·'ascertainable loss" as a 
result of John Knipe's supposedly deceptive actions, as is required by Yellowpine Water User's 
Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 351-52, 760 P.2d, 54,56-57 (1983). Everything relevant to this 
lawsuit had happened before the Robertsons briefly agreed to renew the effective tenns of the 
Employment Contracts: the Employment Contracts had been executed; KLC had perfonned all 
of its duties; KLC had found buyers who signed contracts and who paid money on account of 
their intended purchase of land; both buyers had refused to close their respective transactions and 
suffered the contractual forfeiture of their earnest money; and KLC's contractual entitlement to 
half of that forfeited earnest money accrued at the moment the buyers announced their refusal to 
close. All of that transpired well before February 2008. None of the rights that were in 
controversy at the trial originated with the February 2008 agreement to extend the Employment 
Contracts' terms, and it should not now fonn the basis for any affIrmative relief. 
Finally, the Robertsons elected their remedies WIder Idaho Code § 48-608(1) when they 
chose to "neat" the Employment Contracts as "voidableu within a few days after they received 
KLe's first demand for its share of the forfeited earnest money. Under the plain wording of that 
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statute, that was enough and they have no additional right to claim even nominal damages \Ulder 
the ICPA. 
F. The Judgment Should Not Be "Amended" to Allow Additional Relief on Causes of 
Action That Were Neither Pled nor Tried. 
The Robertsons' argument that the Court may unilaterally keep this controversy open 
after the verdict so they may seek additional claims for relief is not supported by any relevant 
authority. Although Idaho Code § 48-608(1) may give the Court the ability to grant such relief, 
the fact remains that the Robertsons did not seek any relief under the Iep A that was not tried and 
decided by the jury. In the absence of the parties' mutual agreement that claims which were not 
disclosed in the pleadings were nevertheless fairly tried, the Robertsons cannot now go back, 
review the evidence at their leisure and cultivate new causes of action. MK Transp., Inc. v. 
Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). 
II. CONCLUSION 
A new trial, at least, is recommended by the faulty Instructions given to the jury both 
before and at the conclusion of after trial. Allowing the Robertsons' counsel to cross-ex2unine 
KLC's witnesses about events that had nothing to do with the matters actually brought to trial, 
and about statutes that the Court had already determined had no relevance to the contracts 
between KLC and the Robertsons are additional grounds for a new trial. But what stands out in 
the record is the refusal of the Court to follow up on what it had already ruled on in cOMection 
with evidentiary objections and to instruct the jury that the Employment Contracts are 
unambiguous and should not be interpreted by reference to anything other than their plain 
language. Instead. Mr. Robertson was allowed to tell the jury what he privately believed 
"forfeited'l meant, all without any factual basis. That error was amplified when Ms. Crane was 
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allowed to offer her own opinion-and it was nothing more than that-about how the 
MidAmerican land purchase contract operated. 
The critical language in the Employment Contracts is simply that monies paid on account 
of the purchase ofland by a prospective purchaser should be shared equally by the Robertsons 
and KLC if they are "forfeited," As the Court observed~ such a forfeiture is simply "an 
unequivocal surrender of any claim or interest in uncontroverted sum." (Trial Tr. 416: 18-23; 
Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. H,) There is no rule of grammar or anything in the Employment 
Contracts to obscure that plain meaning and justifY the Robertsons engrafting an additional 
requirement that some other independent contract first be ·'breachedn before any "forfeiture" can 
occur. 
The Robertsons claim that it is not enough for a purchaser who is backing out of a land 
purchase contract to lose all interest in and benefit of the earnest money it paid, before that 
money can be deemed forfeited under the tenns of the Employment Contracts. Instead, they add 
a moral gloss to the tenn, requiring that the purchaser losing any right to or benefit from its 
money also have committed some unspecified wrong in the perfonnance of his own land 
purchase contract-a contract, it must be repeated, is necessarily entirely separate from the 
Employment Contracts and which would not have even been imagined, let alone written and 
executed, when the Employment Contracts were signed between the parties to this lawsuit. To 
the Robertsons' conception, the very fact that such a land purchase contract anticipated and 
determined that the consequence of a failure to close should be a loss of any right to Or interest in 
monies previously paid for that land, perversely means that the contract was not "breached" of 
all, and that-now relying solely on Mr. Robertson's subjective feeling about what the word 
"forfeited" as it appeared in the Employment Contracts meant-KLC was therefore entitled to 
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nothing for all its work but the Robertsons would gain another quarter million dollars because of 
it. The argument is illogical and must not obscure the admitted facts in evidence, all of which 
show a deliberate breach of the Employment Contracts. 
DATED: Augustrl,2009. 
STOEL RIVES J..l.P 
~.d~-=-
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
MARK. S. GESTON, being fIrst duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I. I am an attorney with the law fmn ofStoel Rives LLP, counsel of record for 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants, and as such have personal knowledge of the matters set 
forth herein, 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Pages 434 to 437, 
inclusive, ofthe Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial (Expedited) (herein "Trial Transcript"), 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Pages 454 to 457. 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Pages 490 to 497, 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Pages 506 to 509, 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of Pages 526 to 533, 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of Pages 538 to 541, 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Pages 238 to 241, 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of Pages 414 to 417. 
inclusive, of the Trial Transcript. 
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11. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Pages 474 to 477. 
inclusive) of the Trial Transcript. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Pages 482 to 485, 
inclusive, of the Tria) Transcript. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of Pages 407 to 409, 
incluSive, of the Trial Transcript. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
Mark S. Oeston 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J!L day of August, 2009. 
N~ 
My Commission Expires /,;), ·151· W 1:S . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
RECEIVED 
JUL l12009 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, ) 
et al., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
==~===-=--=~====~~---) RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, ) 
et al., ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs,) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JOHN KNIPE, an ) 
individual, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2008-682 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL 
(EXPEDITED) 
PRESIDING JUDGE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
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Page 
(Plaintiffis Exhibit 43 moved for 
admission.) 
MR. WETHERELL: I object, Your Honor, as 
irrelevant. 
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, the relevant portion 
that we wish to discuss is on page 11. 
THE COURT: Page 11? 
MR. GESTON: 11, yes. If the court wishes I 
could just - we and counsel could just come up and I 
can show you exactly what I had in mind. 
THE COURT: (Nodding affirmatively.) 
Okay. Can't you just take - pluck out 
page 11 then? We don't need all the balance of it? 
Mark that 43. All right. 
(Bench conference.) 
MR. WETHERELL: Lack of foundation, judge. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained. 
(Admission of Exhibit 43 into evidence 
denied.) 
MR. GESTON: In that event, Your Honor, we 
rest. 
THE COURT: Plaintiff rests. 
Mr. Wetherell. 
MR. WETHERELL: Would you like to hear some 
motions now, judge, or should reserve that and 
Page 435 
begin? 
THE COURT: Why don't we just get going and 
we'll take it up when we recess for the morning. How 
about that? 
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. I'm making the motion 
now, Your Honor, and I would like to argue it when we 
have our next recess. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. WETHERELL: We would call Richard 
Robertson. 
THE COURT: Sir, if you'll come forward and 
raise your right hand and be sworn, please. 
RICHARD ROBERTSON, 
Having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WETHERELL: 
Good morning, Richard. Could you state 
your name, spell your last. 
Richard Robertson, R-o-b-e-r-t-s-o-n. 
I'd like to have you explain to the jury 
a little bit of your background. Where were you 
(1) 
(2) A. 
(3) Q. 
(4) A. 
(5) Q. 
(6) A. 
(7) Q. 
(8) 
(9) A. 
(10) Q. 
(11) A. 
(12) Q. 
(13) 
(14) A. 
(15) Q. 
(16) 
(17) A. 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) Q. 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) A. 
(24) 
(25) 
(l)Q. 
(2) 
(3) A. 
(4) Q. 
(5) A. 
(6) Q. 
(7) A. 
(8) Q. 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) A. 
(12) Q. 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) A. 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) Q. 
(20) A. 
(21) Q. 
(22) 
(23) A. 
(24) Q. 
(25) A. 
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born? 
I was born in Coalinga, California. 
What year? 
1935. 
And how old are you then? 
I'm 73. 
And where did you - well did you 
graduate from high school? 
No, I did not. 
How far did you go with your schooling? 
I didn't quite complete the tenth grade. 
And after that can you tell us what you 
did for employment? 
I went to work. 
Okay. And what did you go to work 
doing? 
Oh, everything from farm work to working 
in service stations to working for a manufacturing 
company. 
And can you tell us from that time, from 
the time that you got halfway through 10th grade, 
where are the different places you've lived? 
Well, we moved from California - well, 
actually, we lived in Coalinga then we moved to 
Fresno, California. 
Page 437 
You said "we," so let's go ahead and ask 
that. 
Well-
Are you married? 
- my family. 
Your family did? 
Yeah. 
When you get to the point where you met 
Johnnie, will you stop me and we will talk about 
that? Can you do that? 
Yes. 
Okay. So tell me what you did after the 
tenth grade. 
What other places you've lived, right up 
to the time you met Johnnie. 
Okay. From Coalinga to Fresno, 
California. From Fresno, California - in Fresno, I 
met Johnnie. She was-
What year was that? 
1952. 
And are you - how long have you been 
married to Johnnie? 
In two days it will be 54 years. 
And do you have any children? 
Yes, I got three boys and a girl. 
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
3 COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
4 I, DENECE GRAHAM, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
5 and Notary Public duly qualified in and for the State 
6 of Idaho do hereby certify: 
7 That said hearing was taken down by me in 
8 shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
9 thereafter reduced to computer type, and that the 
10 foregoing transcript contains a true and correct 
11 record of the said hearing, all done to the best of 
12 my ability. 
13 I further certify that I have no interest in 
14 the event of this action. 
15 WITNESS my hand this 24th day of July, 2009. 
16 
DZN~~.#324 
Official Court eporter 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
651 
EXHIBITB 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFrrHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
RECEIVED 
JUt l72009 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON, ) 
et al., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
=R=I=C=HAR=-=D=--A=---. """"":R=-O=B=E=R=T=S=O=N-=-,--) 
et al., ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs,) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JOHN KNIPE, an ) 
individual, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
-------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2008-682 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL 
(EXPEDITED) 
PRESIDING JUDGE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
DATE PAGE 
JUNE 23, 2009 6 
JUNE 24, 2009 141 
JUNE 25, 2009 413 
1 
BSA KNIPE L, PANY v RICHARD A. ROBERTSl AL CV-2008-682 1311 
Page 454 Page 456 
(1) closing on that deal? (1) Q. Okay. Then were you approached about 
(2) A. No. (2) signing a new employment contract with Knipe Land an 
(3) Q. Did they breach their contract? (3) Rowena? 
(4) A. No. (4) A. Yes. 
(5) MR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor. (5) Q. And that was presented to you; correct? 
(6) THE COURT: Sustained. (6) A. Yes. 
(7) BY MR. WETHERELL: (7) Q. And that changed it a little bit, because 
(8) Q. Was there a forfeiture of any monies as a (8) it's my understanding that now you're going to sell 
(9) result of the Harmon transaction? (9) the whole operation? 
(10) A. No. (10) A. That's correct. 
(11) Q. Why not? (11) Q. And you executed that document? 
(12) A. They didn't break the contract in any (12) A. Yes. 
(13) way. They had a contingency to where they could get (13) Q. Okay. After you executed that document 
(14) out of the contract. (14) what happened next? 
(15) Q. Now, you signed a document talking about (15) A. Clarify that for me again. 
(16) a forfeiture. Do you understand that? (16) Q. Well, now you've just signed the second 
(1l) A. Yes. (17) contract, employment contract, to sell the entire 
(18) Q. What's a forfeiture? (18) operation, both your personal property and the ranch 
(19) A. It's a breach of contract. (19) property. 
(20) Q. Okay. And why do you say that? Where do (20) A. That's correct. 
(21) you get that? (21) Q. Okay. What happened next? 
(22) A. It - I've always felt that a forfeit was (22) A. Of course they done good job on 
(23) breaking the contract in some way. (23) advertisement and everything and they brought in 
(24) Q. Have you read any books that would change (24) MidAmerica. 
(25) your opinion about what a forfeiture is? (25) Q. Okay. And now that's my question. Did 
Page 455 Page 457 
(1) A. No. (1) the Knipe Land Company do a good job for you? 
(2) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I'll object to this. (2) A. Yes, they did. 
(3) THE COURT: Overruled. (3) Q. And at this point -
(4) BY MR. WETHERELL: (4) A. Rowena was very thorough. 
(5) Q. Did anybody ever mention to you prior to (5) Q. She was very thorough, very good? 
(6) February 19 of 2007 that the Knipe Land Company (6) A. Yes. 
(7) letter, that half of the $35,000 from the Harmon deal (7) Q. Okay. And by this time now the Harmon 
(8) was going to be declared forfeited by your broker and (8) deal is over and we're just starting into the 
(9) that they were entitled to half of it? (9) MidAmerica deal. How good of friends did you become 
(10) A. No. No. (10) with Rowena? 
(11) Q. Excuse me. I'm going to have to do that (11) A. Well, I think we was friends all the way 
(12) again. (12) through. 
(13) February 19 of 2008. Prior to the Knipe (13) Q. Did she start visiting the ranch more? 
(14) letter of February 19, 2008, did anybody either in (14) A. Oh, yes. She would bring her husband out 
(15) writing or verbally mention to you that your own (15) in the evening time and we would visit and ... 
(16) broker was going to declare that money forfeit and (16) Q. Did you have dinners together? 
(17) claim half of it? (17) A. No, we never had dinner together, no. 
(18) A. No. (18) Q. Did you go fishing with them or just 
(19) Q. So what happened next? (19) show-
(20) A. I got a letter from Knipe Land. (20) A. No, but I give her permission to go 
(21) Q. Okay. Now I want to go to the MidAmerica (21) fishing, yes. 
(22) deal? (22) Q. Do you think she would have caught a fish 
(23) A. Oh. (23) if you would have taken her fishing? 
(24) Q. The Harmon deal is over. All right? (24) A. Oh, I'm sure of that. 
(25) A. Okay. (25) Q. Okay. 
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(1) A. Yes. (1) before? 
(2) Q. And you sell them? (2) A. Right in that area, yeah. 
(3) How much would a pup from a champion (3) Q. You mentioned a trespass lease? 
(4) line, or a sire and a dam that showed well in (4) A. Yeah. 
(5) competition, how much would a puppy you might sell (5) Q. I hate to sound ignorant, but what is 
(6) cost in 2006, 2007? (6) that again? 
(7) A. 750 is our average price. (7) A. To give access to your property. 
(8) Q. Do you also have commercial - do you (8) Q. Okay. So that's when a hunting group 
(9) also open your land for guided hunts, bird hunting? (9) comes, and do you have a signed contract for that? 
(10) A. Not guided hunts, but trespass leases. (10) A. No, we don't sign a contract. 
(11) Q. Pardon me? (11) Q. Do you send the hunters any written 
(12) A. Trespass leases. (12) documentation to, you know, formalize the terms of 
(13) Q. What's that? (13) them coming onto your land and hunting birds? 
(14) A. To where a guy pays for access to come (14) A. We - we do have a - a liability form. 
(15) onto your property and to hunt. (15) Q. Is that a contract? 
(16) Q. How much does that cost? (16) A. Yeah, form to sign. 
(17) A. It varies. If they - you know, normally (17) Q. Okay. Who wrote it? 
(18) it's about $350 a day per gun. (18) A. Derek Pica. 
(19) Q. Per hunter? (19) Q. What's the point of a liability 
(20) A. Per hunter, yeah. (20) contract? 
(21) Q. So say - and again, you know, times are (21) A. Releasing liability to us while they're 
(22) rough right now for everybody, but I'm looking back (22) on the property. 
(23) to 2006 and 2007. So about how many of these hunts (23) Q. So and you have the hunters sign this 
(24) did you have over the bird season, or over the year? (24) contract? 
(25) A. Oh, well, we don't do it yearly, we only (25) A. Yes. 
Page 491 Page 493 
(1 ) do it from first of October to the end of the season, (1) Q. And I'm - tell me what it provides. 
(2) which sometimes it ends December 31 and sometimes - (2) A. What's that? 
(3) Q. Sure. (3) Q. Does it provides for a hunter agreeing 
(4) A. - it ends January 15. But we never book (4) with you that if he has an accident or hurts himself 
(5) anything after the first of the year, so it's always (5) he's not going to sue you for some dangerous 
(6) between first of October and into the - December. (6) condition? 
(7) Q. So during though years how many hunters (7) A. That's correct. 
(8) ballpark do you think - (8) Q. Does it provide for anything else? 
(9) A. Usually we have about five parties that (9) A. No. 
(10) will come on and hunt. (10) Q. Ever have a hunter break that contract 
(11) Q. Now is that $350 per hunter? (11 ) and sue you anyway? 
(12) A. Yes. (12) A. No. 
(13) Q. Per day? (13) Q. They always lived up to their end of the 
(14) A. Yes. (14) contract? 
(15) Q. How long is an average hunt? (15) A. Yes. 
(16) A. Well, they can hunt, you know, as many (16) Q. Mr. Robertson, you've bought ahd sold 
(17) hours as they want to hunt. (17) real property before you bought the ranch we're about 
(18) Q. Do you have clients that come out or did (18) today, haven't you? 
(19) you have clients that came out and spent a week? (19) A. Yes. 
(20) A. No. (20) Q. And you've also bought and sold both 
(21) Q. Couple days? (21) residential and commercial property; right? 
(22) A. Probably the longest group we ever had in (22) A. Yes. 
(23) would be probably four days maybe. We used to have a (23) Q. Have you signed contracts in those 
(24) group that would do five days. (24) transactions? 
(25) Q. Was that during the 2006-2007 period or (25) A. Yes. 
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(1) Q. Have you lived up to your end of those (1) A. It's just what I thought it meant. 
(2) contracts? (2) Q. Let's just look at that language just a 
(3) A. Yes. (3) little bit more that's in the employment contracts. 
(4) Q. Have the people you - and of course (4) We've been over that a lot. And it's. "should a 
(5) leaving aside our present controversy - have the (5) deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be 
(6) people you signed the contracts with lived up to (6) forfeited. one-half thereon may be retained by you" 
(7) their end? (7) - you understood "you" to be my client; right? 
(8) A. Yes. (8) A. Yes. 
(9) Q. Do you expect that if a contract is (9) Q. "And one half the balance" - the other 
(10) written in plain English that the other side should (10) half - "would be paid to me." 
(11) just live up to that? (11) A. Right. 
(12) A. Well. if it's a legal contract and both (12) Q. "Me" being you and your wife and the 
(13) parties sign. I think they should live up to it, (13) company? 
(14) yes. (14) A. Right. 
(15) Q. Has that always been your rule? (15) Q. And that was - you read that in both 
(16) A. Yes. (16) contracts? 
(17) Q. All right. Do you try to - do you read (17) A. Yeah. But then it goes on, I believe, to 
(18) your contracts before you sign them? (18) say, shall not exceed the commission. 
(19) A. Yes. (19) Q. All right. And that - yes, it does, it 
(20) Q. Did you read the employment contracts (20) says that. 
(21) that we're talking about in this case before - (21) A. Yep. 
(22) A. Yes. (22) Q. All right. Do you think - all right. 
(23) Q. - you signed them? (23) Now, let's just step back a moment. 
(24) Did you have any question about the (24) The Harmons paid $50.000. Okay? Do you 
(25) meaning of any words in this contract? (25) think that was a deposit or amount paid on account of 
Page 495 Page 497 
(1) A. No. (1) the purchase of the land? 
(2) Q. Now, we're talking - at this contract (2) A. Yes, it was a deposit towards the 
(3) we're talking about listing agreements, the (3) purchase of the property. yes. 
(4) employment contracts signed in 2005. and the (4) Q. All right. I'll ask the same question 
(5) employment contract with my client in 2007. You read (5) about the $450,000 MidAmerican paid. Was that a 
(6) both contracts carefully, didn't you? (6) deposit or amount paid on account of the purchase of 
(7) A. Yes. (7) your land? 
(8) Q. You didn't have any question about the (8) A. Well. there was more to it with -
(9) meaning of any of the words in that, in either (9) Q. No, no. 
(10) contract. did you? (10) A. - MidAmerica. 
(11) A. No. (ll)Q. Well, please just answer yes or no. Was 
(12) Q. Did you tell anybody connected with Knipe (12) it or wasn't it? 
(13) Land that - what you thought the word "forfeiture" (13) A. The money would be taken off the purchase 
(14) meant? (14) price of the property. 
(15) A. No. (15) Q. Okay. So you'd agree with me that it was 
(16) Q. The definition of "forfeiture" that you (16) a deposit or amount paid on account of purchase of 
(17) discussed with your attorney, is that based on (17) the land? 
(18) anything other than your feeling? (18) A. Except that the main reason it was given 
(19) A. Rephrase that. (19) was for due diligence. 
(20) Q. Is it based on anything other than just (20) Q. Just - we'll get to that. Are you 
(21) what- how you feel? (21) saying it wasn't deposited or paid on account of 
(22) A. Yes. (22) purchase of your land? That's all I'm asking. 
(23) Q. Is it based on somebody defining (23) A. Yes, it was. 
(24) something or a particular experience that we should (24) Q. All right. And if the sale had gone 
(25) talk about? (25) through, that money would have been part of the 
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(1) A. Yeah. (1) Q. This was between you and MidAmerican, 
(2) Q. - and I'm just trying to find out why (2) right, for the sale of your land to it, in fact, that 
(3) you made your choice. That's what we're talking (3) was the point of this agreement? 
(4) about when you began your discussion here. (4) A. Yes. 
(5) A. The reason we made that choice was where (5) Q. There wasn't any discussion between you 
(6) we could stay there to give us time to where we could (6) and MidAmerican about how your agreement with it was 
(7) look for the type of property it takes to run this (7) going to affect your listing contract the years 
(8) kind of business. (8) before with Knipe Land Company, was there? 
(9) Q. All right. So then your one of factors (9) A. No. 
(10) on why you chose the period of time or the contract (10) Q. There wasn't any discussion during the 
(11) with the more money but the larger lead time was (11) negotiations for this transaction with Mr. Knipe 
(12) because you could stay there for three years. (12) about how it was going to affect your listing 
(13) A. I n this contract - (13) contracts with Knipe Land Company, was there? 
(14) Q. Yes. (14) A. No. 
(15) A. -yes. (15) Q. You didn't tell anybody that you thought 
(16) Q. So it was a three-year lead time that was (16) if MidAmerican backed out, that that really - and 
(17) appealing to you, not ten years? (17) lost any claim to its money, that that in your mind 
(18) A. Right. (18) was not going to be a forfeiture under the terms of 
(19) Q. I just wanted to clarify. (19) the listing agreement. You didn't discuss that with 
(20) And also the fact that you'd make - that (20) anybody, did you? 
(21) the longer period-of-time contract that MidAmerica (21) A. No. 
(22) offered would bring you a third again more money, and (22) Q. When MidAmerican did terminate, 
(23) here we are talking about very large amounts, that (23) Mr. Robertson, this agreement gave you a choice of 
(24) was an important factor, too, wasn't it? (24) three things to do, didn't it? And the three - I'm 
(25) A. Absolutely. (25) talking all together, because they're all basically 
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(1) Q. Were you aware that the offer you (1) the same, aren't they, the wording is the same on the 
(2) accepted gave MidAmerican more time to reconsider its (2) October agreements? 
(3) position and pull out if it wanted to than the other (3) A. On what now? 
(4) offer? (4) Q. I'm sorry, I'm getting a little ahead of 
(5) A. Yes. (5) myself. 
(6) Q. So you were aware of that risk? (6) All three of the October sales agreements 
(7) A. Yes. (7) with MidAmerican are the same provisions; right? 
(8) Q. Did Knipe Land discuss that with you, (8) A. Yes. 
(9) Mr. Knipe? (9) Q. They just - the single transaction 
(10) A. No. (10) looked at different parcels of property. 
(11) Q. He did not? (11) A. Yes. 
(12) A. No. (12) Q. And you asked for it to be divided up 
(13) Q. But your aware of it all by yourself? (13) that way? 
(14) A. Yes. (14) A. Yes. 
(15) Q. Did you have other consultants helping (15) Q. For your tax planning? 
(16) you in your decision on what to do about this (16) A. Yes. 
(17) MidAmerican - (17) Q. All right. These October agreements in 
(18) A. No. (18) Paragraph 16 anticipate MidAmerica changing its mind 
(19) Q. Didn't have an accountant or lawyer or (19) and not going through with the deal, didn't they? 
(20) anybody? (20) Maybe you could look at that paragraph -
(21) A. I had a lawyer look at the contracts. (21) tell me what exhibit you're looking at so we're 
(22) Q. When you were discussing the contract - (22) a/l-
(23) and you negotiated the contract with MidAmerican; (23) A. 29. 
(24) right? (24) Q. 29, now is that the September agreement? 
(25) A. Yes. (25) MR. WETHERELL: October. 
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(1) A. Borah High School in Boise. (1) A. I did. 
(2) Q. Go Lions? (2) Q. And did you have the opportunity to meet 
(3) A. Absolutely. (3) with Ms. Rowena Strain? 
(4) Q. Okay. And then where did you - did you (4) A. I did. 
(5) go to college? (5) Q. And did you have an opportunity to meet 
(6) A. I took college courses at Boise State (6) with Johnnie Richardson (sic)? 
(7) University. (7) A. Yes, I did, sir. 
(8) Q. And then ultimately did you take a job (8) Q. Did you have an opportunity to meet with 
(9) with MidAmerican? (9) Richard Richardson? 
(10) A. Yes,l did. (10) A. Yes, I did. 
(11) Q. And when did you start working for (11) Q. And was that all in conjunction with 
(12) MidAmerican? (12) negotiating the purchase of the ranch property that 
(13) A. The nuclear business or the holding (13) Mr. Richardson owned? 
(14) company? (14) A. That is correct. 
(15) Q. What is MidAmerican? (15) Q. All right. Did you ultimately enter into 
(16) A. MidAmerican Energy Holding Company is a (16) a contract with him for the purchase of his ranch? 
(17) holding company that will owns several energy (17) A. Yes,l did. 
(18) businesses. They own PacifiCorp, which is a (18) Q. Okay. And you did that on behalf of 
(19) regulated utility headquartered in Portland, Oregon. (19) MidAmerica; correct? 
(20) They own MidAmerican Energy Company, which is a (20) A. That is correct. 
(21) regulated utility that is headquartered in (21) Q. All right. Could you look - well, since 
(22) Des Moines, Iowa. And they also owned MidAmerican (22) it's right on everybody's mind, could you look at 
(23) Nuclear Energy Company, and they have other (23) Exhibit 29. 
(24) business. (24) I have associate by the name of 
(25) Q. And then what's the - who was my client (25) Richardson and he is been here, so it's Robertson. 
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(1) dealing with in this transaction? (1) You understand that? 
(2) A. Initially when the transaction started I (2) A. Yes. 
(3) was conducting business as an employee of PacifiCorp (3) Q. Don't - correct me when I make 
(4) for the MidAmerican Energy Holding Company. (4) mistakes. 
(5) Q. Okay. Now, is this a (5) A. All right, no problem. 
(6) multi-million-dollar operation you're working for? (6) Q. Can you look at Paragraph 16 of 
(7) A. Yes, it is, sir. (7) Exhibit 29. 
(8) Q. What is your title with this (8) A. Okay. Seller's remedies? 
(9) organization? (9) Q. Seller's remedies. Do you see that? 
(10) A. My current title is president of (10) A. Uh-huh. 
(11 ) Interwest Mining Company. (11) Q. Okay. And that's a yes? 
(12) Q. And in two - well, when you were (12) A. Yes. 
(13) negotiated with my client Richard, what was your (13) Q. All right. And you entered into a 
(14) title? (14) contract that has certain contingencies; correct? 
(15) A. At the beginning of the negotiations, (15) A. That is correct. 
(16) sir, I was the managing director of strategy for (16) Q. All right. Now, look at Paragraph 16. 
(17) PacifiCorp's Energy Division, and at the conclusion (17) And it says, quote, "if the seller accepts the offer 
(18) of our contractual relationship I was the vice (18) contained in this agreement." Do you see that first 
(19) president of business development for MidAmerican (19) line? 
(20) Nuclear Energy Company. (20) A. I do. 
(21) Q. Were you the point woman for MidAmerica (21) Q. And then it says, "and buyer" - which 
(22) in this transaction with Richard? (22) would be MidAmerican; correct? 
(23) A. Yes, I was. (23) A. That would be correct. 
(24) Q. And did you have an opportunity to meet (24) Q. "Refuses or neglects to consummate the 
(25) with Mr. Knipe? (25) transaction." Did MidAmerica refuse or neglect to 
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(1) consummate this transaction? (1) A. (Nodding affirmatively.) 
(2) A. No, we did not. (2) Q. - and - okay. So careful when you 
(3) Q. And why do you say that? Tell the jury (3) answer the question. All right? 
(4) why you did not refuse or neglect to consummate this (4) So there were three payments of $150,000 
(5) transaction. (5) each; correct? 
(6) A. The contract was structured to provide us (6) A. That is correct. 
(7) a due diligence window of time in which we had the (7) Q. What was that money paid for? 
(8) right to terminate. And we exercised that right to (8) A. That was nonrefundable earnest money that 
(9) terminate during that period. (9) we paid to get immediate and unfettered access to the 
(10) Q. All right. And do you have lawyers that (10) property, and so that we could perform nuclear plant 
(11 ) work for your company? (11) due diligence activities that are quite intrusive in 
(12) A. Plenty. (12) a very short period of time. 
(13) Q. So you have plenty of lawyers that work (13) Q. I'm going to represent to you that there 
(14) for your company. And you drafted this - your (14) has been testimony by one of the real estate 
(15) lawyer dra.fted this contract; correct? (15) professionals in this case that that money was not 
(16) A. That is correct. (16) paid for access to the property. You said you knew 
(17) Q. In the transaction we are here about (17) Ms. Strain? 
(18) today, does this paragraph even come into play? (18) A. I don't know her, sir, but I did meet 
(19) A. Not as far as - (19) her. 
(20) MR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor. (20) Q. Okay. You did meet her. Did you discuss 
(21) THE WITNESS: - we're concerned, your honor (21) with her at all what this $150,000 was for? 
(22) - or sir. (22) A. I never had any direct or any separate 
(23) MR. GESTON: Objection. (23) discussions with her, sir. 
(24) THE COURT: Sustained. (24) Q. Okay. In any event, you're representing 
(25) BY MR. WETHERELL: (25) the company that's paying this money, and you paid it 
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(1) Q. Well, let's go on. You say MidAmerica (1) for access to the property; is that correct? 
(2) never refused or neglected to do anything; correct? (2) A. That is correct. 
(3) A. That is correct. (3) Q. I do have to ask you this question. 
(4) Q. Okay. Now let's go back down to what the (4) Being from Washington, you understand 
(5) remedies for the seller. Do you see that? (5) there is no subpoena power that I have or this court 
(6) A. I do. (6) has over you; correct? 
(7) Q. Did my client, Mr. Robertson or Johnnie (7) A. I understand that. 
(8) or anybody associated with my client, quote - well, (8) Q. Okay. And you have voluntarily on your 
(9) declare a forfeiture? (9) own dime flown to Boise, driven to Payette, and 
(10) A. No, they did not. (10) appeared here to testify to these people today; is 
(11) Q. Now, there has been testimony that there (11) that correct? 
(12) were three payments made by MidAmerica of $150,000. (12) A. I was asked if I would be able to and my 
(13) Is that your understanding? (13) schedule permitted, and so I had other business in 
(14) A. I need to understand the court's position (14) Boise and made the trip. 
(15) on our confidentiality agreement, sir. (15) Q. Okay. So you made arrangements to do 
(16) Q. We can't talk about your big numbers, but (16) other work while you're here? 
(17) we can talk about the earnest money. Okay. (17) A. Yes, I did. I met Idaho Power on other 
(18) A. Could you scoot over for me for just a (18) matters. 
(19) quick second so I can see my counsel, sir? (19) Q. Okay. But you're here voluntarily, you 
(20) Q. You brought your lawyer with you, didn't (20) haven't been subpoenaed? 
(21) you? Okay. So you're lawyer's in the courtroom; (21) A. That is correct. 
(22) correct? (22) Q. And I guess what I'm getting to, I didn't 
(23) A. Yes, sir. (23) buy your plane ticket to be here, did I? 
(24) Q. Okay. So you're being watched by the (24) A. No. 
(25) jury and your lawyer - (25) Q. Okay. And there is no agreement that 
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(1) A. I believe it referred to the, period after (1) Q. So you didn't have to consummate the 
(2) the due diligence period ended, up until the close. (2) contract? 
(3) Q. But didn't the due diligence period go (3) A. Not during the due diligence period. 
(4) right up to the close? (4) Q. Well, you said - your letter to the 
(5) A. No, sir, it did not. (5) Robertsons said, we terminate the contract, and 
(6) Q. What intervened? (6) MidAmerica had no further efforts to buy that - or 
(7) A. I'm sorry, sir? (7) no further agreement to buy that property; is that 
(8) Q. What intervened? What was to happen (8) correct? 
(9) between MidAmerican's ability to be on the land and (9) A. That is correct. 
(10) the actual closing? (10) Q. And MidAmerican forfeited it's $450,000, 
(11) A. There was a due diligence period that was (11) didn't it? 
(12) defined by the contract. The closing period was a (12) A. We did not forfeited that. We paid that 
(13) 12-month closing window. (13) as nonrefundable up front as part of our access to 
(14) Q. So you had any time within a year to (14) the property. 
(15) actually pay the full purchase price and receive a (15) Q. Where does it say that in the agreement? 
(16) deed? (16) A. It's listed as nonrefundable -
(17) A. That is correct. (17) Q. Okay. 
(18) Q. Could you just show me where that date is (18) A. - earnest money. 
(19) it provided in that contract. (19) Q. Okay. I was talking about the rest of 
(20) Are we looking at - on page 3, (20) your statement. Nonrefundable for access to the 
(21) Paragraph 6, it says closing date, September 23, (21) property, where does it say that? 
(22) 2008? (22) A. It's defined as earnest money in the 
(23) A. That's correct. (23) contract. 
(24) Q. So if we'd gotten to that, if we had (24) Q. Okay. I know that, I'm just saying - I 
(25) gotten to that closing date and MidAmerican said it's (25) was trying to follow up on the rest of your 
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(1 ) happy with the land, here is a check for the (1) description. You said for access to the property. 
(2) remainder of the purchase price deducting the (2) Where does it say that? 
(3) $450,000, give us a deed; right? (3) A. It doesn't define that in the contract. 
(4) A. Yes. (4) Q. So it doesn't say it in the contract. 
(5) Q. And that would have consummated the (5) Does it? 
(6) agreement? (6) A. It does not define that in the contract, 
(7) A. Correct. (7) sir. 
(8) Q. And that's consistent if you look - (8) Q. It doesn't even say anything like that in 
(9) let's see, on page 2, paragraph - well, 3-C, see at (9) the contract, does it? 
(10) the top it says final earnest money? (10) A. It does not say "access" in the contract, 
(11) Do you see that? (11) sir. 
(12) It's right above - (12) Q. There is nothing that directly relates 
(13) A. Yes. (13) the payment of the earnest money, the $150,000 
(14) Q. - numbered paragraph you see where D it (14) payments that were made by MidAmerican, specifically 
(15) says, final earnest money, and the last sentence of (15) to access to the property. There is nothing like 
(16) that paragraph says, if the transaction contemplated (16) that in that agreement, is there? 
(17) herein is consummated in accordance did the term of (17) A. Not in the contract, no, sir. 
(18) the agreement, the final earnest money shall be (18) Q. And there is not anything like that in 
(19) applied to the purchase price at closing. So the (19) any of the other three contracts MidAmerica signed, 
(20) closing would be the consummation of this contract. (20) is there? 
(21) A. Correct. (21) A. No, sir. They are all identical with the 
(22) Q. But MidAmerica said, we're terminating (22) exception of which property and the amounts. 
(23) the contract; is that correct? (23) Q. MidAmerica never - when MidAmerica 
(24)A. We had the right to do that during the (24) terminated the agreement, it had no more intention of 
(25) due diligence period. (25) - well, consummating the contract, did it? 
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(1) A. That was written February 24, 2006. (1) MR. GESTON: 1'/1 renew the objection, Your 
(2) Q. February 24, 2000-what? (2) Honor. I can see where he's going. 
(3) A. '6. (3) THE COURT: Yeah, there is a plain and clear 
(4) Q. 2006. (4) meaning of forfeiture, this is argumentative. 
(5) Now, would it - if Richard received that (5) Sustained 
(6) check for $25,000 nonrefundable earnest money and (6) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(7) neither you nor Knipe claimed a dime of it, wouldn't (7) Q. I'm going to - if I was to read you a 
(8) he think that that was nonrefundable earnest money (8) definition, number one definition of forfeiture, 
(9) and not forfeited money? (9) something surrendered and -
(10) A. He signed- (10) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I think I just 
(11 ) MR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor, calls for (11 ) objected and that was sustained. 
(12) speculation. (12) THE COURT: I'll sustain it. Maybe 
(13) THE COURT: Sustained. (13) Mr. Wetherell can call his own witnesses about their 
(14) BY MR. WETHERELL: (14) understanding. 
(15) Q. What's the definition of a forfeiture, (15) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(16) ma'am, do you know? (16) Q. You had my client sign this agreement; 
(17) A. No. (17) correct? 
(18) Forfeited - (18) A. Your client is a very expertise 
(19) Q. Now, wait a minute. This is a term you (19) businessman. He - he read-
(20) had my client sign? (20) THE COURT: Ms. Strain, please. 
(21) A. Okay. Forfeited means the money - it's (21) THE WITNESS: Okay. 
(22) just common language, it means that when you forfeit (22) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(23) something it is no longer to benefit you, it is money (23) Q. Did you have my client sign this 
(24) that is gone, you cannot recoup it. It's gone (24) agreement? 
(25) forever. (25) A. I did not have him. Your client elected 
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(1) Q. Nonrefundable earnest money is gone (1 ) to sign the agreement. 
(2) forever, isn't it, unless the sale goes through? (2) Q. Okay. Anywhere in that agreement does 
(3) A. Gone from the - from the potential (3) the contract define "forfeiture" for him? 
(4) buyer, it is gone. (4) A. No, it-
(5) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, upon the apprehension (5) Q. It doesn't? 
(6) that we may be referring to a treatise here going to (6) A. No, it doesn't. 
(7) the dictionary, I'll object. There is no implication (7) Q. Now we're here over $300,000, and the 
(8) of ambiguity in the wording here. (8) term you're using is forfeiture and it's not defined 
(9) THE COURT: Well, I'll have to see. (9) in that contract; is that correct? 
(10) MR. WETHERELL: I haven't asked my question (10) A. That is correct. 
(11 ) yet, judge. (11) Q. Okay. So explain to me again why, in 
(12) BY MR. WETHERELL: (12) 2006, you guys didn't declare that $25,000 forfeited 
(13) Q. All right. You said the plain and (13) and split it with him, as opposed to writing him a 
(14) ordinary term - forfeiture is a plain and ordinary (14) check for the whole thing? 
(15) term; correct? (15) A. When we wrote the check it was not - at 
(16) A. It's if - I shouldn't say plain and (16) that time there was still a pending sale, and that 
(17) ordinary. It's a terminology that we - that we have (17) money would have been released to him as 
(18) quite often that the - most of us are familiar with (18) nonrefundable moneys. 
(19) it. I would say the average person is very familiar (19) Q. Well, now, once again, you're a licensed 
(20) with forfeit. (20) real estate agent; correct? 
(21) Q. Okay. Would you agree with me you could (21) A. Yes. 
(22) look at a dictionary - if I was looking for a (22) Q. And if two or more people are entitled to 
(23) definition of a plain and ordinary term, I didn't (23) money and it's in a trust account, do you know what's 
(24) know quite what it was,l could look in the American (24) supposed to happen to it? 
(25) Heritage Dictionary? (25) A. In a - in a trust account? 
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(1) PRO C E E DIN G 
(2) 
(3) OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: 
(4) THE COURT: Please be seated. 
(5) We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel 
(6) and parties are present. 
(7) Counsel? 
(8) MR. WETHERELL: Excuse me, Your Honor? 
(9) THE COURT: Somebody want to take something 
(10) up? 
(11) MR. WETHERELL: Oh, yes, Your Honor, I had an 
(12) offer of proof on using the dictionary, because this 
(13) is the last witness of the plaintiff's case in chief, 
(14) and I just wanted to say that both Rowena testified 
(15) that you use the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
(16) term. It's my understanding - welf, the law is if 
(17) it has a set legal meaning you're supposed to go with 
(18) the set legal meaning. 
(19) Welf, I can't find Idaho case that has a 
(20) set legal meaning for forfeiture. The closest one I 
(21) could find was that opinion of Judge Mitchelf where 
(22) Judge Mitchelf had this very contract in front of him 
(23) and the defense argued that - the defense argued 
(24) that it wasn't enforceable and what Judge Mitchelf 
(25) ruled was that as matter of law that since there was 
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(1) no breach of contract there couldn't be a forfeiture, 
(2) and therefore this provision that we're talking about 
(3) here didn't apply. That's the closest thing I find 
(4) that's a set legal meaning. 
(5) And then it's my understanding under the 
(6) law that if it isn't defined in the contract, there 
(7) is not a set legal meaning, you would go to plain and 
(8) ordinary meaning. And, of course, it's our position 
(9) the plain and ordinary meaning would come right out 
(10) of the dictionary, so I have the American Heritage 
(11 ) Dictionary where it would define forfeiture -
(12) Judge, I ended up in the emergency room 
(13) last night because of this eye and I'm having a hard 
(14) time reading today. I kind of look like Popeye. 
(15) THE COURT: Yeah. 
(16) MR. WETHERELL: Okay. 
(17) The American Heritage, if I was alfowed 
(18) to I would have the witnesses testify the very first 
(19) definition is, quote, "something surrendered as 
(20) punishment for an offense or breach of contract." 
(21) And then Webster's plain and ordinary 
(22) meaning of the term is the very first one, 
(23) forfeiture, from Webster's Handy Cof/egiate 
(24) Dictionary, is a deposit - a posit hostage or agreed 
(25) penalty surrendered through neglect default! a crime, 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11 ) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11 ) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
Page 416 
error, et cetera. And that's what I would use, 
judge. 
And I don't want to do it with Mr. Knipe 
if the court's going to stay with its ruling, so I 
wanted to make that offer of proof at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Geston. 
MR. GESTON: Welf, Your Honor, I think the 
court's decision is correct. I mean, the very 
argument itself shows that we don't need a 
dictionary. Counsel says let's refer to a treatise 
for a plainly and ordinary meaning of a word. Welf, 
if the jury can't - doesn't know the plain and 
ordinary meaning of a particular word, it's not a 
plain and ordinary word. So that's the jury's 
business and I think they can perfectly welf figure 
out what the word "forfeiture" means in this 
contract. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
objection. I think forfeiture is - the 
understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this 
context is just an unequivocal surrender of any claim 
or interest in controverted sum. So I think they 
understand that. 
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
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objection. I think it would be time-wasting, I think 
it would be a diversion of our juror and factfinder 
for something that's easily comprehended by them. 
I'm going to sustain it. 
MR. WETHERELL: And then, judge, with that 
ruling then I wiff not use this - I won't use this 
at alf. 
THE COURT: Just have him telf us what he 
thinks it means, and then have your client telf us 
what he thinks it means, because that's why we're 
here. 
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge. 
THE COURT: Alf right. Thanks. 
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: 
THE COURT: Alf right. Please be seated. 
We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel 
and parties are present, jurors are present. 
We're continuing with the 
cross-examination of Mr. Knipe. 
Sir, you wifl recalf you have been sworn 
and are under oath. 
Go ahead, sir. 
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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My view of this case is that the reason 
we are here is that it faJls between the legal 
cracks. If it were that patently clear, I'm sure 
sagacious counsel as we have in this case would have 
found some way to avoid determining the resolution to 
a jury. 
So at this juncture I'm charged with 
viewing the proofs in an evidence most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. And we can dispatch a couple of 
things that are raised in - what's it caJled 
EJlsbury or - the New Jersey case. 
MR. WETHERELL: EJlsworth Dobbs. 
THE COURT: Right, EJlsworth Dobbs, and its 
progener in that there is no inequality of bargaining 
power here. I'm satisfied by the proofs that 
although Mr. Robertson did not even complete the 
tenth grade, he's obviously a man of vast 
intefligence, and better yet he's shrewd. There is 
just no showing that there is any inequality of 
bargaining power. He resorted to authorities before 
and consulted his personal authorities before he 
entered into this transaction. 
What drives what - in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, a showing can be 
made that this was an incredibly unique piece of 
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realty, that there was some showing that the sale may 
take a extended period of time because of the 
significance of the real property, it's beauty and 
the extent of it. 
In that case, the parties could have 
we", and, in fact, in these two transactions, the 
parties - it could have been within the 
contemplation of the parties that there would be 
actuaJly a technical forfeiture of the monies. And 
in both of these he transactions the purchasers did 
forfeit the money, that is, they made a voluntary and 
unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in the 
controverted sums. There was a literal forfeiture. 
And because of the extensive negotiations 
involved, the parties could have contemplated that 
there might be a case in which there was a 
forfeiture. And even in the Lee Electric case my 
good and scholarly friend Justice Burdick 
contemplated that there may be some instance where 
this is a factual ambiguity, and in such cases that's 
a fact question that's left to the trier of fact. 
And for those reasons and because of the 
uniqueness of these particular facts, I think it 
would be improvident for me to grant a motion for 
directed verdict and/or summary judgment and the same 
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wifl be denied again. 
Let's see. Are we ready to continue? 
And we were about to start Mr. Robertson's cross. 
Anything else before we begin? 
MR. GESTON: Not for the plaintiff, Your 
Honor. 
MR. WETHERELL: WeJl, judge, while we have 
moment, I'JI just - we have that Consumer Protection 
claim that-
THE COURT: Yep. 
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: You didn't submit any instructions 
on it. 
MR. WETHERELL: WeJl, and it wifJ - the way 
you read that statute is it looks like it's an 
equitable remedy the court imposes. 
THE COURT: WeJl, as far as damages go. 
MR. WETHERELL: Correct. I just - I was just 
wondering how the court wanted - how the court 
wanted to handle that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Geston has got an idea. 
MR. GESTON: WeJl, Your Honor, first of aJl I 
don't think there's been any proof of it as the 
court's -
THE COURT: WeJl, we aren't anywhere near done 
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with this case. 
MR. GESTON: WeJl, so far then. So far. 
THE COURT: I told him yesterday to hold off 
on that. 
MR. GESTON: Sure. 
THE COURT: That's going to get us aJl murky. 
MR. GESTON: We don't have any instructions on 
it as the judge has just observed, and I'm not so 
sure - I mean, the problem is, is that the prime 
right of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act is 48-608. That has hasn't received a lot of 
treatment by the Supreme Court. There's the Noah 
case and there is the Fenn - weJl, Noah versus Fenn 
and I think one other. And that reaJly just said 
about the measure of damages that there is that 
$1,000 alternative to actual damages. That sounds 
like a matter for a jury rather than an equitable 
action. This is a statutory remedy. 
THE COURT: WeJl, we can sort aJl that out 
with a special verdict, but I understand. Goes from 
nominal damages by showing just a violation up to 
actual damages. So we wiJl just see what he can put 
on, you know, and then we'JI take a look at it at the 
end. If he hasn't made out a case I'm sure you'JI 
point it out to me. 
D~l'Ia A"7A +_ b ___ A"'" 
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what you think each of these individuals know. And 
plaintiff refused. And that was never supplemented. 
I have no idea what she's going to say, I have 
nothing in the record, I had no reason to go depose 
her or send her any inquiries. 
THE COURT: Make is an offer of proof here, 
Mr. Wetherell, while we were in recess and tell me 
here what you think she can testify to. 
MR. WETHERELL: She will testify that she was 
present - first of all, she's senior vice president 
of MidAmerica, she is the one that negotiated this 
deal and dealt with the real estate agents involved 
and with my client, and that the $150,000 payments 
were paid for access to the property and she was 
present when that was discussed and that's why they 
paid that money. Oh, and that and that there was no 
forfeiture. So those are the two areas -
THE COURT: I'm not going to let her make that 
conclusion. How could she make that conclusion? She 
doesn't know all - we", she could say it was my 
intention to give up the money and forfeit, how is 
she going to make the conclusion it wasn't 
forfeited. That's why we're here. 
MR. WETHERELL: She's just - she's going to 
say I did not consider that money paid as a 
Page 483 
forfeiture, I paid that money for access to the 
ranch. That's it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Geston. 
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, two things. First of 
all we're to look at the substance I'm equally 
puzzled as how she can even talk about such things. 
But first thing I'd like to bring to the court's 
attention, all this is news to me. I'm hearing it 
now for the first time. 
Now we identified her as a person we 
thought to have knowledge, but we didn't know what it 
was so we didn't ask for our interrogatories and 
we're not going to ask to put her on. Now they tell 
us, identifying her as a witness, the first time we 
got her deSignation last week or within ten days, and 
no supplementation of discovery, no response to our 
request, and what do you think each of these people 
know that is relevant to our controversy. 
And yet the plaintiff's answer was, well, 
you know, you go find out. Now I don't think that's 
the way this discovery process should proceed. 
MR. WETHERELL: It's exactly the way it 
proceeds. It's our - this is a witness that we 
don't control. There is no rule that requires us to 
te" the other side what witnesses we have no control 
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over-
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WETHERELL: - wifJ testify to. 
THE COURT: Well, it's not a surprise to me 
that she's going to testify, and I know a lot less 
about it than either of you do. And, secondly, you 
know, when we've got experienced counsel like this 
and they see Ms. Crane knocking around the case, then 
they can take whatever actions they want to take. 
Second thing is that I'll permit her to 
testify on the course of negotiations with 
Mr. Robertson just to corroborate his testimony if 
that's what it's being put on for, but I'm not going 
to let her testify or give legal conclusions to this 
jury about the ultimate fact in question, which is, 
did MidAmerica forfeit money. All right? 
MR. WETHERELL: I understand. 
THE COURT: Let's take another five since we 
took this long, tiJI 10:20 by the courtroom clock. 
(Recess.) 
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
We're again taking up 08-682. 
And, Mr. Robertson, you're on the stand, 
you will recall you have under oath and you have been 
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sworn. 
Our jurors are all present and seated 
appropriately and counsel and parties are here. 
Mr. Geston. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GESTON: 
Hello, Mr. Robertson. 
Hello. 
I'd like to begin by going over one or 
two of things you mentioned about your background 
with the property yourself. 
You said you purchased the property we've 
been talking about in 1997? 
I believe it was December of '97 that we 
done it. 
Thereabouts? 
Yeah. 
How much did you pay for it? 
MR. WETHERELL: Objection, Your Honor, 
irrelevant. 
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, we've already gone 
into -
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. GESTON: 
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(1) he did back out of it? (1) Q. And what is that? 
(2) A. I heard Rowena say that, yes. (2) A. It looks like a note I wrote to Richard 
(3) Q. Do you recall her saying that? (3) and Johnnie telling them that First American says 
(4) MR. GESTON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. (4) they have the earnest money, they're going to prepare 
(5) Back out of what deal, counsel? (5) a document for everyone to sign confirming it's okay 
(6) BY MR. WETHERELl: (6) to release the money, it's nonrefundable money. 
(7) Q. Backed out of this listing of February (7) 'Will fax or email to you their document upon 
(8) 20, '08, that he could back out at any time and he (8) receipt. Thank you, John." 
(9) did. Do you remember her telling the jury that? (9) Q. So now this is an email that you sent to 
(10) A. I remember her telling us that, yes. (10) Richard. Was this on the very first $150,000 that 
(11) Q. Okay. (11) was released from the MidAmerican deal? 
(12) A. I'm not saying that I agree with it, (12) A. I don't see that it says, but I assume it 
(13) but - (13) is. 
(14) Q. Well, you don't agree with it because (14) MR. WETHERELl: Okay. I'd ask tor the 
(15) you're suing him for it? (15) admission of Exhibit KK. 
(16) A. ('m not saying I agree with it or I don't (16) (Defendant's Exhibit KK moved for 
(17) agree with it. (17) admission.) 
(18) Q. Okay. (18) MR. GESTON: No objection. 
(19) A. I'm just saying, yes, I heard her say (19) THE COURT: KK will be admitted. 
(20) that. (20) {Exhibit KK admitted into evidence.} 
(21) Q. But the next day after he signed the (21) MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury, 
(22) contract he actually got a copy of your letter; (22) Your Honor? 
(23) correct? (23) THE COURT: You may. 
(24) A. In the U.S. mail? (24) BY MR. WETHERELL: 
(25) Q. Yes? (25) Q. All right. This is the very first 
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(1) A. Okay. (1) $150,000, and you are telling Richard what's going to 
(2) Q. Okay? Rowena said he could get out of (2) happen to this money, it's hard to read, but number 
(3) this contract, but you're suing him because he didn't (3) one - correct me if I'm wrong - one, you say 
(4) go through with that last listing, aren't you? (4) following up on our conversation a few minutes ago, 
(5) MR. GESTON: Your Honor, excuse me again. If (5) you say, one, have call in to title company to 
(6) we're referring to by this contract to this (6) confirm they have received money into escrow. 
(7) relisting, that's not part of our controversy. (7) Waiting for them to confirm. They were all in some 
(8) That's not what we're talking about. (8) company meeting and expect a call back in few 
(9) THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained. (9) minutes. Two, will instruct the company - the title 
(10) BY MR. WETHERELL: (10) company to cut you a check as follows: A, half to 
(11) Q. I don't know if - I mean, we have a (11) Robertson Kennel, Inc.; B, half to Richard and 
(12) Consumer Protection Act claim, so do I - would the (12) Johnnie Robertson personal property; C, will ask them 
(13) court like me to wait to put on that evidence or - (13) to deduct 5 percent commission on money deposited. 
(14) THE COURT: I would. (14) Our listing says we are to be paid 5 percent on any 
(15) MR. WETHERELL: Okay. (15) nonforfeited nonrefundable money you receive at the 
(16) BY MR. WETHERELL: (16) time that it is paid to you. That money is to be 
(17) Q. Mr. Knipe, I'm handing you what's been (17) credited back at closing. 
(18) marked as Exhibit KK. DO you see that? (18) Do you see that? 
(19) A. Could you repeat the question? (19) A. Yes. 
(20) Q. Do you recognize Exhibit KK? (20) Q. Okay. So this was - what did you 
(21) A. Can I have a second to read through it? (21) consider to be - you're saying that this is 
(22) It's hard to read. (22) nonrefundable earnest money and they get 95 percent 
(23) Q. Please go ahead. It is very hard to (23) of it; right? 
(24) read. (24) A. Well, I - I think at the very beginning 
(25) A. Yes, I do. (25) I'm saying that the title company is preparing escrow 
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KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho 
corporation. 
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Defendants. 
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v. 
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COMES NOW, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe 
(collectively. unless otherwise noted, "KLC") by and through its attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP, and 
submits this Reply in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees ("Reply Brief"). 
I. FACTS 
KLC incorporates by reference the facts previously set forth in KLC's Memorandum in 
Opposition to DefendantslThird Party Plaintiffs~ Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees 
("Memorandum ") filed with this Court On July 29,2009. 
II. ARGUMENT 
KLC requests that the Court disallow the DefendantslThird-Party Plaintiffs' (collectivelYt 
the "Robertsons") Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees, in whole or in part, because the 
Robertsons did not prevail on aU issues at trial, the amount of fees and costs is improperly 
inflated and because a signitic.ant portion of the fees was unreasonably incurred. 
A. The Robertsons Were Only Partially Successful, and Therefore Fees and Costs 
Should be Denied or, Alternatively, Reduced. 
KLe urges the Court to decline to award the Robertsons any costs or attorneys' fees, as 
the Robertsons were only partially successful in this litigation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(1)(B) provides the legal standard governing a court's resolution of the prevailing party 
issue" stating: 
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing 
party and entitled to costs t the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the finaJ judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial coun 
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding 
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
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Idaho R. elv. P. S4(d)(1)(B). When both parties are partially successful, it is within the court's 
discretion to decline an award of attorneys' fees to either side. Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 
24,27,72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003) (detennining entitlement to fees under Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act ("ICPA"). Idaho Code § 48-608(4». 
As set forth in KLC's Memorandum, KLC prevaiJed on several key issues as a matter of 
law. Further, the Robertsons were only partially successful on the remaining issues that went to 
the jury. While the jury found that the Robertsons had not breached the Employment Contracts, 
it also rejected the Robertsons' two counterclaims that the money disbursed from the second 
buyer's deposits had been converted and that KLC had violated the ICPA. Because KLC was at 
least partially successful. it respectfully requests that the Court decline to award attorneys' fees 
and costs to the Robertsons. 
Alternatively. if the Court decides to make an award of fees and costs, KLC requests that 
the Court only award fees and costs that the Robertsons incurred in pursuing claims that they 
won at trial. "Where parties have each prevailed on different causes of action tried in the same 
lawsuit, attorney fees may be apportioned accordingly." Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. 
Peterson, 102 Idaho' Ill, 121, 626 P .2d 767, 777 (1981). The Robertsons have urged the Court 
to ignore the clear language in Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1)(B)-which specifically allows a court to 
consider whether a party prevailed in part and to apportion costs accordingly-because they are 
well .. aware that they were only partially successful in this litiaation. The purely contractual 
claims asserted by KLC against the Robertsons are distinct, both legalJy and in their factual 
particulars, from the claims the Robertsons made against John Knipe for conversion and ]CPA 
violations. As such. the extent the Robertsons prevailed on their ICPA claim.s may be considered 
separately from the fate ofKLC~s contractual claims against them and need not be combined 
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together to determine a single, winner-take-all "prevailing party." Nguyen v. Bu;, 146 Idaho 187, 
_, 191 P.3d 1107, 1115 (et. App. 2008). 
The Robertsons cannot be said to have prevailed On their claims against John Knipe when 
one compares the $1,000 verdict to the open-ended relief the Robertsons sought against him. 
Therefore. should the Court award the Robertsons fees and costs, KLC respectfully requests that 
the award be reduced by at least one-third so that the Robertsons are not collecting fees incurred 
in pursuing claims that were lost at trial, 
B. The Robertsons Have Oventated the Costs They May Recover. 
As a matter of right, the Robertsons may only recover their filing tee, deposition costs 
and the cost of preparing the documents actually admitted into evidence. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 
S4(d)(1)(C)(1), (9). (10). These costs total $1,380.50. Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(I)(C)(6) allows 
only the "[r]easonable costs of the preparation of ... exhibits admitled In evidence as exhibits" to 
be awarded as a matter of right. (Emphasis added.) At trial, only 27 pages of copied documents 
were admitted as exhibits, which, at the Robertsons' claimed cost of SO, 15 a page, totals $4.05. 
KLC submits that the Robertsons' request for costs incurred to publish 12 sets of each exhibit is 
unreasonable and far from efficient. The remaining costs claimed for copied "exhibits" should 
be disallowed 
Although the Court, in its discretion, may award copying costs and travel expenditures, 
the party requesting such expenses must show that such expenditures were "necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party." Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d){l)(D). The Robertsons have made no such showing. 
Routine copying expenses, mediation costs, expenses associated with traveling to and from 
court, and costs of meals are not the "exceptional" costs contemplated by the rule. 
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C. The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Unreasonable, Duplicative, and 
Excessive. 
The calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the court. Bott'V. 
Idaho State Bldg. AUlh.) 128 Idaho 580, 592,917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996), A court may examine 
the reasonableness of time and labor expended by an attorney and disallow fees that were 
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred. Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 
259,263,999 P.2d 914. 918 (Ct. App. 2000). KLC urges the Court to exercise its discretion in 
disallowing part, ifnot all, of the Robertsons' fees and costs on the basis that the bills reflect 
unreasonable billing practices. Specifically, as described in detail in KLC's Memorandum, the 
bills are rife with block entries, ambiguous billing descriptions and unaccounted-for time. all of 
which impede the reasonability analysis. Further. the bills reveal duplicative billing by three 
separate attorneys (two of whom have over 20 years of legal experience each) despite this being 
a conventional breach of contract case. Although the reason for the Robertsons' choice to bring 
in additional counsel on the eve of trial is unknown, KLC should not endure the expense of 
disorganized, last-minute preparation and all the inevjtable inefficiencies that go along with it. 
Moreover, the Robertsons' request for paralegal fees at a rate only $35 less than that charged by 
Derek Pica, who has over 20 years of experience as a lawyer. is simply unreasonable. Perhaps 
more disturbing is that the $2,800 being requested in "paralegal fees" was spent on the Internet 
"researching" individuals on the jury panel.......-clearly a clerical duty. Based on the foregoing, 
KLC requests that any award of fees and costs be reduced by at least 15 percent. 
D. The Court Should Deny the Robertsons' Request for Fees and Costs Related to 
Their Second Motion for Summary JUdgment as Well as Their Motion to 
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification. 
The Robertsons' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion to 
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification were both duplicative and unnecessary. Both motions 
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ignored a clear ruling from the Court on the panies' cross-motions for summary judgment. As 
admitted to by the Robertsons, the motions were not based on any new evidence or any 
previously Wlavailable law. The Robertsons should not be able to collect the thousands of 
doJlars unreasonably incurred in researching and drafting motions that were improperly filed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Robertsons should be prevented from recovering any attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this litigation, as both KLC and the Robertsons were partially successfu]. If the Court 
does award the Robertsons' fees and costs, KLC respectfully requests that the Court disaJlow 
costs not pennitted as a matter of right and reduce discretionary costs by at least one-third. 
Further, KLC requests that the Court award the Robertsons only those fees reasonably associated 
with defending KLC's breach of contract action because they did not prevail on any other claim. 
Finally. KLC requests that the Court decline to award fees dedicated to researching and drafting 
the Robertsons' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion to ReconsiderlMotion 
for Reconsideration, as such motions were unnecessary and duplicative. 
DATED; August,4, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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T. 
INTRODUCTI.ON 
In its Opposition, Plaintiffrehashes many ofthe same arguments tllllt it made in. connection 
with its Motion to Amend theJudgment,a.nd Motion for aNew Trial and.mOV. To the c~tentthcsc 
arguments were previously raised, .Defendants hereby ineorporo.te and refer the Court to their prior 
bri efing as contained in the Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or, 
in tbe Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Plaintiff argues that equitable relief should not be given to 'Defendants under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. In. doing SOt Plainti ff contends that the jury already determined the issues 
in this case and therefore the Court cannot gI':itllt equitable relier. Accorcling to Plaintiff, any 
restitutionary or punitive damages should likewise be precluded. 
This reply brief, however, will show that: (1) the Court should grant equitable remedies bnscd 
upon its inherent power under the Act; (2) the violative conduct oiMc. Knipe is sufficient to sustain 
the damage award under the Act; (3) the Court should impose a constructive trust and gtmlt 
rostitutiQ.Ilary damages; a.nd (4) tl1e Court should grant punitive damages as there was suf.llcicnt 
evidence at trial to support such an award. 
Accordingly, tbe Courtsbould grant Defendant's Motion for Equitable RcliefundertheIwlho 
Consumer Protection Act. This requested reliefsi10uJd also include the enjoining of future use of 
the representation agreement and an award of prejudgment interest to Defendants. 
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u. 
ARG1JMeNT 
The Final Judgment Should Include AdditioDal Remedies Under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
Pla.in.tifrs llrst argument Is that the Court cannot grant remedIes under the Act because the 
case was resolved by the jury. See 1'.4 ofthe Plaintiffs Opposition. AddiLionully, Plaintiff argues 
that Defendants elected their remedies and thus cannot pursue other remedIes under the Act. See p.1 
ofthe Plaintiff s Opposition. Nevertheless. these arguments fail as the Aet expressly gives the Court 
authority to grant remedies above nod beyond drunagcs determined by the jury. The Act stntes as . 
to th.is issue: 
§ 48-608. Loss from purchase or lease - .. Actual and punitive damages. 
(l) Any person wbo purcbases or leases goods or services and thereby 
su.ffers any aScortninable loss ofmoncy orpropmy, real orpcrsonnl, 
as a result of tile usc or employment by anotbcrpcrson ofa method. 
aet or practice declnred unlawful by this chapter, may treat any 
agreement incid.ent thereto as voidable Of, in the alternative, may 
bri11g an aClion to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars 
($1,000). whichever is greater ••.. Any such person or class may 
also seek restitution. an order enjoin.ing the use or employment of 
methods. acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and 
any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion mny 
deem just and necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award 
punitive damages and rna)' provide such equitable reHeras it deems 
necessary or proper in cases of repeated. or flagrant violations. 
See I.C. § 48-608 (emphasis added). 
1"hus, under the express wording of the statute, the Court may grant restitution, an order 
enjoining violative practices.l'unitive damages, and any other appropriate relief-all in addition to 
Defendants' recovery of actual oJ'l1ominal damages. See itl. Notably, there is no requirement under 
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this provision that ajury's verdict precludes the Court from granting additIonal relief. RenceJ U,e 
express wording under the statute states tha.t in addition to nctual or nominal damages, the person 
"may also seek" other damages which "the Court in its discretion ma.y deem just and neecssnry/' 
See id. As a result, the Court has inherent authority to grant remedies above and beyond the damages . 
awa.rded by the jury. 
Plaintiffs election of remedies argument a.lso rails. Specifically, Defendants pled to make 
the contracts voidable, or in the alternative. to obtain damages. As the Court is well aware, thc= 
actual trial proeeccled under the theory that there was a valid and enforceable employment cOl1tra~ 
and that Defendants intended to live up to the terms of the contract and fulfill their obligations. As 
a result, any argument that there has been;m election ofrcmcdics is unpersuasive. 
B. There is Sufficient Evidence to Support the Jury's Verdict for $1,000 Under the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Plaintiff next argues that Defendants failed to show "ascertainable loss" at trial and 
accordingly cannot receive any damages. See 13.8 .. 9 of the Plaintiff's Opposition. Specifically, 
Plaintiffrellcs upon Yellow Pille Water Usel'~.'/ A$$ociatioll V. IlIIel, lOS Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 
(1983). Nevertheless, more recent Idaho appellate authority shows that statutory damages must be 
given once a violation is found. See Wllitev. Mock, 140 ldnho 882, 890, l04P.3d 356, 364(2004). 
In Mock, the'ldaho Supreme Court held that it is a reversible error for the jU1)f, hnving 
determined a violation under the Act, to not make an award of at least S 1 ,000. See id. This holding 
was affim1ed again by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court in that case held: "Once a violation of 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is found, it is error to not award statutory damages." Fellll v. 
Noal" 142 Idallo 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240.1244 (2006). 
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Additionally, Oerendants presented. evid.ence to the jury that they had been ciama&ed by 
Plaintiffwhen it kept $22,500. Given Defendants' conversion claim, however, Dcfendants asked the 
jury to simplyaward$l,OOO under the Act, which thejurydid. Therefore, theju.ty·saward of$1,000 
ispropcr and should be sustained. 
C. The Court Should Impose a Constructive Trust and Grant Rcstitutionary 
Damages. 
Similar to its other arguments, Plail1ti.ff contends that the jury already deter.mincd the 
outcome as to rcstitutionary damages when it decided on Defendant'S conversion clnim.. See 1'.1 0 
ofthe Plolntifrs Opposition. Plain.tiffdoes not support its argument, however, with any Idaho Jaw. 
As set forth in prior briefing, constructive trusts arc equitable in nature and are il1voked where 
title to property is found in. one who in fairness ought not to retain it. Cleill v. $I,a,v, 109 Idaho 237, 
240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. HISS). Furtllcr, a constructive trust applies where it party 
obtains property in any '''unconseientious man.ner." See id. 
In the case at bar, ~laintiff retained $22,500 in money owed to :Oefendunts u.nder the 
transaction with MidAmerlea.n. Therefore, this property must be rcconvcyed by .Plaintiff to 
Defendants. This result is consistent with the remedy of restitution under the Idaho Consumer 
Protecti 011 Act. 
rhe Idaho ConsunlCf Protection Aet gives the Court authority, sepa.rate and distinct of any 
role of the jury, to grant restitution La Defendants in this case. See Le. § 48-608(1). Further, 
restitution under the Act includes the surrendering of all monies taken in association with a party's 
violation of the Act. See Kidwell v. Muster Distributors, llle., 101 Idaho 447. 456,615 P.2d 116, 
125 (19S0)(quoting Fletcller v. Security Pat:iflt: NaL BatIk, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cat. '197~1)) ("·One 
requirement ofsueh enforcement is a basic policy that those who have engaged in. proscribed conduct 
surrender all pro'fits flowing thcrefrom.'j. 
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The Court should grant rcstitutionary damages in this ease as Plaintiff's actions have been 
deemed to violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See Ans. to Question 6 ofVcrcUet Form.. It 
is undisputed that Plaintiff kept $22,500 from a tn111saction under the 2007 ctnployment contract. 
Plaintiffclid this despite no contractual authority to do so. In fact, the jury found no breaeh oftl1e 
contracts by:Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffshould not be allowed to benefit, but should surrender 
the proceeds obtained from its violative conduct. See Kidwell, 101 Tdaho at 456, 61 S P .2d at 125. 
'D. The Court Should Enjoin Future Use of the Represenmtion Agreement. 
Plaintiffncxt argues that no mention of injunctive reliefwas made to the jury, and thus this 
remedy should be precluded. See p.l 0 of Plaintiffs Opposition. This argument, however. lacks 
merit given that injunctive reliefis a matter to be determined by the Court, and not by the jury. See 
I.C. § 48-608(1) (stating that a person may also seck from the court "an order Cl1joining the use or 
employt'nent ofmethods. aets or praetices declared unlawfu.l under thjs chapter,"). 
A determination llns been made by the jury that Mr. Knipe's conduct violated the Act. As 
a result, there is a sufficient basis to gnmt injunctive reliefprohlbiting Pinintifffrom similar future 
conduct. Further, this will help to safeguard the interests of other consumers. See Kidwell. 1 01 T duho 
at 455, GIS 1).2d at 124 (discussing the overall purposes of the Aet). 
E. The Court Should Grant Punitive Dnmages to Defendants. 
Plaintiff also contends that the Court expressly denied Defendants' request fOT punitiv.: 
damages, See p.ll ofPlamtifrs Opposition. Additionally, Plaintiffargues that Defendants never 
moved to amend their Complaint for punitive damages, and thus they are precluded. See p.ll of 
Plaintiff'S Opposition. Nevertheless, the Court should grant punitive damages to :Oefendants based 
upon the singular remedies provided under the Act. 
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A review of the Court IT''Jl1scripl as provided by P lainti:r-rindi cates that the Court did not deny 
Defendants' request for punitive damages. Ruther, the Court. declined an invitatic.'m to insl.ruct the 
jury on the issue Ofpul1iLive damages, which; under Idaho law, would merely have been advisory to 
the Court. Sec Trial Tr. S60: 19-21 as contained in Exhibit "P" of Affidavit of Ooston. This is 
consistent with the express wording or the statute which grants the determination of punitive 
damages to the trial court. See 1.C. § 4S .. G08(l). 
Significantly, punitive damages underthe Idaho COllsumerProteen.on. Act are ul,ique. These 
damages are .not based in common law. but rather prescnt an entirely now remedy ereated by the 
legislature. See Mac Tools, rite.. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193~ 198, 879 P .ld 112G, 1131 (1994). In 
fact, punitive damages under the Act are to be considered onlyby tbe Court, and not by the jury. See 
I.C. § 48-608(1). 
Tho [net that :Defendants did not formally amend their pleadings prior to trial is not 
dispositive on this issue. Where evidence regarding the issues of punitive damages arc fully tried 
by the parties. a district court should treat the issue as ifit had been properly pled. See Mikesell v. 
New World Deve/oPIIU!II4 Corp., 122 Idaho 868. 877, 840 P.2dl090. 1099 (Ct. App. 1992). 
PlaintiffwtlS well aware in advance orma! as to the evidence used to support Defendants' 
punitive damage claim. This is because the evidence at trial with respect to this elaim came 
primarily from the depositi.on of Mr. Knipe. 
Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' claim for punitive damages. 
F. The Court Should Crant Prejudgment Interest to Defendants. 
Pla.i.nt:i.f:rs fi.nal contention is that any demand forprejudgmcnt interest by Defendants should 
be denied. See p.13 of Plaintiffs Opposition. Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to provide any legal 
Ral'T .. Y 70 PLAtN'1"tFFfn.u..ttD·.PAR'l'Y DEFENDANT'S oPPOSmON TO DEF1!N.DANTmiIRD·PA'RTY 
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authority OT argument. As such, Defenda.nts are entitled to a constructive trust and reslitutionury 
damages from tl,e date in which the unlawful holding or taking ofDefendanl;s' monies occurred. 
Idaho statute grants prejudgment interest where moneyis ~'received to the USe ofanothcr and 
retained beyond a reasonable time without the owners' consent" See I.C. § 28-22-104(4). 
Moreover, prejudgment interest merely requires a liquidated OT readily ascertainable amount. See 
Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274,27G, 178 P.3d G39, 041 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The monies held and retained by Pla.intiffbcyond a reasonable time in th.is matter arc entitled 
to prejudgment interest. As a result, the Coun should grant Defendants prejudgment interest on the 
amount of$22,500, beginning at the time Plaintifffai led to return the demanded monies on February 
11.200S. 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Oefendm1ts' Motion for Equitable RelieF, 
including the imposition of a constructive trust, rcstitutionary damages, and punitive damages. 1"he 
Court should also enjoin Plaintiff from futuro usc of its forfeIture provision and grant prejudgment 
inlerest to Defendants. 
DATED' this ~y of August, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETl-I.ER.ELL & CRAWFORD 
REP.LY TO pLA.l'N'l1FFm.tlRO·.PAR1"Y O.aF.l!NDANT·S OPPOSITION TO DEFBNJ)ANTmrm.O.lWRTY 
PLAlNTTJi'FS' MOT)ON 1:0.R EQurrABLE REtTEr UNOlm TIm IDAHO CONSUMER PR01"2CTION At::r - 8 
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COME NOW, Defendantsf'rlUrd.·Party Plainli Frs (hereinaiter"Defcndantsn ) by and through 
their counsel of record. Brnssey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provides this Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Strl.kc Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S. Gcston in SuP.port ofPlaintiff/third :Party 
I 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment. for a New Trial, Or:. in the Alternative, Por Judgment 
NotwHhstanding the Verdict. as follows: 
l.R.C . .P. S9(b) allows 14 days from the entry of Judgment to present a motion for a new trial. 
r.R.C.P. 59(c) requires those affidavits to be subJllitted in support of the motion at the time the 
motion is filed. Ii is well seltled law in Idaho. that tho a.r.adavits must be filed at the time of the filing 
of the motion in order to provide the opposiog party time to respond. Defendant has not had time 
to rcspond to the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff and the affidavit should. be stricken. As the 
Supreme Court has sUtted, and as is settled law: 
"the trial court corroctly ruled that Watson had not complied with the 
time requirements ofLR..C.P. 59(c) in fiUng the affidavit opposing 
International Harvcsterfs motion (or new tria.l and it did .oat err in 
refusing to consider Watson's second set of affidavits:' 
Watson v. Navistar International Tram~p()rtati()n Corp .. 1211daho 643, 827 P .2d. CiSCi. 
Based upon the foregoi..ng. the Court should. grant Defendant's Motion to Strike the 
Supplementa1 Affi.davit of Mark Gcston with respect to Plaintifi's Motion for NewTrlnlandJNOV. 
DATED this -..:.- day of August, 2009. 
BRASSEYt WE~rHERELL & eRA WFOR'O 
MSMOAANOUM TNSUPPORTOP M0110NiO STRncEStJPPLJ!M.EN'l'AJ.,MFIDA vrr OF'MART<S. GBSTON 
IN SUPPORT OFPLATNiTFF/TFflltt) PARTVOBFENDAN1.'·S M01'10N oro AMBNl) .rtJl)GMENT. FOR. A NEW 
'11Ut\L.. OR. IN 1"l'l'a At iERNA TlV2. FOR JTJDGM1iNT N01"Wl1'HS'L'ANDlNO Tl"!E VEROTCT • 2 
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RICHAR.O A. ROBERTSON and 
JOF!NNI5 L. R.OBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
lNC.; an Idaho Corporation 
Third.Pnrty Pla.i.n.rlffs, 
VB. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
TI"ird-Part Defendant. 
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COME NOW, OcfcodantslThird .. Party Plaintiffs (hereina.fl:er"0 efendants'j by and through 
their counsel ofreeord, BrJ..'lSey, Wetherell &. Crawford, and hereby move the Court for an Order 
striking the Supplemental Affidavit ofM ark S. Geston in Support orPlaintifflthird. Party Defendant· s 
Motion to Amend J ud,;,ttnent, for a New ~rrial, Or, in the Alteolativc. For J udgmcnt Notwithstanding 
the Verdict. 
This motion is supported by the memorandum in support filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED thitlL ~y of August, 2009 • 
.BRASSEY, WETH::E:ltELL & CRA WPOR.O 
Mo'nON TO STlUlOl SUPPLEMeNTAl.. AFFIDA VlT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPOR.'l' OF PLAIN· 
l"ll<F111fI1U:J PARTY D.l!FENDANT'S MOTION TO AMENt) JUDGMENT. FOR A NlSW TRTAL. OR. IN TH.E 
ALTERNA'rIVB. POR JtJDGMi!NT N01'W1TRST ANDlNO '1'11.1; VERDIct ·2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
********** 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
COURT REPORTER: Denece Graham 
DATE: August 21, 2009 
Knipe Land Company, etal., 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-2008-000682 
-vs-
Richard A. Roberston, etal., 
Defendant. 
COURT MINUTES 
Time: 1:33-2:11 p.m. 
Courtroom #1 
This being the time and place set for Motion for Attorney Fees, 
Motion for Equitable Relief Under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act, Motion to Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or in the 
Alternatvie for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, present 
before the Honorable Stephen W. Drescher were Mark Geston, 
attorney on behalf of the plaintiff, and Robert Wetherell, 
attorney on behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Geston presented argument 
motions. The Court gave his 
testimony during the trial. 
on behalf of 
interpretation 
the 
of 
Mr. Wetherell responded to the plaintiff's motions. 
Mr. Geston replied. 
plaintiff's 
Ms. Crane's 
The Court advised it would revisit the issues and make a decision 
to the motions. 
Court was adjourned. 
STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
essen, Clerk 
BY: 
Court Minutes page-1-
SEP 1 7 2009 
--_.. - A.M. P.M. 
BETIY J. DRESSEN 
By 
I Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
) 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and 
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ) 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ) 
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS 
CASE NO. CV-2008-682 
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL 
MOTIONS 
Appearances: Mark Geston for Plaintiff 
Robert Wetherell for Defendants 
The factual history of this case has been set forth at length in prior orders issued by this 
Court. Those facts will therefore not be repeated here, but are hereby incorporated by reference. 
Initially, the Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment to strike certain language not 
permitted by LR.C.P. 54(a). The Defendants agreed that the rule does not allow for a recitation 
of the pleadings in the Judgment. The motion is therefore granted on that point. 
The Plaintiff next seeks a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to IRCP 50(b). 
The standard of review was well set out by the Idaho Court of appeals in Carlson v. Stanger, 146 
Idaho 642, 646, 200 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Ct.App.2008) as follows: 
The issue to be determined on a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether substantial evidence 
supports the jury's verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 P.2d 
912, 921 (1997). Substantial evidence does not require that the evidence be 
uncontradicted. Highland Enterprises, Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 337, 986 P.2d 996, 
1003 (1999). Rather, the evidence need only be of sufficient quantity and probative value 
that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. ld. Upon a 
motion for j.n.o.v., the moving party admits the truth of all adverse evidence and all 
inferences that can legitimately be drawn from it. ld. In ruling on a motion for j.n.o.v., the 
trial court cannot weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or make its 
own factual findings and compare them to those of the jury. Id. The trial court draws all 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. ld. The motion should be granted only where 
there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have 
reached and when that conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict. ld. 
In this case, context is everything. The actions of the parties before, during, and after the 
signing of the Employment Contracts and the Purchase and Sale Agreements relating to both 
offers they received, established the understanding of the parties as to the meanings of the terms 
of those contracts. It was the duty of the trier of fact to decide this case in light of the actions of 
2 
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the parties, along with the other circumstances of this case presented at trial. Drawing all facts 
and inferences in favor of the Robertsons including, but in no way limited to, the failure of the 
Plaintiff to seek payment under the first Purchase and Sale Agreement in a timely manner, along 
with the timing of the extension of the Employment Contracts, this Court finds that reasonable 
minds can conclude the jury verdict was reasonable. As stated by the appellate court above, a 
motion for new trial should only be granted where there can be but one conclusion and that 
conclusion does not conform to the verdict. This is a demanding standard that has not been 
satisfied in this case. Therefore, the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied. 
Turning next to the Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, the Court's review of such a motion 
under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) is different from its review of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. A motion for new trial calls the trial judge to weigh the evidence and determine (1) 
whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether 
a new trial would produce a different result. Juarez v. Aardema, 128 Idaho 687, 695, 918 P.2d 
271,279 (1996); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188,193 (1990); Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986); Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826,833,136 P.3d 297,304 (2006). 
As stated previously, context is everything in this case. There was a clear course of 
conduct of both parties manifesting what they believed the contracts meant. There was 
substantial evidence presented at trial that the Plaintiff did not make any claim on the relatively 
small amount of money at issue from the Harmon Offer to Purchase until after the $450,000 
from the subsequent prospective buyer came into question. In addition, Ms. Crane testified that 
the $450,000 was simply money paid III exchange for a license to enable the subsequent 
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prospective buyer to thoroughly and extensively investigate the property. In sum, at no time did 
anyone other than the Plaintiff treat the money that went to the Defendants as a forfeiture. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff only treated it as such after there was a large sum of money at issue from 
the second prospective purchaser. This evidence, in this Court's view, clearly supports the 
jury's verdict. Likewise, it is this Court's opinion that the evidence presented at trial, when 
taken as a whole, makes the possibility of a different result for the Plaintiff unlikely, should a 
new trial be granted. 
With respect to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7), The 
Plaintiff alleged ten errors of law that it believes entitles him to a new trial. Upon review of each 
of these asserted errors, this Court is of the view that the decisions at issue were each made with 
due deliberation and consideration, and were appropriate under the facts and circumstances. The 
Motion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) is therefore denied. 
Next, the Court turns to Defendants' Motion for equitable relief under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. The jury was given the option to award damages thereunder, and they 
elected to award a nominal amount. That award was one upon which reasonable minds could 
agree given the facts of this case. The Court therefore declines to alter that award. 
The Court likewise declines to award punitive damages under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. [W]hen a party brings an action for violation of the ICPA, that party does not 
have to show an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct in order to be awarded 
punitive damages, but rather must show repeated or flagrant violations of the ICP A. Mac Tools, 
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Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198, 879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994). The evidence in this case 
simply does not rise to the necessary level needed to support an award of punitive damages. 
Finally, we come to the Defendants' Motion for Costs and Fees. The applicable statute in 
this case, where the gravamen of the lawsuit was a commercial transaction, is I.e. 12-120(3) 
which states in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The determination of who is a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees 
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Suitts v. First Security Bank, 125 Idaho 27, 
35, 867 P.2d 260, 268 (Ct.App.l993). "The determination of a prevailing party involves a three-
part inquiry: The court must examine (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party prevailed 
on each issue or claim." Joseph CL. U Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d 
1146, 1148 (Ct.App.1990); Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 162, 968 P.2d 247, 
257 (Ct.App.l998). 
The substantive procedural history of the case is as follows: Plaintiff s motion to amend 
the Complaint to add punitive damages was denied. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
was granted on the issue of the validity of the contracts, but denied on the remainder of the 
issues. Both of Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment were denied, as was their 
motion to reconsider. At trial, the jury found that the Defendants did not breach the Employment 
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Contracts and the Plaintiff was not awarded any of the $220,000 sought. The Plaintiff was 
likewise found not liable on the issue of conversion, resulting in Knipe land Company being 
permitted to retain the $22,500 it previously received. In addition, Third Party Defendant John 
Knipe was found to have violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and nominal damages of 
$1,000 were awarded to the Defendants. Considering these facts in their entirety in the light of 
the case law set forth above, this Court finds that the Defendants are the prevailing party in this 
matter. 
The Court, having found the Defendants to be the prevailing party in a suit where a 
commercial transaction was the gravamen of the complaint, see Miller v. Sf. Alphonsus Reg. 
Med Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825,839,87 P.3d 934, 948 (2004), pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), now 
makes the following findings: 
1. The litigation was pending for approximately one year. The trial lasted three 
days; 
2. The issues of the case were not particularly unique; 
3. It was necessary for counsel to possess appropriate trial skills and 
professionalism to present the case; 
4. The charges claimed are consistent with seasoned trial counsel in 
Southwestern Idaho; 
5. The attorney's fees in this matter are fixed; 
6. The Court is unaware of any time limitations imposed by clients; 
7. The discrepancies between the amounts sought and those recovered were 
discussed previously; 
8. The case in not an undesirable one; 
9. The nature and length of the relationship between the parties and their counsel 
are unknown to the Court; 
10. The award of attorney fees is consistent with the fees awarded for comparable 
time and effort in similar cases; and 
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11. The Defendants do not seek reimbursement of automated research costs. 
Upon review of the billing statements, the Court finds that Mr. Pica charged an additional 
$50 per hour over and above his standard hourly rate for 104 hours of trial preparation and the 
trial itself. It is the opinion of this Court that Mr. Pica mainly assisted during the trial of this case 
and he should therefore not be entitled to more than his normal hourly rate. The attorney fees 
sought will therefore be reduced by $5,200 to reflect this. Therefore, attorney fees in the amount 
of $105,107.50 will be awarded. Costs as a matter of right in the amount of $1,876.58 will 
likewise be awarded. This includes $71 for the filing fee, $500 for exhibits, and $1305.58 for 
depositions. Discretionary costs will be disallowed as the same are merely the ordinary and 
incidental costs of a law practice. 
---
DATED this ~-+- '200~7? 
/;:~ 
Stephen W. Drescher . 
District Judge 
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CER TIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded to 
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Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd, Ste. 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Robert T. Wetherell 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83701 
Derek Pica 
199 N. Capitol Blvd, Ste. 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Deputy Clerk 
Robe11 T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FILED 
TH!HD JUDICIAL D!STR~CT COUHT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT -1 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
JUDGMENT 
This matter having come on regularly for jury tlia1 and the jury having rendered its verdict 
in this cause on June 26, 2009, and the Court having hearing the post trial motions involving 
multiple parties and multiple causes of action, and the Court specifically finding that there is no just 
reason for delay, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that JUDGMENT is hereby 
entered and that Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY'S Complaint in this matter is dismissed, with 
prejudice and Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY shall take nothing by way of its Complaint. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that Defendants RICHARD A. 
ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE:t. ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, be awarded $1,000.00 on its counterclaim. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that RICHARD A. ROBERT-
SON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, be awarded $105,107.50 for attomeys fees, and costs as a matter of rights of 
$1,876.58. Discretionary costs are DENIED. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that JUDGMENT be entered 
in favor of Defendants RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation and against KNIPE LAND 
COMPANY and JOHN KNIPE, an individual in the total amount of$1 07,984.08. 
<i(/ 
DATED thi~! day of September, 2009 ~ ! 
:;;~ 
HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
JUDGMENT - 2 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ?f2 day of September, 2009, I served a tme and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by 
the method and to the atIdresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Robert T. Wetherell 
Brassey, Wetherell, & Crawford 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
JUDGMENT - 3 
/U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 389-9040 
L US. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 344-7077 
10/01/200,9 13:43 FAX 
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M, Reinha:rdt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoeJ.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PA YETIE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintitfl Appellant, 
V. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
DefendantslRespondents. 
RlCHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third Part Defendant! A eHant. 
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Case No. CV 2008-682 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
~002/010 
10/01/2008 13:43 FAX 
TO: THE ABOVE·NAMED RESPONDENTS, RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., BY AND 
THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
IdJ 003/010 
1. l'he above-named Plaintiff/Appellants, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third 
Party Defendant lohn Knipe (collectively, "Appellants"), hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court against Defendants and Third Party Plaintiff's Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson, husband and wife, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "Respondents"). from 
the following judgments, decisions, and orders entered in the above entitled action, the 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding: 
a. The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed on April 9, 
2009, to foreclose admission at trial of testimony and extrinsic evidence interpreting, 
explaining, and modifying unambiguous contracts. 
b. The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed June 18,2009, 
to foreclose testimony at trial by Respondents' witness, Cindy Crane. 
c. The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict 011 June 
25,2009; 
d. The jury's Verdict entered on June 25,2009; 
e. rae .JHSgmeRt efttefed hHy 8, 2009, as modified by the Court's Order Oft 
P.e~ Trial :MetioftS efttefed Oft Septemtter 17,2009; 
fA The Court's Order on Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17,2009, 
denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. or. in the Alternative, for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict ... and erroneously awarding costs as a matter of right. 
f. The Judgment ejltered on September 30,2009. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. 2 
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2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders and 
Judgments set forth in section 1 above are appealable PUl'suant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 1 (a)(l) . 
3. Appellants state that the following issues are the subject of this appeal, subject to 
their right to assert other issues on appeal: 
A. That the District Court erred by failing to rule that the Employment 
Contracts in controversy are unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not be 
admitted to interpret, explain, or otherwise modify their plain meaning. 
B. That the District Court erred by failing to decide whether the Employment 
Contracts were ambiguous or not and consequently abdicated that determination to the 
jury. 
C. That the District Court erred by permitting testimony and other extrinsic 
evidence regarding the meaning of unambiguous contracts. 
D. That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents· witness, Cindy 
Crane, to testify as to the meaning of unambiguous contracts that were irrelevant to the 
Employment Contracts in controversy, and, additionally, permitting her to testify when 
Respondents had failed and refused to disclose her relevant knowledge in response to 
Appellants' written pretrial discovery. 
E. That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' counsel to 
examine John Knipe and Rowena Strain about inapplicable statutes, and then permitting 
said counsel to argue such matters of irrelevant law to the jury after the close of evidence. 
F. That the District Court erred by improperly instructing the jury, as 
follows: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL· 3 
Boise-223549.l 0010908-00008 
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i. By giving Opening Instruction No.4 erroneously instructing the 
jury that the parties had reportedly agreed that the earnest monies deposited by 
MidAmerican included "the 5% commission" disbursed to Knipe Land Co.; 
it By refusing to give Appellants' requested opening Instruction 
No.5 and their requested closing Instruction Nos. 7,12, 15,19, and 20; 
iii. By giving the jury Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, instructing it to 
determine issues oflaw; 
iv. By giving the jury Instruction No. 16, instructing it as to the 
Robensons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to 
satisfy the criteria for such affirmative defense; 
v. By giving the jury Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to fmd 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (UICPA") that had no support in 
the evidence, concerned events which were irrelevant to the rights of the parties 
under the contracts in controversy, inadequately instructed on what was needed to 
show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICPA was 
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law, 
O. That the District Court erred by allowing the jury to consider alleged 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act without any relevant evidentiary support 
for an allegation that Third Party Defendant had breached any portion of Idaho Code 
§ 48·603 or that Respondents had suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as 
a result thereof. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL .. 4 
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H. That the jury's Verdict is not supported by any relevant evidence, Of, in 
the alternative, that the Verdict is at such variance with the evidenoe that a new trial is 
required. 
I. That the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and 
the undisputed factual evidence. 
J. That the District Court erred by denying Appellant's Motion for a 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
K. That the District Court erred by erroneously awarding costs as a matter of 
right. 
L. That the Judgment entered on September 30. 2009 must be reversed and 
set aside and that the matter either remanded to the District CoUll for a new trial. or that 
judgment should be entered by the Spring Com in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Remondents. there being no question of fact to be resolved in a new trial. 
4. An Order was entered sealing portions of the record on July 17,2008, which was 
modified by the District Court's oral ruling on June 21, 2009, granting Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant's July 19,2009 Motion to Amend Confidentiality and Protective Order. 
5. A reporter's transcript bas been requested. 
A. Appellant requests a standard transcript (both hard copy and electronic 
copy) of the August 21, 2009 hetU'ins on Knipe Land Company's Motion to Amend 
Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL· 5 
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B. Appellant requests a supplemented transcript (both hard copy and 
electronic copy), of the June 21,2009 through June 25,2009 Trial, including the 
following items of additional record otherwise excluded by Rule 25(c): 
i. The opening statements and closing arguments of counsel. 
ii. The conference on requested instructions, the objections of the 
parties to the instructions, and the District Court's rulings thereon. 
141007/010 
iii. The oral presentation by the court of written instructions given to 
the jury and reported by the reporter. 
6. In addition to the standard documents included in the clerk's record under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28, Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record: 
A. The District Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed 
February 12,2009. 
B. Plaintiff Knipe Land Companyls Motion in Limine filed April 9, 2009; 
C. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in 
Limine filed Apri19, 2009; 
D. Appellants' Affidavit and evidence filed in Support of Plaintiff Knipe 
Land Company's Motion in Limine on April 9,2009; 
E. Defendants' Memorandum. in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine, 
their supporting Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Richard A. Robertson. dated May 7, 
2009; 
F. Appellants' Reply in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion 
in Limine dated May 13. 2009. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
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G. Appel1ants' Motion in Limine, supporting Memorandum oflawJ and 
supporting Affidavit of counsel, filed on June 18, 2009. 
H. Respondents' Memorandum of law and Mfidavit, filed on or about June 
19, 2009, opposing Appellants' June 18, 2009 Motion in Limine. 
I. Appellants' requested opening and closing Jury Instructions. 
J. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's Trial Brief dated June 15,2009; 
K. Plaintiff and Defendants' Stipulation of Facts dated June 16,2009; 
L. PlaintifflThird Party Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New 
Trial. or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. dated July 20, 
2009; 
M. PlaintifflThird Party Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, dated July 20, 2009; 
N. Respondents' response to Plaintifrs Motion to Amend Judgment, for New 
Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated August 14, 
2009; 
O. Reply Brief in Support ofPlaintiffiThird Party Defendant's Motion to 
Amend JUdgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, and Supplemental Affidavit of counselJ dated August 19, 2009i 
P. Respondents' Motion for Costs and Fees and to supponing Affidavits of 
counselJ filed on or about July 15, 2009; and 
Q. AppellantsJ Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 
on or about July 29,2009. 
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7. Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered were 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
A. Trial Exhibit Nos. 4, 6, 7,8,10,12,13,16,17,20,21,22,23,25,26,28, 
29, 30, 31. 32, 34, 38, 43, Q, R. T, and U. 
8. I certify: 
A. That a copy oithis Notice of Appeal has been served on the court l~eporter, 
Denece Graham. at the address set forth in the Certificate of Service attached; 
B. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reponer's transcript, 
C. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record ofS100.00 has 
been paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost; 
D. That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid; 
E. That seNice has been made upon all parties required to be served )lursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED: October ~ 2009. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
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STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IV/V I/~OO~ 13:44 FAX 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on October --L, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL on the following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
Roben T. Wetherell 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ %,Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
[ tYia U.S. Mail [vi' Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
( ] Via Email 
P. O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Email: rtw@brassey.net 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Denece Graham, C,S.R. 
1675 E, 9th Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
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r ~ia U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] ViaEmaU 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~010/010 
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third Part Defendant/ Ap ellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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Case No. CV 2008-682 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Filing Category: L.4 
Filing Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., BY AND 
THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Plaintiff! Appellants, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third 
Party Defendant John Knipe (collectively, "Appellants"), hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court against Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson, husband and wife, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "Respondents"), from 
the following judgments, decisions, and orders entered in the above entitled action, the 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding: 
a. The Court's denial of Appellants' M6tion in Limine, filed on April 9, 
2009, to foreclose admission at trial of testimony and extrinsic evidence interpreting, 
explaining, and modifying unambiguous contracts. 
b. The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed June 18,2009, 
to foreclose testimony at trial by Respondents' witness, Cindy Crane. 
c. The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict on June 
25,2009; 
d. The jury's Verdict entered on June 25, 2009; 
e. The Judgment entered July 8, 2009, as modified by the Court's Order on 
Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17, 2009; 
f. The Court's Order on Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17,2009, 
denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and erroneously awarding costs as a matter of right. 
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2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders and 
Judgments set forth in section 1 above are appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) . 
3. Appellants state that the following issues are the subject of this appeal, subject to 
their right to assert other issues on appeal: 
A. That the District Court erred by failing to rule that the Employment 
Contracts in controversy are unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not be 
admitted to interpret, explain, or otherwise modify their plain meaning. 
B. That the District Court erred by failing to decide whether the Employment 
Contracts were ambiguous or not and consequently abdicated that determination to the 
Jury. 
C. That the District Court erred by permitting testimony and other extrinsic 
evidence regarding the meaning of unambiguous contracts. 
D. That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' witness, Cindy 
Crane, to testify as to the meaning of unambiguous contracts that were irrelevant to the 
Employment Contracts in controversy, and, additionally, permitting her to testify when 
Respondents had failed and refused to disclose her relevant knowledge in response to 
Appellants' written pretrial discovery. 
E. That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' counsel to 
examine John Knipe and Rowena Strain about inapplicable statutes, and then permitting 
said counsel to argue such matters of irrelevant law to the jury after the close of evidence. 
F. That the District Court erred by improperly instructing the jury, as 
follows: 
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1. By giving Opening Instruction No.4 erroneously instructing the 
jury that the parties had reportedly agreed that the earnest monies deposited by 
MidAmerican included "the 5% commission" disbursed to Knipe Land Co.; 
II. By refusing to give Appellants' requested opening Instruction 
No.5 and their requested closing Instruction Nos. 7, 12, 15, 19, and 20; 
III. By giving the jury Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, instructing it to 
determine issues of law; 
IV. By giving the jury Instruction No. 16, instructing it as to the 
Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to 
satisfY the criteria for such affirmative defense; 
v. By giving the jury Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICP A") that had no support in 
the evidence, concerned events which were irrelevant to the rights of the parties 
under the contracts in controversy, inadequately instructed on what was needed to 
show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICP A was 
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law. 
G. That the District Court erred by allowing the jury to consider alleged 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act without any relevant evidentiary support 
for an allegation that Third Party Defendant had breached any portion ofIdaho Code 
§ 48-603 or that Respondents had suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as 
a result thereof. 
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H. That the jury's Verdict is not supported by any relevant evidence, or, in 
the alternative, that the Verdict is at such variance with the evidence that a new trial is 
required. 
I. That the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and 
the undisputed factual evidence. 
J. That the District Court erred by denying Appellant's Motion for a 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
K. That the District Court erred by erroneously awarding costs as a matter of 
right. 
4. An Order was entered sealing portions of the record on July 17, 2008, which was 
modified by the District Court's oral ruling on June 21, 2009, granting Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant's July 19,2009 Motion to Amend Confidentiality and Protective Order. 
5. A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
A. Appellant requests a standard transcript (both hard copy and electronic 
copy) of the August 21,2009 hearing on Knipe Land Company's Motion to Amend 
Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
B. Appellant requests a supplemented transcript (both hard copy and 
electronic copy), of the June 21, 2009 through June 25, 2009 Trial, including the 
following items of additional record otherwise excluded by Rule 25(c): 
1. The opening statements and closing arguments of counsel. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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11. The conference on requested instructions, the objections of the 
parties to the instructions, and the District Court's rulings thereon. 
iii. The oral presentation by the court of written instructions given to 
the jury and reported by the reporter. 
6. In addition to the standard documents included in the clerk's record under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28, Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record: 
A. The District Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed 
February 12,2009. 
B. Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine filed April 9, 2009; 
C. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in 
Limine filed April 9, 2009; 
D. Appellants' Affidavit and evidence filed in Support of Plaintiff Knipe 
Land Company's Motion in Limine on April 9, 2009; 
E. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine, 
their supporting Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Richard A. Robertson, dated May 7, 
2009; 
F. Appellants' Reply in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion 
in Limine dated May 13,2009; 
O. Appellants' Motion in Limine, supporting Memorandum oflaw, and 
supporting Affidavit of counsel, filed on June 18, 2009. 
H. Respondents' Memorandum of law and Affidavit, filed on or about June 
19,2009, opposing Appellants' June 18,2009 Motion in Limine. 
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I. Appellants' requested opening and closing Jury Instructions. 
J. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's Trial Brief dated June 15,2009; 
K. Plaintiff and Defendants' Stipulation of Facts dated June 16, 2009; 
L. Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New 
Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated July 20, 
2009; 
M. Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, dated July 20, 2009; 
N. Respondents' response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New 
Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated August 14, 
2009; 
O. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to 
Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, and Supplemental Affidavit of counsel, dated August 19, 2009; 
P. Respondents' Motion for Costs and Fees and to supporting Affidavits of 
counsel, filed on or about July 15,2009; and 
Q. Appellants' Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 
on or about July 29,2009. 
7. Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered were 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
A. Trial Exhibit Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17,20,21,22,23,25,26,28, 
29,30,31,32,34,38,43, Q, R, T, and U. 
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8. I certify; 
A. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter, 
Denece Graham, at the address set forth in the Certificate of Service attached; 
B. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
C. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record of$100.00 has 
been paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost; 
D. That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid; 
E. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED: September30, 2009. 
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STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on September~, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
OF APPEAL on the following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
Robert T. Wetherell 
[t.-]Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
[0Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery P. O. Box 1009 
Boise,ID 83701-1009 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Email: rtw@brassey.net 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Denece Graham, C.S.R. 
1675 E. 9th Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
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Boise-223363.3 0010908- 00008 
[ ] Via Email 
[vr-Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY <gr-Pi~;~'~ DFlE~EN __ ,. 
""'--- , Deputy 
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Knipe Land Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
Vs. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Payette County Case No. 
CV-2008-00682 
Supreme Court # 
--------
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Vs. 
John Knipe, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable 
Stephen W. Drescher, presiding. 
Case Number from Court: District Court: CV-2008-00682. 
Order or Judgment appealed from: COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE, on April 9, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE, on June 18, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT on June 25, 2009. JURY'S VERDICT 
on June 25, 2009. COURT'S ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS on 
September 17, 2009. JUDGMENT on September 30, 2009. 
Attorney for Appellant: Mark Geston attorney of record for Knipe 
Land Company and John Knipe. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 -
Attorney for Respondents: Dereck Pica and Robert Wetherell 
attorney(s) of record for Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. 
Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
Appealed by: Plaintiff 
Appealed Against: Defendant 
Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009 
Amended Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: 
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes, October 1, 2009, $101.00. 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record 
filed: 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional 
Reporter's Transcript filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated number of pages: no estimate in file. Appellant did 
not pay the estimated cost of reporter's transcript of $200.00 to 
the clerk. 
If so name of reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as 
named below at the address below: Denece Graham 
DATE: 
Official Court Reporter 
1675 E. 9~ Street 
Weiser ID 83672 
October 2, 2009 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
By~~~~~~=--. ____ _ Cl.erk -
:;)tate of Idaho 
County of Payette 55 
I hereby certify that the foregoing 
instrument is a true and correct copy of the 
origin JI on file in this office. 
02~ed / () " i'~ 0 1 
BETT' J. DRESSEN 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 - O':crK ( :, 'i!le DisTrict Court and 
Ex-otfi, '0 Au itor nd Recorder 
8y~~~~~ ______________ Depu~ 
ULI-CI-cUUY~WEO) 13:29 Bras WetherelL et a1. 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson. IS:a No. 7008 
BUSSEY, WETHERELL &. eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 8370l-10m) 
Telephone: (20S) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7071 
email: rhY.®]my;sC..l.net 
Attorneys for DefcndantsIR.espondents/ 
Cross-Appellants 
(FAX) P.002l005 
FILED 
THIRD JW.JlCIAL DlSTRlCT COURT I 
~ CAu.'1t'!, kl.I<ho I 
OCT 2 12009 
___ A.M P.M. 
8€T.TY J. DRi~ 
By ,Oepu 
IN T.I.I£ DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JT.1DICIAL DIST.RlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAliO, .IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE· 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho 
corporation 
VS. 
PlaintifflCounterdefendantl Appellant! 
Cross-Respondent, 
RICHARD A. RO:aSRTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS. 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
DefendnntslCounterclaimantsl 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants. 
RlCliARO A. ROBERTSON and 
JO.HNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaint.i1fsIRespondentsl 
Cross-Appellants, 
NonCE Or CROSS.APPEAL .1 
Case No. CV 2008·682 
NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL 
Bras y, WetherelL et al. (FRX)2083447077 P. 003/005 
VB. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant! Appellant! 
Cross-Respondent. 
TO: TBEABOVE-N.AMED CROSS.RESPONDENTS.,KNlPELAND COMPANY 
AND JOBNKNIPE AND TBE PARTJES'ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Cross-Appellants, Richard A R.obertson, Johnnie L. Robertson aod 
Robertson KennelSt Inr;'7 bereby cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against Plaintiffl 
Counterdcfeodant!Appellant Knipe Land Company and Third.Party Defendant/Appellant John 
Knipe, trom the following decisions and Order entered in the above-referenced action, theHonomble 
Stephen W. Drescher presiding: Order on Post-trial Motions dated September 14, 2009. 
2. Cross-Appellants have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Order described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and. pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
11(a)(1), 
3. CrOSS-Appellants provide the following pretiminmy statement on appeal which the 
Cross .. Appellants intend to assert in the appeal. This prcliminary stateolent, however, provides only 
preliminary issues, and shall in no way prevent the Cross-Appellant 110m asserting other issues on 
appeal. Theprcliminaryissuo on cross .. appenl is: Did the district court err in not granting restitution 
and/or a constructive trust: or other rem edi cs under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which would 
NOT1C£ Or CROSS.A.PPJ;.AJ.. ·2 
ULI-cl-cUUY(WEO) 13:29 Bras ,Wetherel L et a!. (FAX) 3447077 P. 00111005 
have required Cross-Respondents to rcturn the $22,500 to Cross-Appellants that was placed as an. 
advance on the Cross-R.espondents' commission. I 
4. No additional reporter tnmscript is requested, as it was requested previously in the 
original appeal. 
s. Cross-Appellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the 
Clerk's record as they were previously designated in the original appca1. 
o. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as ~hibits arc requested in this 
Cross-Appeal as they were requested in the original appeal. 
7. 1 certify: 
~ That a copy of tlUs Notice of Cross-Appeal. bas been served on the court 
reporter, Denise Clniliam, at the address set forth in the certificate of serviee attached; 
b. That .DO additional fees arc ncccssuy as no additional doeuments ba.ve been 
requested; 
e. '!hat service has been 'made upon an parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2009. 
BRASS:SY, 'WETHERELL.· eRA WFORD, LLP 
; 
.' 
I To the ~nt: that rcmitution and/or il constructive trust is not approprlnte, the Coun; should grnnt punitive 
damages to deter Crass-R.c:spoudc:nU4 .from c:nguginB in futW'l; 'imilar .pm~i/;C$, 
NOTIC! OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
UL I-C 1-c:uu'HWEO) J 3: 29 Bras ,Wetherell, et al. (FAX) 3447077 P.005/005 
cxRTDnCATEQFSERVTCE 
. , 
T HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,,6/ day of October, 2009, I served a true and correct: 
copy of the foregOing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by 
t11c method and to the addresses indicatcc1 below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rivest LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idabo 83702 
Derek Pica 
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Oenise Graham 
lo7S:E. 9th Street 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
NOTIce OF CROSS .. APPJ;.AL. • 4 
_ U.S. Mail, postageprcpaid 
Hand-Delivered 
_ ~vcmigbt Mail 
~Pacsi:mile 389·9040 
_ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
_ .ffiemight Mail 
y Facsimile 336-4980 
-
J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
O,vcmight Mail 
:Facsimile 
FILED 
THiRD J{.!5ICl,<\L DISTRICT COUHT 
Pe.l'~~C .. um'y, !d!l).hc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
*************** 
Knipe Land Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
Vs. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
AMENDED 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Payette County Case No. 
CV-2008-00682 
Supreme Court #37002-2009 
that the foregoing 
, Deputy 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
u't is a true and correct copy of the 
'" or! fiie in this office. 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Vs. 
John Knipe, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable 
Stephen W. Drescher, presiding. 
Case Number .from Court: District Court: CV-2008-00682. 
Order or Judgment appealed from: COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE, on April 9, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE, on June 18, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT on June 25, 2009. JURY'S VERDICT 
on June 25, 2009. COURT'S ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS on 
September 17, 2009. JUDGMENT on September 30, 2009. 
Attorney for Appellant: Mark Geston attorney of record for Knipe 
Land Company and John Knipe. 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 -
Attorney for Respondents: Dereck Pica and Robert Wetherell 
attorney(s) of record for Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. 
Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
Appealed by: Plaintiff 
Appealed Against: Defendant 
Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009 
Amended Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: October 21, 2009, filed by Attorney 
for the Respondent, Robert Wetherell. 
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes, October 1, 2009, $101.00. 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record 
filed: 
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional 
Reporter's Transcript filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated number of pages: no estimate in file. Appellant did 
not pay the estimated cost of reporter's transcript of $200.00 to 
the clerk. Fee was paid on October 6, 2009. 
If so name of reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as 
named below at the address below: Denece Graham 
DATE: 
Official Court Reporter 
1675 E. 9~ street 
Weiser ID 83672 
October 22, 2009 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 -
". Dec.?3 2009 3: 54PM LASERJET 3330 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, \VETHERBLL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Derek A. Pica, 1SB No. 3559 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capital Blvd, 8te. 302 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Attorneys for DefendantslRespondentsl 
Cross-Appellants 
FILED 
THiRD JUOfCW. DISTRICT COURT 
Payette County, Id$bo 
DEC2a _ 
___ A.M . P.M. 
BETTY J. DRESSEN 
By 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY~ an Idaho 
corporation 
VS. 
Plaintif:t7Counterdefendantl Appellant! 
Cross-Respondent, 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants/Counterclaimantsl 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
A.\1ENDED NOTICE OF 
CROSS-APPEAL 
"Dec'23 2009 3:54PM LASERJET 3330 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
We., an Idaho Corporation 
vs. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs/Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants, 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant! Appellant! 
Cross-Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, KNIPE LAND COMPANY 
AND JOHN KNIPE AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS OF RECORD; AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Cross-Appellants, Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. Robertson and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc., hereby cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against Plaintiff! 
CounterdefendantiAppellant Knipe Land Company and Third-Party DefendantJAppellant John 
Knipe, from the following decisions and Order,! entered in the above-referenced action, the 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding: Order on Post-trial Motions dated September 14, 2009 
and Order on Motions for Summary Jud2ment dated Febmary 12, 2009. 
2. Cross-Appellants have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Order described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
l1(a)(t). 
3. Cross-Appellants provide the following preliminary statement on appea1 which the 
Cross-Appellants intend to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, provides only 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2 
p.3 
,.uec.~3 2009 3:54PM LASERJET 3330 
preliminary issues, and shall in no way prevent the Cross-Appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal. The preliminary issue on cross-appeal is: Did the district court en- in not granting restitution 
and/or a constructive trustor otherremedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which would 
have required Cross-Respondents to return the $22,500 to Cross-Appellants that was placed as an 
advance on the Cross-Respondents' commission. 1 An additional issue on Cross-Appeal is: Did 
the district court err by failing to declare that the contracts in this matter were unenforceable 
under the Ellsworth Dobbs doctrine and the associated cases and prineiples, and therefore the 
district court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for Summarv Judwent. 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants recoWIize that it may not be necessary to raise this 
latter issue in the cross-appeal under Idaho AppeUateRules Il(&) and 35(b)(41 but nonetbeless 
raise this issne in the Cross-Appeal to ensure that the issue is preserved on appeal. 
4. No additional reporter transcript is requested. as it was requested previously in the 
original appeal_ 
5. Cross:-Appellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the 
Clerk's record as they were previously designated in the original appeal. 
6. ~o additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are requested in this 
Cross~Appeal as they were requested in the original appeal. 
7. r celtify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been served on the court 
reporter, Denise Graham, at the address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
1 To the extent that restitution and/or a constructive trust is not appropriate, the Comi should grant punitive 
damages to deter Cross-Respondents from engaging in future similar practices. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL - 3 
p.4 
, • Dec' .23 2009 3: 54PM LASERJET 3330 
b. That no additional fees are necessary as no additional documents have been 
requested; 
c. That service has been made upon an parties required to be served pUrSllil.llt 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this __ day of December. 2009. 
BRt\SSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4 
T. Wetherell. of the finn 
ttomeys for Cross-Appellants 
p.5 
· ., Dec' .23 2009 3: 54PM LASERJET 3330 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CJ'~(~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _(A_.:J_ day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by 
the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Derek Pica 
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Denise Graham 
1675 E. 9th Street 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL - 5 
u. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 389-9040 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 336-4980 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
Knipe Land Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
Vs. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Payette County Case No. 
CV-2008-00682 
Supreme Court #37002-2009 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Vs. 
John Knipe, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant/Appellant. 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that the following is a 
list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been 
lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
Jury Trial June 23 , 2009 
Plaintiff1s Trial Exhibits: 
Exh.No. 
1 
2 
Description 
Map of Little Willow 
Creek Property 
Map of Defendant's 
real property 
Certificate of Exhibits - 1 
Marked Admitted Retained by Clerk 
x x 
x x 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
20 
21 
22 
Legal description of X 
Defendant's real property 
Employment contract X 
Records of Payette County X 
Recorder for Tax parcels 
#7784, 2400, 2401, 2402, 
2404, 2457, 2458, and 7777 
Purchase and sale agreement X 
- Harmon 
Harmon purchase agreement X 
- Addendum 1 
Harmon purchase agreement X 
- Addenda 2 and 3 ($25,000) 
RE 11 - Addendum 7 ($10,000) X 
Email from Robertson to 
Strain re extension to 
Harmon contract 
Notice to terminate 
contract (Harmon) 
Letter with Little Willow 
Ranch brochure 
X 
X 
X 
Email from Robertson to X 
Strain - list the whole ranch 
Employment contract X 
(Robertson Kennels, Inc property) 
Maps of defendant's 
real property 
X 
Marketing information X 
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed 
by defendant Richard Robertson 
Marketing information X 
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed 
by defendant Richard Robertson 
Certificate of Exhibits - 2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
23 
25 
26 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
34 
38 
43 
Marketing information X X 
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed 
by defendant Richard Robertson 
Employment contract X X 
renewals for defendant's real property 
Agreement to sell and X X 
purchase 
Instructions to escrow - X X 
First American Title Co ($75,000/ $75,000) 
Agreement to sell and X X 
purchase - Kennel Ranch 
Agreement to sell and X X 
purchase - Robertson residence 
Agreement to sell and X X 
purchase - Little Willow Ranch 
X X Instructions to escrow -
First American Title Co. ($75,000/$75,000) 
Instructions to escrow - X X 
First American Title Co ($75,000/$75,000) 
Termination Letter X X 
Defendants Richard and X X 
Johnnie Robertson's 2007 tax returns - page 11 only 
Defendant's Trial Exhibits: 
A 
N 
o 
Q 
2005 employment contract X 
Rowena Strain facsimile X 
stating Richard will extend closing 
with non-refundable earnest money 
Harmon extension agreement 
dated February 15, 2006 
Check from Silverhawk 
Realty to Knipe ($10,000) 
Certificate of Exhibits - 3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
R 
T 
u 
v 
KK 
MM 
PP 
QQ 
RR 
TT 
Check from Knipe to 
Robertson ($25,000) 
Check from Silverhawk 
Realty to Knipe ($10,000) 
x 
x 
Check from Knipe to Robertson X 
($10,000) 
Notice to terminate contract X 
and release of earnest money 
Email from Knipe to Robertson X 
dated September 26, 2007 regarding 
non-forfeited earnest money 
Emails between Knipe X 
and Strain dated October 5, 2007 
regarding earnest money 
x 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Email from Richard to Rowena X X 
dated February 11, 2008 regarding $22,500 
Emails between Knipe and X 
Strain regarding telling Robertson of 
claim to earnest monies and extension 
X 
Letter from Knipe to Robertson X X 
regarding earnest money dated February 19, 2008 
Knipe's notes to himself X X 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the seal 0 the said Court at Payette, Idaho, this 
3 da y 0 f Yl r 2 010 . 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
Certificate of Exhibits - 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
Knipe Land Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
Vs. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Payette County Case No. 
CV-2008-00682 
Supreme Court #37002-2009 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Vs. 
John Knipe, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant/Appellant. 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third JUdicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of 
the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the 
parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
MARK GESTON 
101 S. Capitol Blvd Ste 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for: 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
ROBERT WETHERELL 
203 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for: 
Respondent/Defendant 
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date 
of service of the appeal record to file any objections, together 
with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no 
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be 
filed with the Supreme Court. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-l 
If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will 
serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon 
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating 
which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed 
in seven (7) days, I will serve the party whose name appears 
first in the case title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this {3 day of 
____ ~ b (vt My , 2 0 ---12- . 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY~~ Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
Knipe Land Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
Vs. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie 
L. Robertson, husband and wife; 
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Vs. 
John Knipe, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant/Appellant. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Payette County Case No. 
CV-2008-00682 
Supreme Court #37002-2009 
I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Payette do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause will be 
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the 
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE -1 
I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits 
identified in the Reporter's Transcript, the following will be 
submitted as a confidential exhibit to the Record on Appeal: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~ day of 
,Awc", ~f ' 20 JCL.. . 
Betty J. Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
BYf~ Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE -~ 
